Internet Voting in Estonia

Several countries have conducted Internet voting trials in binding public elections over the past decade, including Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These trials have been conducted at the local and regional levels of government, targeting specific populations of voters. However, Estonia—a former Soviet republic and now a full member of the European Union—has advanced the farthest in deploying Internet voting. Since 2000, Estonia has conducted two national elections in which all voters could use Internet voting. The first election, in October 2005, was for local offices and the second election, in March 2007, was a national parliamentary election. In this article, we discuss the context for the Estonian experience in deploying Internet voting. We focus on how the Estonians have systematically addressed the legal and technical considerations required to make Internet voting a functioning voting platform, as well as the political and cultural framework that promoted this innovation. Using data from our own qualitative and quantitative studies of the Estonian experience, we consider who voted over the Internet in these elections, and the political implications of the voting platform. Finally, we consider the lessons that other countries can learn from the Estonian experience

Internet voting in Estonia 2005–2019: Evidence from eleven elections

Internet voting is a highly contested topic in electoral studies. This article examines Internet voting in Estonia over 15 years and 11 nation-wide elections. It focuses on the following questions: How is Internet voting organized and used in Estonia? How have the Estonian Internet voting system and its usage evolved over time? What are the preconditions and consequences of large-scale deployment of Internet voting? The results suggest that the rapid uptake and burgeoning usage rates reflect the system's embeddedness in a highly developed digital state and society. Through continuous technological and legal innovation and development, Estonia has built an advanced Internet voting system that complies with normative standards for democratic elections and is widely trusted and used by the voters. Internet voting has not boosted turnout in a setting where voting was already easily accessible. Neither has it created digital divides: Internet voting in Estonia has diffused to the extent that socio-demographic characteristics no longer predict usage. This, combined with massive uptake, reduces incentives for political parties to politicize the novel voting mode

Wyzwania i-głosowania – praktyka, zasady funkcjonowania i perspektywy. Przykład Estonii i Szwajcarii

This paper discusses the experience related to selected European states implementing i-voting. Particular emphasis is given in the text to the issues of the definition of internet voting (as one of the forms of electronic voting); the analysis of experiences gathered by states with a history of the implementation of internet voting; and the procedures of vote casting via Internet. The main goal of this text is to answer the questions of the greatest risks and benefits of internet voting, the influence i-voting has on voter turnout and the future prospects of i-voting. The considerations presented here focus on the experiences of two states with apparently the greatest experience in the field of i-voting, namely Estonia and Switzerland.Przedmiotem niniejszego tekstu są doświadczenia związane z wdrożeniem i-votingu w wybranych państwach Europy. W tekście zwrócono szczególną uwagę na zagadnienia związane z: definiowaniem głosowania internetowego (jako jednej z form głosowania elektronicznego); analizą doświadczeń państw, mających doświadczenia związane z wdrożeniem internetowego głosowania czy procedurom oddawania głosów za pośrednictwem głosowania internetowego. Głównym celem niniejszego tekstu jest odpowiedź na pytania o najważniejsze ryzyka i korzyści związane z głosowaniem przez Internet, o wpływ i-voting na frekwencję wyborczą, jak i o przyszłe perspektywy stosowania i-voting. Rozważania w niniejszym tekście koncentrują się na doświadczeniach dwóch państw z największym – jak się wydaje – doświadczaniem w obszarze i-voting, tj. Estonii oraz Szwajcarii

Digital Civic Engagement in the EU: Analysing Examples, Tools, and Sentiment in Latvia and Estonia

The decline of civic engagement has been an issue for several EU Member States. To promote civic engagement, digital tools have been perceived as one of the possible solutions both at the EU and national levels. Within the context of the COVID-19 pandemic that has intensified digitalisation in many forms and sectors, the issue of digital solutions for civic engagement has regained its relevance and topicality. In the last decade, Latvia has been among other EU Member States in which civic engagement has become a concerning and long-term challenge. For instance, as opposed to Estonia, voter turnout in the most recent national and European parliamentary elections has gradually declined in Latvia. There are also limited digital possibilities through which Latvian society can participate and influence the political agenda daily. Therefore, this article provides an overview of the provisions and guidelines at the EU level to address the issue of civic engagement by promoting digital democracy tools. Secondly, it analyses what digital tools exist in Latvia to promote civic engagement. Thirdly, by comparing the digital civic engagement solutions implemented in Estonia and Latvia, the lessons learned are drawn. Finally, using data from quantitative (polls) studies (before and during the COVID-19 pandemic), the article provides recommendations for Latvia in the context of I-voting

Комунікативні технології у формуванні політичної медіареальності під час конфліктів

