A note on games corresponding to sequencing situations with due dates

convex cooperative games;one-machine sequencing situations;due dates;ready times

On the Balancedness of M-Sequencing Games

This paper studies m-sequencing games that arise from sequencing situations with m parallel and identical machines. These m-sequencing games, which involve n players, give rise to m-machine games, which involve m players. Here, n corresponds to the number of jobs in an m-sequencing situation, and m corresponds to the number of machines in the same m-sequencing situation. We prove that an m-sequening game is balanced if and only if the corresponding m-machine game is balanced. Furthermore, it is shown that m-sequencing games are balanced ifm 2 f1;2g. Finally, ifm 3, balancedness is established for two special classes of m-sequencing games.cooperative games;sequencing situations

Job Scheduling, Cooperation and Control

This paper considers one machine job scheduling situations or sequencing problems, where clients can have more than a single job to be processed in order to get a final output.Moreover, a job can be of interest for different players. This means that one of the main assumptions in classic sequencing problems is dropped: the one to one correspondence between clients and jobs.It is shown that the corresponding cooperative games are balanced for specific types of cost criteria.scheduling;cooperation;game theory;cooperative games

Batch Sequencing and Cooperation

Game theoretic analysis of sequencing situations has been restricted to manufactur- ing systems which consist of machines that can process only one job at a time. However, in many manufacturing systems, operations are carried out by batch machines which can simultaneously process multiple jobs. This paper aims to extend the game theoretical approach to the cost allocation problems arising from sequencing situations on systems that consist of batch machines. We first consider sequencing situations with a single batch machine and analyze cooperative games arising from these situations. It is shown that these games are convex and an expression for the Shapley value of these games is provided. We also introduce an equal gain splitting rule for these sequencing situa- tions and provide an axiomatic characterization. Second, we analyze various aspects of flow-shop sequencing situations which consist of batch machines only. In particular, we provide two cases in which the cooperative game arising from the flow-shop sequencing situation is equal to the game arising from a sequencing situation that corresponds to one specific machine in the flow-shop.Sequencing situations;sequencing games;batch machines

On Games corresponding to Sequencing Situations with Precedence Relations

In this paper we study a class of cooperative sequencing games that arise from one-machine sequencing situations in which chain precedence relations are imposed on the jobs. It is shown that these sequencing games are convex.cooperative games, sequencing situations, convexity

On the Balancedness of Relaxed Sequencing Games

This paper shows that some classes of relaxed sequencing games, which arise from the class of sequencing games as introduced in Curiel, Pederzoli, Tijs (1989), are balanced.sequencing situations;sequencing games;balancedness;game theory

On the Convexity of Precedence Sequencing Games

In this paper we study a class of cooperative sequencing games that arise from one-machine sequencing situations in which chain precedence relations are imposed on the jobs.It is shown that these sequencing games are convex.cooperative games;sequencing games

Partitioning Sequencing Situations and Games

The research that studies the interaction between sequencing situations and cooperative games, that started with the paper of Curiel et al. (1989), has become an established line of research. This paper introduces a new model in this field: partitioning sequencing situations and games. The characteristic of partitioning sequencing situations is that the jobs arrive in batches, and those jobs that arrive in earlier batches have some privileges over jobs in later arrived batches. For partitioning sequencing situations we introduce and characterise the partitioning equal gain splitting rule. Next, we define cooperative games that arise from these partitioning sequencing situations. It is shown that these games are convex. Moreover, we present a game independent expression for the Shapley value. Finally, it is shown that the partitioning equal gain splitting rule can be used to generate a core allocation and can be viewed as the average of two specific marginal vectors.Sequencing situations;sequencing games