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The Effects of System Justification and Reminders of Ingroup Disadvantage on Just World

Beliefs

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Abstract

The tendency to believe that people get what they deserve—termed just world beliefs—is a pervasive phenomenon associated with acceptance of the suffering of others. We tested whether we could decrease just world beliefs. We experimentally manipulated system justification, and gave participants false feedback on a gender Implicit Association Test telling them that they favor the "opposite" gender. For female participants, this false feedback represented a reminder of their ingroup's low status by suggesting that they support the status quo that disadvantages women. Participants then completed a self-report measure of just world beliefs. As an indirect measure of just world beliefs, participants rated the funniness, offensiveness, and appropriateness of sexist jokes. There were no effects on just world beliefs; however, participants in the high (vs. low) system justification condition rated the sexist jokes marginally more positively. Thus, people who are motivated to justify the status quo are somewhat more accepting of humor that is derisive of a disadvantaged group, suggesting that they may not take group inequality seriously.

Keywords: Just world beliefs; system justification; gender inequality

The Effects of System Justification and Reminders of Ingroup Disadvantage on Just World

Beliefs

Empirical data continue to demonstrate that society has yet to achieve ideal levels of equality and fairness. For example, reflecting pervasive gender stereotyping, female graduate school applicants are still perceived as less competent than their male counterparts, despite no real gender differences in competence and qualifications (Moss-Racusin, Dovidio, Brescoll, Graham, & Handelsman, 2012). Yet research in social psychology has produced striking evidence that people have a strong tendency to believe that the world is a just place. That is, people tend to believe that we get what we deserve and deserve what we get, a belief that has been termed the just world phenomenon (Hafer & Bègue, 2005). In the present study, we attempted to uncover two factors that may underlie belief in a just world: The extent to which people want to justify the societal status quo – known as system justification (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004) – and a reminder of the disadvantages suffered by one's own group, specifically women. We examined the relationships among just world beliefs, system justification, and ingroup disadvantage through the lens of society's continued gender inequality.

There is a vast literature studying the just world phenomenon and just world beliefs (JWBs) as a predictor variable in multiple different contexts. For example, higher JWBs predict skepticism about global warming and lower willingness to change habits to decrease one's carbon footprint (Feinberg & Willer, 2011). Higher JWBs among men predict greater judging of less physically attractive individuals as less likely to achieve success (Dion & Dion, 1987). Higher JWBs predict less anger when a person is subject to an injustice, presumably because people rationalize the angering situation they are in as being just (i.e., they believe they deserve what they are getting; Dalbert, 2002). Higher JWBs furthermore predict more negative

evaluations of rape victims (Kleinke & Meyer, 1990); lower levels of help offered to the sick and greater perceptions of the sick as deserving their suffering (Aguiar, Correia, & Vala, 2001; Depalma, Madey, Tillman, & Wheeler, 1999); and less sympathy for a person who has drawn a high-priority draft number for the army (Rubin & Peplau, 1973), among numerous other variables (for a review, see Bègue & Hafer, 2005). In summary, the literature suggests that believing in a just world may allow people to accept and rationalize unjust events, both in others' lives and in their own lives.

Comparatively little research has investigated just world beliefs as a *dependent* variable, however. This small literature has revealed that victims of war in Bosnia and of extreme poverty or separation from relatives in Macedonia reported lower JWBs (Fasel & Spini, 2010). In another study, participants who read about high-status people who passed a test and low-status people who failed a test subsequently reported higher JWBs than participants who read about high-status people failing and low-status people passing (Iatridis & Fousiani, 2009). Hunt (2000) investigated several individual difference variables that predicted JWBs among American participants, including race, religiosity, religious affiliation, and socioeconomic status, finding for example that lower socioeconomic status predicted higher JWBs and that men reported higher JWBs than women. Finally, Rubin and Peplau (1973) found that greater beliefs in an active god and greater religiosity correlated with higher JWBs. These findings indicate that people who have experienced or have recently learned about an event that contradicts the idea that the world is just, or are members of a generally disadvantaged group, tend to have lower JWBs—with the notable exception that lower socioeconomic status predicts *higher* JWBs. Conversely, people who have experienced or are exposed to anecdotes that promote the idea of a just world, are members of an advantaged group in society, or hold a system-justifying ideology

such as certain religious beliefs (Jost, Hawkins, Nosek, Hennes, Stern, Gosling, & Graham, 2013) generally tend to report higher JWBs.

