Manipulating Memory Associations Changes Decision-making Preferences in a Preconditioning Task

Memories of past experiences can guide our decisions. Thus, if memories are undermined or distorted, decision making should be affected. Nevertheless, little empirical research has been done to examine the role of memory in reinforcement decision-making . We hypothesized that if memories guide choices in a conditioning decision-making task, then manipulating these memories would result in a change of decision preferences to gain reward. We manipulated participants’ memories by providing false feedback that their memory associations were wrong before they made decisions that could lead them to win money . Participants’ memory ratings decreased significantly after receiving false feedback. More importantly, we found that false feedback led participants’ decision bias to disappear after their memory associations were undermined . Our results suggest that reinforcement decision-making can be altered by fasle feedback on memories . The results are discussed using memory mechanisms such as spreading activation theories

The role of attributional style in the development of depression in college females with pathological eating practices

In this experiment, participants were randomly assigned to receive either stressful false feedback or non-stressful false feedback following a weight-related fictional test. Participants were assessed on eating disorder measures to determine their degree of eating pathology. Those with a higher degree of eating pathology reported more body dissatisfaction and higher levels of clinical depression. In addition they made more depressogenic attributions and became more depressed, anxious, and hostile following stressful false feedback

Promoting Learning by Inducing and Scaffolding Cognitive Disequilibrium and Confusion through System Feedback

Learners frequently experience uncertainty about how to proceed during learning. These experiences cause learners to enter a state of cognitive disequilibrium and its affiliated affective state of confusion. Cognitive disequilibrium and confusion have been found to frequently occur during complex learning and provide opportunities for deeper learning. In the current thesis, a learning environment that induces confusion was investigated. In the environment, learners engaged in a dialogue on scientific reasoning with an animated pedagogical agent. Confusion was induced through false feedback provided by the tutor agent (e.g., when learners responded correctly and were told their response was incorrect). Self-reports of confusion during the training session indicated that false feedback was an effective method for inducing confusion. False feedback was also found to increase learners’ ability to apply this knowledge to new and novel situations, under certain conditions. Implications for the design of learning environments are also discussed

Lessons for future research:two experiments failed to reproduce a relationship between achievement motivation and autobiographical memory distortion

Previous research (Sharman & Calacouris, 2010. Motivated imagination inflation: Implicit and explicit motives predict imagination inflation for achievement and affiliation events. Experimental Psychology, 57, 77–82) found that participants’ achievement-motivation was associated with the inflation of memory and confidence for unlikely achievement-related events in childhood. Similarly, other research has shown correlations between achievement motivation and grade inflation. In the current studies, we experimentally investigate the effect of false feedback and achievement-motivation on memory distortion for an unlikely childhood event (e.g. inventing an important device). In Experiment 1, we found that false feedback did have an effect, but contrary to previous research, self-reported achievement-motivation was not a statistically significant correlate of memory distortion. In Experiment 2, we again found a main effect for false feedback, no main effect of motivation, and an interaction. Both Experiments did not find, as earlier research had, a significant relationship between achievement-motivation and achievement-related memory distortion. We suggest others use different methods to ours when attempting to demonstrate a causal relationship between motivation and false memories

The effects of collective interdependence efficacy on the difficulty of self-chosen group goals

This study examined the effects of collective interdependence efficacy on the difficulty of self-chosen group goals and performance levels. Teamwork interdependence KSAs were manipulated by false feedback in an experimental setting

Creating memories for false autobiographical events in childhood: a systematic review

Using a framework that distinguishes autobiographical belief, recollective experience, and confidence in memory, we review three major paradigms used to suggest false childhood events to adults: imagination inflation, false feedback and memory implantation. Imagination inflation and false feedback studies increase the belief that a suggested event occurred by a small amount such that events are still thought unlikely to have happened. In memory implantation studies, some recollective experience for the suggested events is induced on average in 47% of participants, but only in 15% are these experiences likely to be rated as full memories. We conclude that susceptibility to false memories of childhood events appears more limited than has been suggested. The data emphasise the complex judgements involved in distinguishing real from imaginary recollections and caution against accepting investigator-based ratings as necessarily corresponding to participants' self-reports. Recommendations are made for presenting the results of these studies in courtroom settings

The Effects of System Justification and Reminders of Ingroup Disadvantage on Just World Beliefs

