Enhancing Artificial Intelligence on a Real Mobile Game

Mobile games represent a killer application that is attracting millions of subscribers worldwide. One of the aspects crucial to the commercial success of a game is ensuring an appropriately challenging artificial intelligence (AI) algorithm against which to play. However, creating this component is particularly complex as classic search AI algorithms cannot be employed by limited devices such as mobile phones or, even on more powerful computers, when considering imperfect information games (i.e., games in which participants do not a complete knowledge of the game state at any moment). In this paper, we propose to solve this issue by resorting to a machine learning algorithm which uses profiling functionalities in order to infer the missing information, thus making the AI able to efficiently adapt its strategies to the human opponent. We studied a simple and computationally light machine learning method that can be employed with success, enabling AI improvements for imperfect information games even on mobile phones. We created a mobile phone-based version of a game calledGhostsand present results which clearly show the ability of our algorithm to quickly improve its own predictive performance as far as the number of games against the same human opponent increases

Concepts and analogies in cybernetics: Mathematical investigations of the role of analogy in concept formation and problem solving; with emphasis for conflict resolution via object and morphism eliminations

This thesis was submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and awarded by Brunel University.We address two problematic areas of cybernetics; nam. Analogical Problem Solving (APS) and Analogical Learning (AL). Both these human faculties do unquestionably require Intelligence. In addition, we point out that shifting of representations is the main unified theme underlying these two intellectual tasks. We focus our attention on the formulation and clarification of the notion of analogy, which has been loosely treated and used in the literature; and also on its role in shifting of representations. We describe analogizing situations in a new representational scheme, borrowed from mathematics and modified and extended to cater for our targets. We call it k-structure, closely resembling semantic networks and directed graphs; the main components of it are the so-called objects and morphisms. We argue and substantiate the need for such a representation scheme, by analysing what its constituents stand for and by cataloguing its virtues, the main one being its visual appeal and its mathematical clarity, and by listing its disadvantages when it is compared to other representation systems. Emphasis is also given to its descriptive power and usefulness by implementing it in a number of APS and AL situations. Besides representation issues, attention is paid to intelligence mechanisms which are involved in APS and AL. A cornerstone in APS and a fundamental theme in AL is the 'skeletization of k-structures'. APS is conceived as 'harmonization of skeletons'. The methodology we develop involves techniques which are computer implemented and extensively studied in theoretic terms via a proposed theory for extended k-structures. To name but a few: 1. 'the separation of the context of a concept from the concept itself', based on the ideas of k-opens and k-spaces; 2, 'object and morphism elimination' of a controversial nature; and 3. 'conflict or deadlock or dilemma resolution' which naturally arises in a k-structure interaction. The overall system, is then applied to capture the essence of EVANS' (1963) analogy-type problems and WINSTOM (1970) learning-type situations. In our attempt not to be too informal, we use basic notions and terminology from abstract Algebra, Topology and Category theory. We rather tend to be "non-logical" (analogical) in EVANS' and WINSTON's sense; "non-numeric", in MESAROVIC (1970) terms (we rather deal with abstract conceptual entities); "non-linguistic" (we do not touch natural language); and "non-resolution" oriented, in the sense of BLEDSOE (1977). However, we give hints sometimes about logical deductive axiomatic systems, employing First Order Predicate Calculus (FOPC); and about semiotics, by which we denote syntactic-semantic-pragmatic features of our system and issues of the problem domains it is acting upon. We believe in what we call: shift from the traditional 'Heuristic search paradigm' era to the 'Analogy-paradigm' era underlying Artificial Intelligence and Cybernetics. We justify this merely by listing a number of A. I. works, which employ, in some way or another, the concept of analogy, over the last fifteen years or so, where a noticeable peak is obvious during the last years and especially in 1977. Finally, we hope that if the proposed conceptual framework and techniques developed do not straightforwardly constitute some kind of platform for Artificial Intelligence, at least it would give some insights into and illuminate our understanding of the two most fundamental faculties the human brain is occupied with; namely problem solving and learning

