Understanding collaboration in volunteer computing systems

Volunteer computing is a paradigm in which devices participating in a distributed environment share part of their resources to help others perform their activities. The effectiveness of this computing paradigm depends on the collaboration attitude adopted by the participating devices. Unfortunately for software designers it is not clear how to contribute with local resources to the shared environment without compromising resources that could then be required by the contributors. Therefore, many designers adopt a conservative position when defining the collaboration strategy to be embedded in volunteer computing applications. This position produces an underutilization of the devices’ local resources and reduces the effectiveness of these solutions. This article presents a study that helps designers understand the impact of adopting a particular collaboration attitude to contribute with local resources to the distributed shared environment. The study considers five collaboration strategies, which are analyzed in computing environments with both, abundance and scarcity of resources. The obtained results indicate that collaboration strategies based on effort-based incentives work better than those using contribution-based incentives. These results also show that the use of effort-based incentives does not jeopardize the availability of local resources for the local needs.Peer ReviewedPostprint (published version

Support Service for Reciprocal Computational Resource Sharing in Wireless Community Networks

In community networks, individuals and local organizations from a geographic area team up to create and run a community-owned IP network to satisfy the community's demand for ICT, such as facilitating Internet access and providing services of local interest. Most current community networks use wireless links for the node interconnection, applying off-the-shelf wireless equipment. While IP connectivity over the shared network infrastructure is successfully achieved, the deployment of applications in community networks is surprisingly low. To address the solution of this problem, we propose in this paper a service to incentivize the contribution of computing and storage as cloud resources to community networks, in order to stimulate the deployment of services and applications. Our final goal is the vision that in the long term, the users of community networks will not need to consume applications from the Internet, but find them within the wireless community network

Clustering and Sharing Incentives in BitTorrent Systems

Peer-to-peer protocols play an increasingly instrumental role in Internet content distribution. Consequently, it is important to gain a full understanding of how these protocols behave in practice and how their parameters impact overall performance. We present the first experimental investigation of the peer selection strategy of the popular BitTorrent protocol in an instrumented private torrent. By observing the decisions of more than 40 nodes, we validate three BitTorrent properties that, though widely believed to hold, have not been demonstrated experimentally. These include the clustering of similar-bandwidth peers, the effectiveness of BitTorrent's sharing incentives, and the peers' high average upload utilization. In addition, our results show that BitTorrent's new choking algorithm in seed state provides uniform service to all peers, and that an underprovisioned initial seed leads to the absence of peer clustering and less effective sharing incentives. Based on our observations, we provide guidelines for seed provisioning by content providers, and discuss a tracker protocol extension that addresses an identified limitation of the protocol

Mesmerizer: A Effective Tool for a Complete Peer-to-Peer Software Development Life-cycle

In this paper we present what are, in our experience, the best practices in Peer-To-Peer(P2P) application development and how we combined them in a middleware platform called Mesmerizer. We explain how simulation is an integral part of the development process and not just an assessment tool. We then present our component-based event-driven framework for P2P application development, which can be used to execute multiple instances of the same application in a strictly controlled manner over an emulated network layer for simulation/testing, or a single application in a concurrent environment for deployment purpose. We highlight modeling aspects that are of critical importance for designing and testing P2P applications, e.g. the emulation of Network Address Translation and bandwidth dynamics. We show how our simulator scales when emulating low-level bandwidth characteristics of thousands of concurrent peers while preserving a good degree of accuracy compared to a packet-level simulator

A Mechanism for Fair Distribution of Resources without Payments

We design a mechanism for Fair and Efficient Distribution of Resources (FEDoR) in the presence of strategic agents. We consider a multiple-instances, Bayesian setting, where in each round the preference of an agent over the set of resources is a private information. We assume that in each of r rounds n agents are competing for k non-identical indivisible goods, (n > k). In each round the strategic agents declare how much they value receiving any of the goods in the specific round. The agent declaring the highest valuation receives the good with the highest value, the agent with the second highest valuation receives the second highest valued good, etc. Hence we assume a decision function that assigns goods to agents based on their valuations. The novelty of the mechanism is that no payment scheme is required to achieve truthfulness in a setting with rational/strategic agents. The FEDoR mechanism takes advantage of the repeated nature of the framework, and through a statistical test is able to punish the misreporting agents and be fair, truthful, and socially efficient. FEDoR is fair in the sense that, in expectation over the course of the rounds, all agents will receive the same good the same amount of times. FEDoR is an eligible candidate for applications that require fair distribution of resources over time. For example, equal share of bandwidth for nodes through the same point of access. But further on, FEDoR can be applied in less trivial settings like sponsored search, where payment is necessary and can be given in the form of a flat participation fee. To this extent we perform a comparison with traditional mechanisms applied to sponsored search, presenting the advantage of FEDoR

On the Applicability of Resources Optimization Model for Mitigating Free Riding in P2P System

The survival of peer-to-peer systems depends on the contribution of resources by all the participating peers. Selfish behavior of some peers that do not contribute resources inhibits the expected level of service delivery. Free riding has been found to seriously affect the performance and negates the sharing principle of peer-to-peer networks. In this paper, first, we investigate through simulations the effectiveness of a proposed linear model for mitigating free riding in a P2P system. Second, we extended the initial linear model by incorporating additional constraints on download and upload of each peer. This helps in reducing the effects of free riding behavior on the system. Lastly, we evaluate the impacts of some parameters on the models.Keywords: Peer-to-Peer, Resources, Free rider, Optimization, Constraints, Algorith

Tit-for-Token: fair rewards for moving data in decentralized storage networks

Centralized data silos are not only becoming prohibitively expensive but also raise issues of data ownership and data availability. These developments are affecting the industry, researchers, and ultimately society in general. Decentralized storage solutions present a promising alternative. Furthermore, such systems can become a crucial layer for new paradigms of edge-centric computing and web3 applications. Decentralized storage solutions based on p2p networks can enable scalable and self-sustaining open-source infrastructures. However, like other p2p systems, they require well-designed incentive mechanisms for participating peers. These mechanisms should be not only effective but also fair in regard to individual participants. Even though several such systems have been studied in deployment, there is still a lack of systematic understanding regarding these issues. We investigate the interplay between incentive mechanisms, network characteristics, and fairness of peer rewards. In particular, we identify and evaluate three core and up-to-date reward mechanisms for moving data in p2p networks: distance-based payments, reciprocity, and time-limited free service. Distance-based payments are relevant since libp2p Kademlia, which enables distance-based algorithms for content lookup and retrieval, is part of various modern p2p systems. We base our model on the Swarm network that uses a combination of the three mechanisms and serves as inspiration for our Tit-for-Token model. We present our Tit-for-Token model and develop a tool to explore the behaviors of these payment mechanisms. Our evaluation provides novel insights into the functioning and interplay of these mechanisms and helps. Based on these insights, we propose modifications to these mechanisms that better address fairness concerns and outline improvement proposals for the Swarm network