I’m not the person I used to be: The self and autobiographical memories of immoral actions

People maintain a positive identity in at least two ways: They evaluate themselves more favorably than other people, and they judge themselves to be better now than they were in the past. Both strategies rely on autobiographical memories. The authors investigate the role of autobiographical memories of lying and emotional harm in maintaining a positive identity. For memories of lying to or emotionally harming others, participants judge their own actions as less morally wrong and less negative than those in which other people lied to or emotionally harmed them. Furthermore, people judge those actions that happened further in the past to be more morally wrong than those that happened more recently. Finally, for periods of the past when they believed that they were very different people than they are now, participants judge their actions to be more morally wrong and more negative than those actions from periods of their pasts when they believed that they were very similar to who they are now. The authors discuss these findings in relation to theories about the function of autobiographical memory and moral cognition in constructing and perceiving the self over time

The 'not-so-strange' body in the mirror: : A principal components analysis of direct and mirror self-observation

This document is the Accepted Manuscript version of the following article: Paul M. Jenkinson, and Catherine Preston, ‘The “not-so-strange” body in the mirror: A principal components analysis of direct and mirror self-observation’, Consciousness and Cognition, Vol. 48, pp. 262-272, first published online 4 January 2017, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2016.12.007 This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.In this study we adopted a psychometric approach to examine how the body is subjectively experienced in a mirror. One hundred and twenty-four healthy participants viewed their body for five minutes directly or via a mirror, and then completed a 20-item questionnaire designed to capture subjective experiences of the body. PCA revealed a two-component structure for both direct and mirror conditions, comprising body evaluations (and alienation) and unusual feelings and perceptions. The relationship between these components and pre-existing tendencies for appearance anxiety, body dysmorphic-type beliefs, dissociative symptomatology, self-objectification and delusion ideation further supported the similarity between direct and mirror conditions; however, the occurrence of strange experiences like those reported to occur during prolonged face viewing was not confirmed. These results suggest that, despite obvious differences in visual feedback, observing the body via a mirror (as an outside observer) is subjectively equivalent to observing the body directly (from our own viewpoint).Peer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio

The Psycho-neurology of Embodiment with Examples from Authentic Movement and Laban Movement Analysis

This document is the Accepted Manuscript version of the following article: Helen Payne, 'The Psycho-neurology of Embodiment with Examples from Authentic Movement and Laban Movement Analysis', American Journal of Dance Therapy, June 2017. Under embargo. Embargo end date: 7 June 2018. The final publication is available at Springer via https://doi.org/10.1007/s10465-017-9256-2.There is widespread agreement that thought is embodied cognition and that our earliest learning is implicit, through the body, and nonverbal expression. This article advances the proposition that the integration of thought and emotion is felt through the body. Embodiment and embodied simulation (ES) (Gallese in Neuropsychoanalysis 13(2):196–200, 2011) represent controversial topics in both the philosophy of mind (Clark in Being there: Putting brain, body, and world together again, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1998) and cognitive neuroscience (Gallagher in Cognitive Syst Res 34–35:35–43, 2015a; Gallagher in Conscious Cogn 36:452–465, 2015b; Gallese & Sinigaglia in J Conscious Stud 18(7–8):117–143, 2011a; Gallese in Philos Trans R Soc B 369(1644):20130177, 2014). As a result of advances in these areas of research, there is a need to re-conceptualize our understanding of the mechanisms and processes involved in dance movement psychotherapy. Could ES be applied to the psychology of movement? This article attempts to apply this theory of embodiment to the practice of Authentic Movement (AM) and Laban Movement Analysis. The theory of ES is proposed as one possible explanation of how the witness in AM comes to know her inner experience in the presence of a mover, which may lead to an “offering” to that mover from the witness’ conscious body (Adler in Offering from the conscious body: The discipline of Authentic Movement, Inner Traditions, Rochester, VT, 2002). Furthermore, there is an examination of how ES connects to the task of movement observation and how meaning is arrived at from the various movement patterns observed.Peer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio

