Greed Works -- Online Algorithms For Unrelated Machine Stochastic Scheduling

This paper establishes performance guarantees for online algorithms that schedule stochastic, nonpreemptive jobs on unrelated machines to minimize the expected total weighted completion time. Prior work on unrelated machine scheduling with stochastic jobs was restricted to the offline case, and required linear or convex programming relaxations for the assignment of jobs to machines. The algorithms introduced in this paper are purely combinatorial. The performance bounds are of the same order of magnitude as those of earlier work, and depend linearly on an upper bound on the squared coefficient of variation of the jobs' processing times. Specifically for deterministic processing times, without and with release times, the competitive ratios are 4 and 7.216, respectively. As to the technical contribution, the paper shows how dual fitting techniques can be used for stochastic and nonpreemptive scheduling problems.Comment: Preliminary version appeared in IPCO 201

Minimizing Maximum Flow Time on Related Machines via Dynamic Posted Pricing

We consider a setting where selfish agents want to schedule jobs on related machines. The agent submitting a job picks a server that minimizes a linear combination of the server price and the resulting response time for that job on the selected server. The manager\u27s task is to maintain server prices to (approximately) optimize the maximum response time, which is a measure of social good. We show that the existence of a pricing scheme with certain competitiveness is equivalent to the existence of a monotone immediate-dispatch algorithm. Our main result is a monotone immediate-dispatch algorithm that is O(1)-competitive with respect to the maximum response time

Programming your way out of the past: ISIS and the META Project

The ISIS distributed programming system and the META Project are described. The ISIS programming toolkit is an aid to low-level programming that makes it easy to build fault-tolerant distributed applications that exploit replication and concurrent execution. The META Project is reexamining high-level mechanisms such as the filesystem, shell language, and administration tools in distributed systems

Scheduling Games with Machine-Dependent Priority Lists

We consider a scheduling game in which jobs try to minimize their completion time by choosing a machine to be processed on. Each machine uses an individual priority list to decide on the order according to which the jobs on the machine are processed. We characterize four classes of instances in which a pure Nash equilibrium (NE) is guaranteed to exist, and show, by means of an example, that none of these characterizations can be relaxed. We then bound the performance of Nash equilibria for each of these classes with respect to the makespan of the schedule and the sum of completion times. We also analyze the computational complexity of several problems arising in this model. For instance, we prove that it is NP-hard to decide whether a NE exists, and that even for instances with identical machines, for which a NE is guaranteed to exist, it is NP-hard to approximate the best NE within a factor of $2-\frac{1}{m}-\epsilon$ for all $\epsilon>0$. In addition, we study a generalized model in which players' strategies are subsets of resources, each having its own priority list over the players. We show that in this general model, even unweighted symmetric games may not have a pure NE, and we bound the price of anarchy with respect to the total players' costs.Comment: 19 pages, 2 figure

Resource-Aware Cost-Sharing Mechanisms with Priors

In a decentralized system with $m$ machines, we study the selfish scheduling problem where each user strategically chooses which machine to use. Each machine incurs a cost, which is a function of the total load assigned to it, and some cost-sharing mechanism distributes this cost among the machine's users. The users choose a machine aiming to minimize their own share of the cost, so the cost-sharing mechanism induces a game among them. We approach this problem from the perspective of a designer who can select which cost-sharing mechanism to use, aiming to minimize the price of anarchy (PoA) of the induced games. Recent work introduced the class of \emph{resource-aware} cost-sharing mechanisms, whose decisions can depend on the set of machines in the system, but are oblivious to the total number of users. These mechanisms can guarantee low PoA bounds for instances where the cost functions of the machines are all convex or concave, but can suffer from very high PoA for cost functions that deviate from these families. In this paper we show that if we enhance the class of resource-aware mechanisms with some prior information regarding the users, then they can achieve low PoA for a much more general family of cost functions. We first show that, as long as the mechanism knows just two of the participating users, then it can assign special roles to them and ensure a constant PoA. We then extend this idea to settings where the mechanism has access to the probability with which each user is present in the system. For all these instances, we provide a mechanism that achieves an expected PoA that is logarithmic in the expected number of users

