Literal Perceptual Inference

In this paper, I argue that theories of perception that appeal to Helmholtz’s idea of unconscious inference (“Helmholtzian” theories) should be taken literally, i.e. that the inferences appealed to in such theories are inferences in the full sense of the term, as employed elsewhere in philosophy and in ordinary discourse. In the course of the argument, I consider constraints on inference based on the idea that inference is a deliberate acton, and on the idea that inferences depend on the syntactic structure of representations. I argue that inference is a personal-level but sometimes unconscious process that cannot in general be distinguished from association on the basis of the structures of the representations over which it’s defined. I also critique arguments against representationalist interpretations of Helmholtzian theories, and argue against the view that perceptual inference is encapsulated in a module

A Case Study on Computational Hermeneutics: E. J. Lowe’s Modal Ontological Argument

Computers may help us to better understand (not just verify) arguments. In this article we defend this claim by showcasing the application of a new, computer-assisted interpretive method to an exemplary natural-language ar- gument with strong ties to metaphysics and religion: E. J. Lowe’s modern variant of St. Anselm’s ontological argument for the existence of God. Our new method, which we call computational hermeneutics, has been particularly conceived for use in interactive-automated proof assistants. It aims at shedding light on the meanings of words and sentences by framing their inferential role in a given argument. By employing automated theorem reasoning technology within interactive proof assistants, we are able to drastically reduce (by several orders of magnitude) the time needed to test the logical validity of an argu- ment’s formalization. As a result, a new approach to logical analysis, inspired by Donald Davidson’s account of radical interpretation, has been enabled. In computational hermeneutics, the utilization of automated reasoning tools ef- fectively boosts our capacity to expose the assumptions we indirectly commit ourselves to every time we engage in rational argumentation and it fosters the explicitation and revision of our concepts and commitments

Theory of mind in utterance interpretation: the case from clinical pragmatics

The cognitive basis of utterance interpretation is an area that continues to provoke intense theoretical debate among pragmatists. That utterance interpretation involves some type of mind-reading or theory of mind (ToM) is indisputable. However, theorists are divided on the exact nature of this ToM-based mechanism. In this paper, it is argued that the only type of ToM-based mechanism that can adequately represent the cognitive basis of utterance interpretation is one which reflects the rational, intentional, holistic character of interpretation. Such a ToM-based mechanism is supported on conceptual and empirical grounds. Empirical support for this view derives from the study of children and adults with pragmatic disorders. Specifically, three types of clinical case are considered. In the first case, evidence is advanced which indicates that individuals with pragmatic disorders exhibit deficits in reasoning and the use of inferences. These deficits compromise the ability of children and adults with pragmatic disorders to comply with the rational dimension of utterance interpretation

Capturing Social Embeddedness: a constructivist approach

A constructivist approach is applied to characterising social embeddedness and to the design of a simulation of social agents which displays the social embedding of agents. Social embeddedness is defined as the extent to which modelling the behaviour of an agent requires the inclusion of the society of agents as a whole. Possible effects of social embedding and ways to check for it are discussed briefly. A model of co-developing agents is exhibited, which is an extension of Brian Arthur's `El Farol Bar' model, but extended to include learning based upon a GP algorithm and the introduction of communication. Some indicators of social embedding are analysed and some possible causes of social embedding are discussed