Embodied Precision : Intranasal Oxytocin Modulates Multisensory Integration

© 2018 Massachusetts Institute of Technology.Multisensory integration processes are fundamental to our sense of self as embodied beings. Bodily illusions, such as the rubber hand illusion (RHI) and the size-weight illusion (SWI), allow us to investigate how the brain resolves conflicting multisensory evidence during perceptual inference in relation to different facets of body representation. In the RHI, synchronous tactile stimulation of a participant's hidden hand and a visible rubber hand creates illusory body ownership; in the SWI, the perceived size of the body can modulate the estimated weight of external objects. According to Bayesian models, such illusions arise as an attempt to explain the causes of multisensory perception and may reflect the attenuation of somatosensory precision, which is required to resolve perceptual hypotheses about conflicting multisensory input. Recent hypotheses propose that the precision of sensorimotor representations is determined by modulators of synaptic gain, like dopamine, acetylcholine, and oxytocin. However, these neuromodulatory hypotheses have not been tested in the context of embodied multisensory integration. The present, double-blind, placebo-controlled, crossover study ( N = 41 healthy volunteers) aimed to investigate the effect of intranasal oxytocin (IN-OT) on multisensory integration processes, tested by means of the RHI and the SWI. Results showed that IN-OT enhanced the subjective feeling of ownership in the RHI, only when synchronous tactile stimulation was involved. Furthermore, IN-OT increased an embodied version of the SWI (quantified as estimation error during a weight estimation task). These findings suggest that oxytocin might modulate processes of visuotactile multisensory integration by increasing the precision of top-down signals against bottom-up sensory input.Peer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio

When Imagining Yourself in Pain, Visual Perspective Matters : The Neural and Behavioral Correlates of Simulated Sensory Experiences

© 2015 Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyPeer reviewedPublisher PD

Psychoanalysis and neurosciences: fuzzy outlines? Notes on the notion of cerebral plasticity

“Psychoanalysis versus psychiatry” and “unconscious versus brain” are classic oppositions between different perspectives on the human being and mental suffering. This article draws on certain elements of this discussion and reflects on how new ideas about the brain and biology favor closer interaction between psychoanalysis and the neurosciences. These questions are redefined through the notion of cerebral plasticity, by which the brain is open to interaction with the social environment and the influence of psychoanalytical therapy. Conceiving of the brain as a plastic organ allows for the possibility of interchange between psychoanalysis and the neurosciences.Fil: Mantilla, Maria Jimena. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. Instituto de Investigaciones ; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentin

Treating Psychopaths Fairly

Dietmar Hübner and Lucie White question the ethical justification of employing risky neurosurgical interventions to treat imprisoned psychopaths. They argue that (1) such interventions would confer no medical benefit on the psychopath as there is no “subjective suffering” involved in psychopathy and (2) psychopaths could not voluntarily consent to such procedures because they could have no “internal motivation” for doing so. In the course of their discussion, the authors insightfully show that certain aspects of the psychopath’s personality structure are especially relevant to assessing the ethics of risky treatment options. As I argue, however, the particular conclusions that the authors draw are too strong. A deeper look at the psychopathic profile casts doubt on (1) and (2). In some cases, psychopaths can be plausibly construed as experiencing subjective suffering on account of their disorder and as appropriately motivated to voluntarily consent to neurosurgical treatment. After arguing for this view, I suggest that the psychopath’s consent to neurosurgical intervention might nonetheless be problematic, as their emotional incapacities might preclude their abilities to adequately appreciate the relevant risks

The implosion of reality: schizophrenia, the anterior cingular cortex and anticipation

In contemporary neuroscientific and psychiatric research into schizophrenia, we can observe a shift in focus from the clinical dysfunctions (positive and negative symptoms) towards a mapping of the cognitive function. In this paper we look at a specific cognitive problem area in schizophrenic brain functioning, the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC). We show what the ACC is, what it probably does and how this is relevant in research concerning certain psychiatric disorders. Then we explain the role of the ACC in choice anticipation. In this we underline the possible link between choice anticipation and the lack of ‘Error Related Negativity’ (ERN) in this specific area. Lastly we incorporate this approach to the problem of schizophrenic anticipation within the neuropsychoanalytical framework and the role it might play in the formation of hallucinations and delusion