The Problems with Problem Solving: Reflections on the Rise, Current Status, and Possible Future of a Cognitive Research Paradigm

The research paradigm invented by Allen Newell and Herbert A. Simon in the late 1950s dominated the study of problem solving for more than three decades. But in the early 1990s, problem solving ceased to drive research on complex cognition. As part of this decline, Newell and Simon’s most innovative research practices – especially their method for inducing subjects’ strategies from verbal protocols - were abandoned. In this essay, I summarize Newell and Simon’s theoretical and methodological innovations and explain why their strategy identification method did not become a standard research tool. I argue that the method lacked a systematic way to aggregate data, and that Newell and Simon’s search for general problem solving strategies failed. Paradoxically, the theoretical vision that led them to search elsewhere for general principles led researchers away from studies of complex problem solving. Newell and Simon’s main enduring contribution is the theory that people solve problems via heuristic search through a problem space. This theory remains the centerpiece of our understanding of how people solve unfamiliar problems, but it is seriously incomplete. In the early 1970s, Newell and Simon suggested that the field should focus on the question where problem spaces and search strategies come from. I propose a breakdown of this overarching question into five specific research questions. Principled answers to those questions would expand the theory of heuristic search into a more complete theory of human problem solving

Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics

When we leave our closet, and engage in the common affairs of life, (reason's) conclusions seem to vanish, like the phantoms of the night on the appearance of the morning; and 'tis difficult for us to retain even that conviction, which we had attained with difficulty (Hume, 1739/, p 507). we must constantly adjust our lives, our thoughts and our emotions, in order to live simultaneously within different kinds of orders according to different rules. If we were to apply the unmodified, uncurbed rules (of caring intervention to do visible 'good') of the small band or troop, or our families to the (extended order of cooperation through markets), as our instincts and sentimental yearnings often make us wish to do, we would destroy it. Yet if we were to always apply the (noncooperative) rules of the extended order to our more intimate groupings, we would crush them. (Hayek, 1988, p 18). (Italics are his, parenthetical reductions are mine).behavioral economics; experimental economics

Darwin Turing Dawkins: Building a General Theory of Evolution

Living things, computers, societies, and even books are part of a grand evolutionary struggle to survive. That struggle shapes nature, nations, religions, art, science, and you. What you think, feel, and do is determined by it. Darwinian evolution does not apply solely to the genes that are stored in DNA. Using the insights of Alan Turing and Richard Dawkins, we will see that it also applies to the memes we store in our brains and the information we store in our computers. The next time you run for president, fight a war, or just deal with the ordinary problems humans are heir to, perhaps this book will be of use. If you want to understand why and when you will die, or if you want to achieve greatness this book may help. If you are concerned about where the computer revolution is headed, this book may provide some answers.Comment: 247 page

Network Theoretic Analyses and Enhancements of Evolutionary Algorithms

Information in evolutionary algorithms is available at multiple levels; however most analyses focus on the individual level. This dissertation extracts useful information from networks and communities formed by examining interrelationships between individuals in the populations as they change with time. Network theoretic analyses are extremely useful in multiple fields and applications, e.g., biology (regulation of gene expression), organizational behavior (social networks), and intelligence data analysis (message traffic on the Internet). Evolving populations are represented as dynamic networks, and we show that changes in population characteristics can be recognized at the level of the networks representing successive generations, with implications for possible improvements in the evolutionary algorithm, e.g., in deciding when a population is prematurely converging, and when a reinitialization of the population may be beneficial to avoid computational effort, or to improve the probability of finding better points to examine. In this dissertation, we show that network theoretic analyses can be applied to study, analyze and improve the performance of evolutionary algorithms. We propose various approaches to study the dynamic behavior of evolutionary algorithms, each highlighting the benefits of studying community-level behaviors, using graph properties and metrics to analyze evolutionary algorithms, identifying imminent convergence, and identifying time points at which it would help to reseed a fraction of the population. Improvements to evolutionary algorithms result in alleviating the effects of premature convergence occurrences, and saving computational effort by reaching better solutions faster. We demonstrate that this new approach, using network science to analyze evolutionary algorithms, is advantageous for a variety of evolutionary algorithms, including Genetic Algorithms, Particle Swarm Optimization, and Learning Classifier Systems

