The Stores Model of Code Cognition

Program comprehension is perhaps one of the oldest topics within the psychology of programming. It addresses a central issue: how programmers work with and manipulate source code to construct effective software systems. Models can play an important role in understanding the challenges developers and engineers contend with. This paper presents a model of program comprehension, or code cognition, which has been derived from literature found within the disciplines of computing and psychology. Drawing on direct experimentation, this paper argues that a model of code cognition should take account of the visual, spatial and linguistic abilities of developers. The strengths and weaknesses of this model are discussed and further research directions presented

Hungarian Gyerekestül versus Gyerekkel (‘with [the] kid’)

The paper analyzes the various uses of the Hungarian -stUl (‘together with’, ‘along with’) sociative (associative) suffix (later in the paper referred to simply as “sociative”), as in the example gyerekestül. As opposed to its comitative-instrumental suffix -vAl (‘with’), the - stUl suffix cannot express instrumentality. The paper aims to demonstrate the difference in use between the comitative-instrumental -vAl and the -stUl suffix in contemporary Hungarian, and to illuminate the historical emergence of the suffix as well as its grammatical status. It is argued on the basis of Antal (1960) and Kiefer (2003) that -stUl cannot be analyzed as an inflectional case suffix (such as the -vAl suffix, or -ed, -ing, or the plural in English), but should rather be categorized as a derivational suffix (such as English dis-, re-, in-, -ance, - able, -ish, -like, etc.). The paper also tries to shed light on the hypothetical cognitive psychological distinction between the comitative and the sociative. It is suggested that the sociative is based on the amalgam image schema which is derived from the LINK schema of the comitative. The ironical reading of the sociative is an implicature in the sense of Grice (1989) and Sperber and Wilson (1987). Psycholinguistic experimentation is proposed to follow up on the mental representation of the sociative

What working memory is for

Glenberg focuses on conceptualizations that change from moment to moment, yet he dismisses the concept of working memory (sect. 4.3), which offers an account of temporary storage and on-line cognition. This commentary questions whether Glenberg's account adequately caters for observations of consistent data patterns in temporary storage of verbal and visuospatial information in healthy adults and in brain-damaged patients with deficits in temporary retention.</jats:p

Neuronal bases of structural coherence in contemporary dance observation

The neuronal processes underlying dance observation have been the focus of an increasing number of brain imaging studies over the past decade. However, the existing literature mainly dealt with effects of motor and visual expertise, whereas the neural and cognitive mechanisms that underlie the interpretation of dance choreographies remained unexplored. Hence, much attention has been given to the Action Observation Network (AON) whereas the role of other potentially relevant neuro-cognitive mechanisms such as mentalizing (theory of mind) or language (narrative comprehension) in dance understanding is yet to be elucidated. We report the results of an fMRI study where the structural coherence of short contemporary dance choreographies was manipulated parametrically using the same taped movement material. Our participants were all trained dancers. The whole-brain analysis argues that the interpretation of structurally coherent dance phrases involves a subpart (Superior Parietal) of the AON as well as mentalizing regions in the dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex. An ROI analysis based on a similar study using linguistic materials (Pallier et al. 2011) suggests that structural processing in language and dance might share certain neural mechanisms

The Linguistic Determination of Conscious Thought Contents

In this paper we address the question of what determines the content of our conscious episodes of thinking, considering recent claims that phenomenal character individuates thought contents. We present one prominent way for defenders of phenomenal intentionality to develop that view and then examine ‘sensory inner speech views’, which provide an alternative way of accounting for thought-content determinacy. We argue that such views fare well with inner speech thinking but have problems accounting for unsymbolized thinking. Within this dialectic, we present an account of the nature of unsymbolized thinking that accords with and can be seen as a continuation of the activity of inner speech, while offering a way of explaining thought-content determinacy in terms of linguistic structures and representation

Travel Planning Ability in Right Brain-Damaged Patients: Two Case Reports

Planning ability is fundamental for goal-directed spatial navigation. Preliminary findings from patients and healthy individuals suggest that travel planning (TP)—namely, navigational planning—can be considered a distinct process from visuospatial planning (VP) ability. To shed light on this distinction, two right brain-damaged patients without hemineglect were compared with a control group on two tasks aimed at testing VP (i.e., Tower of London-16, ToL-16) and TP (i.e., Minefield Task, MFT). The former requires planning the moves to reach the right configuration of three colored beads on three pegs, whereas the latter was opportunely developed to assess TP in the navigational environment when obstacles are present. Specifically, the MFT requires participants to plan a route on a large carpet avoiding some hidden obstacles previously observed. Patient 1 showed lesions encompassing the temporoparietal region and the insula; she performed poorer than the control group on the ToL-16 but showed no deficit on the MFT. Conversely, Patient 2 showed lesions mainly located in the occipitoparietal network of spatial navigation; she performed worse than the control group on the MFT but not on the ToL-16. In both cases performances satisfied the criteria for a classical dissociation, meeting criteria for a double dissociation. These results support the idea that TP is a distinct ability and that it is dissociated from VP skills

Switching modalities in a sentence verification task: ERP evidence for embodied language processing

In an event related potential (ERP) experiment using written language materials only, we investigated a potential modulation of the N400 by the modality switch effect. The modality switch effect occurs when a first sentence, describing a fact grounded in one modality, is followed by a second sentence describing a second fact grounded in a different modality. For example, "A cellar is dark" (visual), was preceded by either another visual property "Ham is pink" or by a tactile property "A mitten is soft." We also investigated whether the modality switch effect occurs for false sentences ("A cellar is light"). We found that, for true sentences, the ERP at the critical word "dark" elicited a significantly greater frontal, early N400-like effect (270370 ms) when there was a modality mismatch than when there was a modality-match. This pattern was not found for the critical word "light" in false sentences. Results similar to the frontal negativity were obtained in a late time window (500700 ms). The obtained ERP effect is similar to one previously obtained for pictures. We conclude that in this paradigm we obtained fast access to conceptual properties for modality-matched pairs, which leads to embodiment effects similar to those previously obtained with pictorial stimuli

Neural overlap of L1 and L2 semantic representations across visual and auditory modalities : a decoding approach/

This study investigated whether brain activity in Dutch-French bilinguals during semantic access to concepts from one language could be used to predict neural activation during access to the same concepts from another language, in different language modalities/tasks. This was tested using multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA), within and across language comprehension (word listening and word reading) and production (picture naming). It was possible to identify the picture or word named, read or heard in one language (e.g. maan, meaning moon) based on the brain activity in a distributed bilateral brain network while, respectively, naming, reading or listening to the picture or word in the other language (e.g. lune). The brain regions identified differed across tasks. During picture naming, brain activation in the occipital and temporal regions allowed concepts to be predicted across languages. During word listening and word reading, across-language predictions were observed in the rolandic operculum and several motor-related areas (pre- and postcentral, the cerebellum). In addition, across-language predictions during reading were identified in regions typically associated with semantic processing (left inferior frontal, middle temporal cortex, right cerebellum and precuneus) and visual processing (inferior and middle occipital regions and calcarine sulcus). Furthermore, across modalities and languages, the left lingual gyrus showed semantic overlap across production and word reading. These findings support the idea of at least partially language- and modality-independent semantic neural representations