Fodor on imagistic mental representations

Abstract: Fodor’s view of the mind is thoroughly computational. This means that the basic kind of mental entity is a “discursive” mental representation and operations over this kind of mental representation have broad architectural scope, extending out to the edges of perception and the motor system. However, in multiple epochs of his work, Fodor attempted to define a functional role for non-discursive, imagistic representation. I describe and critique his two considered proposals. The first view says that images play a particular kind of functional role in certain types of deliberative tasks. The second says that images are solely restricted to the borders of perception, and act as a sort of medium for the fixing of conceptual reference. I argue, against the first proposal, that a broad-scope computationalism such as Fodor’s renders images in principle functionally redundant. I argue, against the second proposal, that empirical evidence suggests that non-discursive representations are learned through perceptual learning, and directly inform category judgments. In each case, I point out extant debates for which the arguments are relevant. The upshot is that there is motivation for limited scope computationalism, in which some, but not all, mental processes operate on discursive mental representations.Keywords: Computational Theory of Mind; Mental Representation; Perception; Mental Image; Jerry Fodor  Fodor e le rappresentazioni mentali come immaginiRiassunto: La concezione della mente di Fodor è rigorosamente computazionale, ossia le entità mentali di base sono rappresentazioni mentali “discorsive”. Le operazioni su queste rappresentazioni hanno un fine architettonico ampio, che va fino ai confini della percezione e del sistema motorio. In periodi diversi del suo lavoro, Fodor ha proposto due modi per definire un ruolo funzionale per la rappresentazione non-discorsiva come immagine. Tratterò criticamente entrambi. Per il primo, le immagini giocano un particolare tipo di ruolo funzionale in certi tipi di compiti deliberativi, mentre, per il secondo, sono relegate unicamente ai confini della percezione, agendo come medium per fissare il riferimento concettuale. Contro il primo sosterrò che un computazionalismo così ampio come quello di Fodor rende le immagini in principio funzionalmente ridondanti. Contro il secondo sosterrò che l’evidenza empirica suggerisce che le rappresentazioni non-discorsive vengono apprese percettivamente, agendo direttamente sui giudizi di categorizzazione. In entrambi i casi considererò gli argomenti più rilevanti nel dibattito corrente. Si vedrà che ci sono buone ragioni in favore di un computazionalismo più limitato, in cui alcuni processi mentali (ma non tutti) operano su rappresentazioni mentali discorsive.Parole chiave: Teoria computazionale della mente; Rappresentazione mentale; Percezione; Immagine mentale; Jerry Fodo

Autonomic computing architecture for SCADA cyber security

Cognitive computing relates to intelligent computing platforms that are based on the disciplines of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and other innovative technologies. These technologies can be used to design systems that mimic the human brain to learn about their environment and can autonomously predict an impending anomalous situation. IBM first used the term ‘Autonomic Computing’ in 2001 to combat the looming complexity crisis (Ganek and Corbi, 2003). The concept has been inspired by the human biological autonomic system. An autonomic system is self-healing, self-regulating, self-optimising and self-protecting (Ganek and Corbi, 2003). Therefore, the system should be able to protect itself against both malicious attacks and unintended mistakes by the operator

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A HOLISTIC EXPERT SYSTEM FOR INTEGRATED COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT

Coastal data and information comprise a massive and complex resource, which is vital to the practice of Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM), an increasingly important application. ICZM is just as complex, but uses the holistic paradigm to deal with the sophistication. The application domain and its resource require a tool of matching characteristics, which is facilitated by the current wide availability of high performance computing. An object-oriented expert system, COAMES, has been constructed to prove this concept. The application of expert systems to ICZM in particular has been flagged as a viable challenge and yet very few have taken it up. COAMES uses the Dempster- Shafer theory of evidence to reason with uncertainty and importantly introduces the power of ignorance and integration to model the holistic approach. In addition, object orientation enables a modular approach, embodied in the inference engine - knowledge base separation. Two case studies have been developed to test COAMES. In both case studies, knowledge has been successfully used to drive data and actions using metadata. Thus a holism of data, information and knowledge has been achieved. Also, a technological holism has been proved through the effective classification of landforms on the rapidly eroding Holderness coast. A holism across disciplines and CZM institutions has been effected by intelligent metadata management of a Fal Estuary dataset. Finally, the differing spatial and temporal scales that the two case studies operate at implicitly demonstrate a holism of scale, though explicit means of managing scale were suggested. In all cases the same knowledge structure was used to effectively manage and disseminate coastal data, information and knowledge

Exploring foundations for using simulations in IS research

Simulation has been adopted in many disciplines as a means for understanding the behavior of a system by imitating it through an artificial object that exhibits a nearly identical behavior. Although simulation approaches have been widely adopted for theory building in disciplines such as engineering, computer science, management, and social sciences, their potential in the IS field is often overlooked. The aim of this paper is to understand how different simulation approaches are used in IS research, thereby providing insights and methodological recommendations for future studies. A literature review of simulation studies published in top-tier IS journals leads to the definition of three classes of simulations, namely the self-organizing, the elementary, and the situated. A set of stylized facts is identified for characterizing the ways in which the premise, the inference, and the contribution are presented in IS simulation studies. As a result, this study provides guidance to future simulation researchers in designing and presenting findings