Machine learning methods applied to the dots and boxes board game

Pontos e Quadrados (Dots and Boxes na versão anglo-saxónica) é um jogo clássico de tabuleiro no qual os jogadores unem quatro pontos próximos numa grelha para criar o maior número possível de quadrados. Este trabalho irá inverstigar técnicas de aprendizagem profunda e aprendizagem por reforço, que torna possível um programa de computador aprender como jogar o jogo, sem nenhuma interação humana, e aplicar o mesmo ao jogo Dots and Boxes; a abordagem usada no DeepMind AlphaZero será analisada. O AlphaZero combina uma rede neural convolucional e o algoritmo Monte Carlo Tree Search para alcançar um desempenho super humano, sem conhecimento prévio, em jogos como o Xadrez, Go, e Shogi. Os resultados obtidos permitem aferir sobre a adequação da abordagem ao jogo Pontos e Quadrados.Dots and Boxes is a classical board game in which players connect four nearest dots in a grid to create the maximum possible number of boxes. This work will investigate deep learning techniques with reinforcement learning to make possible a computer program to learn how to play the game, without human interaction, and apply it to the Dots and Boxes board game; the approach beyond DeepMind AlphaZero being taken as the approach to follow. AlphaZero makes a connection between a Convolutional Neural Network and the Monte Carlo Tree Search algorithm to achieve superhuman performance, starting from no a priori knowledge in games such as Chess, Go, and Shogi. The results obtained allow to measure the approach adequacy to the game Dots and Boxes

Game Theory Relaunched

The game is on. Do you know how to play? Game theory sets out to explore what can be said about making decisions which go beyond accepting the rules of a game. Since 1942, a well elaborated mathematical apparatus has been developed to do so; but there is more. During the last three decades game theoretic reasoning has popped up in many other fields as well - from engineering to biology and psychology. New simulation tools and network analysis have made game theory omnipresent these days. This book collects recent research papers in game theory, which come from diverse scientific communities all across the world; they combine many different fields like economics, politics, history, engineering, mathematics, physics, and psychology. All of them have as a common denominator some method of game theory. Enjoy

Naturalism and the Problem of Normativity

This dissertation explores the way in which normative facts create a problem for naturalist approaches to philosophy. How can lumpy scientific matter give rise to technicolour normativity? How can normative facts show up in the world described from a scientific perspective? In this context, I start by analysing Hume’s discussion of ’is’ and ‘ought’, Moore’s open question argument, and Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations. I then look at the nature of philosophical naturalism in detail, arguing that is fundamentally an epistemological commitment to the norms governing scientific publications. I consider the particular examples of Penelope Maddy’s approach to naturalising logic and the instrumentalist accounts of epistemic normativity favoured by advocates of naturalised epistemology. I argue, however, that these approaches to naturalising normativity are unsuccessful. In the second half of the dissertation, I develop a novel account of the nature of normative facts and explain how this relates to and resolves some of the difficulties raised in the first half. The account I defend has Kantian foundations and an Aristotelian superstructure. I associate the right with the necessary preconditions for engaging in valuable activity and the good with the satisfaction of the constitutive ends of activities and practices. I explain how my theory can account for epistemic normativity and defend a virtue-based theory of epistemic evaluation. Finally, I argue against desire-based accounts of reasons and in favour of a role for the emotions in normative cognition. The view I defend is intended to be compatible with our best scientific theories. However, it is not naturalistic insofar as it is justified by distinctively philosophical methods and relies on extra-scientific considerations