У сучасному політичному світі є важливими інформаційно-технологічні принципи, що й формують медіапростір, – фактори маніпуляції, фейкових новин, підтримки політичних а́кторів. Засоби масової інформації в XXI столітті не просто маніпулюють суспільством й створюють конфронтаційні моменти, але й у своїй діяльності «змішують» політику, комерційну рекламу, кримінальні аспекти. Сучасним продуктом медіакультури є медіареальність, яка формує нові межі соціально-культурного простору кожної держави. Медіареальність є одним з елементів комунікативних технологій, що здійснюють вплив на суспільство, окремі державні інститути. Зосередження на вагомих політичних проблемах та питаннях у сучасному світі зводиться до суспільної (масової) уваги, висвітлення неокоректної (фейкової) інформації про опонента – так і відбувається процес маніпуляції громадянами й створення конфліктів у суспільстві. Це все супроводжується дисбалансом комунікаційної взаємодії й інформаційними шумами, що й призводить до викривлення інформаційного простору держави, нових гібридних війн, інформаційних суперечок, фейкових новин.В Україні склалися труднощі з підтримкою медіапростору на міжнародній арені, адже ми маємо низку відкритих й латентних конфліктів. Відповідно, медіапростір – зв’язки і взаємодія, а також розриви та протидя між агентами на політичній арені. Україні варто зрозуміти, що варто розвиватися й інтегруватися в нові комунікативні технології. Це дасть можливість не лише політично зорієнтуватися і зрозуміти переваги й недоліки тієї чи іншої політичної сили, а й сформувати власний цілісний та ефективний державний інтерес та цінності. Стрімкий процес інформаційно-комунікативних технологій у всіх сферах життєдіяльності суспільства спричинив глобальні перетворення, відкрив нові можливості інформаційного простору.Популярна в Європі модель інтегрованих політичних технологій – соціальне управління в реальній комунікаційній мережі. Наприклад, Естонія має прогресивну модель електронного уряду в Європі, а це означає, що в державі функціонують комунікативні технології й мінімізований рівень конфліктологічних чинників.In the modern political world, information and technological principles are important, which form the media space – factors of manipulation, fake news, support for political actors. The media, in the XXI century, not only manipulate society and create confrontational moments, but also in their activities mix politics, commercial advertising, criminal aspects. The modern product of media culture is media reality, which forms new boundaries of the socio-cultural space of each state. Media reality is one of the elements of communication technologies that influence society, but also individual state institutions. Focusing on important political problems and issues in the modern world is reduced to public (mass) attention, coverage of incorrect (fake) information about the opponent – and so is the process of manipulation of citizens and the creation of conflicts in society. All this is accompanied by an imbalance of communication interaction and information noise, which leads to distortion of the information space of the state, new hybrid wars, information disputes, fake news.In Ukraine, there are difficulties in maintaining the media space in the international arena, because we have a number of open and latent conflicts. Accordingly, the media space – connections and interaction, as well as gaps and opposition between agents in the political arena. Ukraine should understand that it is necessary to develop and integrate into new communication technologies. This will give an opportunity not only to orient oneself politically and to understand the advantages and disadvantages of one or another political force, but also to form one’s own integral and effective state interest and values. The rapid process of information and communication technologies in all spheres of society has caused global transformations, opened new opportunities for the information space.A popular model of integrated political technologies in Europe is social management in a real communication network. For example, Estonia has a progressive model of e-government in Europe, which means that communication technologies and a minimized level of conflict factors function accordingly in the country

Comparing "challenge-based" and "code-based" internet voting verification implementations

Internet-enabled voting introduces an element of invisibility and unfamiliarity into the voting process, which makes it very different from traditional voting. Voters might be concerned about their vote being recorded correctly and included in the final tally. To mitigate mistrust, many Internet-enabled voting systems build verifiability into their systems. This allows voters to verify that their votes have been cast as intended, stored as cast and tallied as stored at the conclusion of the voting period. Verification implementations have not been universally successful, mostly due to voter difficulties using them. Here, we evaluate two cast as intended verification approaches in a lab study: (1) "Challenge-Based" and (2) "Code-Based". We assessed cast-as-intended vote verification efficacy, and identified usability issues related to verifying and/or vote casting. We also explored acceptance issues post-verification, to see whether our participants were willing to engage with Internet voting in a real election. Our study revealed the superiority of the code-based approach, in terms of ability to verify effectively. In terms of real-life Internet voting acceptance, convenience encourages acceptance, while security concerns and complexity might lead to rejection

The New South Wales iVote System: Security Failures and Verification Flaws in a Live Online Election

In the world's largest-ever deployment of online voting, the iVote Internet voting system was trusted for the return of 280,000 ballots in the 2015 state election in New South Wales, Australia. During the election, we performed an independent security analysis of parts of the live iVote system and uncovered severe vulnerabilities that could be leveraged to manipulate votes, violate ballot privacy, and subvert the verification mechanism. These vulnerabilities do not seem to have been detected by the election authorities before we disclosed them, despite a pre-election security review and despite the system having run in a live state election for five days. One vulnerability, the result of including analytics software from an insecure external server, exposed some votes to complete compromise of privacy and integrity. At least one parliamentary seat was decided by a margin much smaller than the number of votes taken while the system was vulnerable. We also found protocol flaws, including vote verification that was itself susceptible to manipulation. This incident underscores the difficulty of conducting secure elections online and carries lessons for voters, election officials, and the e-voting research community