The tendency to believe that people get what they deserve—termed just world beliefs—is a pervasive phenomenon associated with acceptance of the suffering of others. We tested whether we could decrease just world beliefs. We experimentally manipulated system justification, and gave participants false feedback on a gender Implicit Association Test telling them that they favor the “opposite” gender. For female participants, this false feedback represented a reminder of their ingroup’s low status by suggesting that they support the status quo that disadvantages women. Participants then completed a self-report measure of just world beliefs. As an indirect measure of just world beliefs, participants rated the funniness, offensiveness, and appropriateness of sexist jokes. There were no effects on just world beliefs; however, participants in the high (vs. low) system justification condition rated the sexist jokes marginally more positively. Thus, people who are motivated to justify the status quo are somewhat more accepting of humor that is derisive of a disadvantaged group, suggesting that they may not take group inequality seriously

Manipulating Memory Associations Minimizes Avoidance Behavior

Memories of the past can guide humans to avoid harm. The logical consequence of this is if memories are changed, avoidance behavior should be affected. More than 80 years of false memory research has shown that people’s memory can be re-constructed or distorted by receiving suggestive false feedback. The current study examined whether manipulating people’s memories of learned associations would impact fear related behavior. A modified sensory preconditioning paradigm of fear learning was used. Critically, in a memory test after fear learning, participants received verbal false feedback to change their memory associations. After receiving the false feedback, participants’ beliefs and memories ratings for learned associations decreased significantly compared to the no feedback condition. Furthermore, in the false feedback condition, participants no longer showed avoidance to fear conditioned stimuli and relevant subjective fear ratings dropped significantly. Our results suggest that manipulating memory associations might minimize avoidance behavior in fear conditioning. These data also highlight the role of memory in higher order conditioning

Memory and truth: correcting errors with true feedback versus overwriting correct answers with errors

In five experiments, we examined the conditions under which participants remembered true and false information given as feedback. Participants answered general information questions, expressed their confidence in the correctness of their answers, and were given true or false feedback. In all five experiments, participants hypercorrected when they had made a mistake; that is, they remembered better the correct feedback to errors made with high compared to low confidence. However, in none of the experiments did participants hyper'correct' when false feedback followed an initially correct response. Telling people whether the feedback was right or wrong made little difference, suggesting that people already knew whether the feedback was true or false and differentially encoded the true feedback compared to the false feedback. An exception occurred when false feedback followed an error: participants hyper'corrected' to this false feedback, suggesting that when people are wrong initially, they are susceptible to further incorrect information. These results indicate that people have some kind of privileged access to whether their answers are right or wrong, above and beyond their confidence ratings, and that they behave differently when trying to remember new “corrective” information depending upon whether they, themselves, were right or wrong initially. The likely source of this additional information is knowledge about the truth of the feedback, which they rapidly process and use to modulate memory encoding

Modulation of emotional appraisal by false physiological feedback during fMRI

BACKGROUND James and Lange proposed that emotions are the perception of physiological reactions. Two-level theories of emotion extend this model to suggest that cognitive interpretations of physiological changes shape self-reported emotions. Correspondingly false physiological feedback of evoked or tonic bodily responses can alter emotional attributions. Moreover, anxiety states are proposed to arise from detection of mismatch between actual and anticipated states of physiological arousal. However, the neural underpinnings of these phenomena previously have not been examined. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS We undertook a functional brain imaging (fMRI) experiment to investigate how both primary and second-order levels of physiological (viscerosensory) representation impact on the processing of external emotional cues. 12 participants were scanned while judging face stimuli during both exercise and non-exercise conditions in the context of true and false auditory feedback of tonic heart rate. We observed that the perceived emotional intensity/salience of neutral faces was enhanced by false feedback of increased heart rate. Regional changes in neural activity corresponding to this behavioural interaction were observed within included right anterior insula, bilateral mid insula, and amygdala. In addition, right anterior insula activity was enhanced during by asynchronous relative to synchronous cardiac feedback even with no change in perceived or actual heart rate suggesting this region serves as a comparator to detect physiological mismatches. Finally, BOLD activity within right anterior insula and amygdala predicted the corresponding changes in perceived intensity ratings at both a group and an individual level. CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE Our findings identify the neural substrates supporting behavioural effects of false physiological feedback, and highlight mechanisms that underlie subjective anxiety states, including the importance of the right anterior insula in guiding second-order "cognitive" representations of bodily arousal state