233 research outputs found
A Byzantine Fault-Tolerant Ordering Service for the Hyperledger Fabric Blockchain Platform
Hyperledger Fabric (HLF) is a flexible permissioned blockchain platform
designed for business applications beyond the basic digital coin addressed by
Bitcoin and other existing networks. A key property of HLF is its
extensibility, and in particular the support for multiple ordering services for
building the blockchain. Nonetheless, the version 1.0 was launched in early
2017 without an implementation of a Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) ordering
service. To overcome this limitation, we designed, implemented, and evaluated a
BFT ordering service for HLF on top of the BFT-SMaRt state machine
replication/consensus library, implementing also optimizations for wide-area
deployment. Our results show that HLF with our ordering service can achieve up
to ten thousand transactions per second and write a transaction irrevocably in
the blockchain in half a second, even with peers spread in different
continents
OS diversity for intrusion tolerance: Myth or reality?
One of the key benefits of using intrusion-tolerant systems is the possibility of ensuring correct behavior in the presence of attacks and intrusions. These security gains are directly dependent on the components exhibiting failure diversity. To what extent failure diversity is observed in practical deployment depends on how diverse are the components that constitute the system. In this paper we present a study with operating systems (OS) vulnerability data from the NIST National Vulnerability Database. We have analyzed the vulnerabilities of 11 different OSes over a period of roughly 15 years, to check how many of these vulnerabilities occur in more than one OS. We found this number to be low for several combinations of OSes. Hence, our analysis provides a strong indication that building a system with diverse OSes may be a useful technique to improve its intrusion tolerance capabilities
Brief Announcement: Auditable Register Emulations
We initiate the study of auditable storage emulations, which provide the capability for an auditor to report the previously executed reads in a register. We define the notion of auditable register and its properties, and establish tight bounds and impossibility results for auditable storage emulations in the presence of faulty base storage objects. Our formulation considers registers that securely store data using information dispersal (each base object stores only a block of the written value) and supporting fast reads (that complete in one communication round-trip). In such a scenario, given a maximum number f of faulty storage objects and a minimum number ? of data blocks required to recover a stored value, we prove that (R1) auditability is impossible if ? ? 2f; (R2) implementing a weak form of auditability requires ? ? 3f+1; and (R3) a stronger form of auditability is impossible. We also show that (R4) signing read requests generically overcomes the lower bound of weak auditability, while (R5 and R6) totally ordering operations or using non-fast reads enables strong auditability. These results establish that practical storage emulations need f to 2f additional objects compared to their original lower bounds to support auditability
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Enhancing Fault / Intrusion Tolerance through Design and Configuration Diversity
Fault/intrusion tolerance is usually the only viable way of improving the system dependability and security in the presence of continuously evolving threats. Many of the solutions in the literature concern a specific snapshot in the production or deployment of a fault-tolerant system and no immediate considerations are made about how the system should evolve to deal with novel threats. In this paper we outline and evaluate a set of operating systems’ and applications’ reconfiguration rules which can be used to modify the state of a system replica prior to deployment or in between recoveries, and hence increase the replicas chance of a longer intrusion-free operation
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