Fault tolerant architectures for integrated aircraft electronics systems

Work into possible architectures for future flight control computer systems is described. Ada for Fault-Tolerant Systems, the NETS Network Error-Tolerant System architecture, and voting in asynchronous systems are covered

Simulating Wde-area Replication

We describe our experiences with simulating replication algorithms for use in far flung distributed systems. The algorithms under scrutiny mimic epidemics. Epidemic algorithms seem to scale and adapt to change (such as varying replica sets) well. The loose consistency guarantees they make seem more useful in applications where availability strongly outweighs correctness; e.g., distributed name service

Fault tolerant architectures for integrated aircraft electronics systems, task 2

The architectural basis for an advanced fault tolerant on-board computer to succeed the current generation of fault tolerant computers is examined. The network error tolerant system architecture is studied with particular attention to intercluster configurations and communication protocols, and to refined reliability estimates. The diagnosis of faults, so that appropriate choices for reconfiguration can be made is discussed. The analysis relates particularly to the recognition of transient faults in a system with tasks at many levels of priority. The demand driven data-flow architecture, which appears to have possible application in fault tolerant systems is described and work investigating the feasibility of automatic generation of aircraft flight control programs from abstract specifications is reported

Analysis of operating system diversity for intrusion tolerance

One of the key benefits of using intrusion-tolerant systems is the possibility of ensuring correct behavior in the presence of attacks and intrusions. These security gains are directly dependent on the components exhibiting failure diversity. To what extent failure diversity is observed in practical deployment depends on how diverse are the components that constitute the system. In this paper, we present a study with operating system's (OS's) vulnerability data from the NIST National Vulnerability Database (NVD). We have analyzed the vulnerabilities of 11 different OSs over a period of 18 years, to check how many of these vulnerabilities occur in more than one OS. We found this number to be low for several combinations of OSs. Hence, although there are a few caveats on the use of NVD data to support definitive conclusions, our analysis shows that by selecting appropriate OSs, one can preclude (or reduce substantially) common vulnerabilities from occurring in the replicas of the intrusion-tolerant system