Cost-Sharing Methods for Scheduling Games under Uncertainty

We study the performance of cost-sharing protocols in a selfish scheduling setting with load-dependent cost functions. Previous work on selfish scheduling protocols has focused on two extreme models: omnipotent protocols that are aware of every machine and every job that is active at any given time, and oblivious protocols that are aware of nothing beyond the machine they control. The main focus of this paper is on a well-motivated middle-ground model of resource-aware protocols, which are aware of the set of machines that the system comprises, but unaware of what jobs are active at any given time. Apart from considering budget-balanced protocols, to which previous work was restricted, we augment the design space by also studying the extent to which overcharging can lead to improved performance. We first show that, in the omnipotent model, overcharging enables us to enforce the optimal outcome as the unique equilibrium, which largely improves over the Θ(log n)-approximation of social welfare that can be obtained by budget-balanced protocols, even in their best equilibrium. We then transition to the resource-aware model and provide price of anarchy (PoA) upper and lower bounds for different classes of cost functions. For concave cost functions, we provide a protocol with PoA of 1+ε for arbitrarily small ε0. When the cost functions can be both convex and concave we construct an overcharging protocol that yields PoA ≤ 2; a spectacular improvement over the bounds obtained for budget-balanced protocols, even in the omnipotent model. We complement our positive results with impossibility results for general increasing cost functions. We show that any resource-aware budget-balanced cost-sharing protocol has PoA of Θ(n) in this setting and, even if we use overcharging, no resource-aware protocol can achieve a PoA of o(√n)

Resource-Aware Protocols for Network Cost-Sharing Games

We study the extent to which decentralized cost-sharing protocols can achieve good price of anarchy (PoA) bounds in network cost-sharing games with $n$ agents. We focus on the model of resource-aware protocols, where the designer has prior access to the network structure and can also increase the total cost of an edge(overcharging), and we study classes of games with concave or convex cost functions. We first consider concave cost functions and our main result is a cost-sharing protocol for symmetric games on directed acyclic graphs that achieves a PoA of $2+\varepsilon$ for some arbitrary small positive $\varepsilon$, which improves to $1+\varepsilon$ for games with at least two players. We also achieve a PoA of 1 for series-parallel graphs and show that no protocol can achieve a PoA better than $\Omega(\sqrt{n})$ for multicast games. We then also consider convex cost functions and prove analogous results for series-parallel networks and multicast games, as well as a lower bound of $\Omega(n)$ for the PoA on directed acyclic graphs without the use of overcharging

Mobile edge computing assisted green scheduling of on-move electric vehicles

Mobile edge computing (MEC) has been proposed as a promising solution, which enables the content processing at the edges of the network helping to significantly improve the quality of experience (QoE) of end users. In this article, we aim to utilize the MEC facilities integrated with time-varying renewable energy resources for charging/discharging scheduling known as green scheduling of on-move electric vehicles (EVs) in a geographical wide area comprising of multiple charging stations (CSs). In the proposed system, the charging/discharging demands and the contextual information of EVs are first transmitted to nearby edge servers. With instantaneous electricity load/pricing and the availability of renewable energy at nearby CSs collected by aggregators, a weighted social-welfare maximization problem is then solved at the edges using greedy-based algorithms to choose the best CS for the EV’s service. From the system point of view, our results reveal that compared to cloud-based scheme, the proposed MEC-assisted EVs scheduling system significantly improves the complexity burden, boosts the satisfaction (QoE) of EVs’ drivers by localizing the traffic at nearby CSs, and further helps to efficiently utilize the renewable energy across CSs. Furthermore, our greedy-based algorithm, which utilizes the internal updating heuristics, outperforms some baseline solutions in terms of social welfare and power grid ancillary services

Serial-batch scheduling – the special case of laser-cutting machines

The dissertation deals with a problem in the field of short-term production planning, namely the scheduling of laser-cutting machines. The object of decision is the grouping of production orders (batching) and the sequencing of these order groups on one or more machines (scheduling). This problem is also known in the literature as "batch scheduling problem" and belongs to the class of combinatorial optimization problems due to the interdependencies between the batching and the scheduling decisions. The concepts and methods used are mainly from production planning, operations research and machine learning