Thus, there is only a limited amount of research examining potential predictors of just world beliefs, and little of this research has been experimental. Most of the research of this nature has investigated whether people's pre-existing attributes – which tend to be relatively static – relate to just world beliefs. Less research has been done to investigate variables that, when manipulated experimentally, can *change* just world beliefs. This was the goal of the present study. Our overall aim was to provide some insight into how variables that momentarily influence just world beliefs could be employed to decrease people's *overall* level of just world beliefs by having them incorporated into education and other institutions that affect people's beliefs about the condition of society.

We propose that one variable that may affect belief in a just world is the extent to which people are motivated to justify society's current conditions—that is, system justification (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2004). Like just world beliefs, system justification has been found to be a pervasive phenomenon (Jost et al., 2004). Paradoxically, system justification is prevalent among disadvantaged groups such as women and racial/ethnic minorities, as well as more privileged groups such as White men (Jost et al., 2004). This presents an enigma: One might expect that members of disadvantaged groups would seek most of all to *change* (rather than preserve and justify) the system that relegates them to an unequal position. Yet it is consistently found that members of disadvantaged groups do justify the system, though often to a lesser extent than members of more advantaged groups (Jost et al., 2004). Studies have suggested that system justifying tendencies and just world beliefs are positively correlated (Hunyady & Jost, 2005; Jost & Burgess, 2000; Kay & Jost, 2003). Indeed, it makes intuitive sense that a

psychological variable predicting the extent to which people might justify the status quo and one predicting the extent to which they perceive the world as just would be closely intertwined. People might justify the status quo because they perceive it as just, or they may perceive the world as just because they justify the status quo.

In the present study, we investigated whether we could influence participants' just world beliefs by manipulating system justifying tendencies. In one condition, we sought to increase system justification by exposing participants to *system threat* – that is, criticizing or "threatening" the system, which has been previously found to increase system justifying tendencies (e.g., Brescoll, Uhlmann, & Newman, 2013). In another condition, we sought to decrease system justifying tendencies by exposing participants to *system affirmation* – that is, praising or "affirming" the system (e.g., Brescoll et al., 2013). We predicted that just world beliefs would be higher in the system threat condition (when system justification was more salient), relative to the system affirmation condition (when system justification was less salient).

We furthermore examined whether the effect of system justification may interact with reminders that one's ingroup occupies a disadvantaged position in society. For this purpose, we exposed participants to information that, for female participants, represented possible evidence about their disadvantaged position. Specifically, participants completed a gender Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), which is a measure of implicit or automatic attitudes toward men and women. No matter their actual results on the IAT, all participants were given false feedback indicating that they had an unconscious bias favoring the "opposite" gender. The purpose of this procedure was to bring to the fore for female participants their disadvantaged position by suggesting that they favor the advantaged outgroup. That is, being told that they favor men may demonstrate to women – no matter their conscious beliefs –

that unconsciously they seem to favor the status quo in which women are disadvantaged relative to men. This may bring about cognitive dissonance between female participants' conscious beliefs and what they are being told about their unconscious beliefs. A possible resolution to this cognitive dissonance may be an increase in just world beliefs.

Therefore, we predicted that just world beliefs would be distinctively high among female participants in the system threat condition, as these participants would have both a reminder of their ingroup's disadvantage and have their system justifying tendencies increased. That is, although women on average express lower JWBs than men (Hunt, 2000), we hypothesized that the combination of a system-justifying ideology being salient (i.e., system threat) and exposure to information that promotes the idea of a just world (i.e., the IAT feedback) would override and even reverse this gender difference (see also Iatridis & Fousiani, 2009; Jost et al., 2013).

In the present study, participants were exposed either to system threat (designed to elicit greater system justification) or system affirmation (designed to elicit lower system justification). Participants then completed a gender IAT and were told that they had an implicit bias favoring the opposite gender (regardless of their actual IAT responses). For female participants, this IAT feedback was intended to serve as a subtle reminder of the continuing disadvantage women face in today's society. Finally, participants completed two measures of just world beliefs: a self-report questionnaire taken from Rubin and Peplau (1975) and a rating of sexist jokes on their offensiveness, funniness, and appropriateness. This latter measure was intended to serve as a subtle index of just world beliefs. We reasoned that higher just world beliefs would correlate with a more accepting attitude toward sexist jokes, because if one believes in a just world then one might be more willing to accept the derision of a disadvantaged group.

We predicted a main effect of system justification, expecting that participants in the system threat condition would report higher levels of JWBs than participants in the system affirmation condition. We also predicted an interaction between system justification and participants' gender, expecting that female participants in the system threat condition would report distinctively high JWBs, as the false IAT feedback may exacerbate the effect of system threat. We expected that the impact of the false IAT feedback on women's JWBs would be counteracted by system affirmation, resulting in relatively lower JWBs for female participants in the system affirmation (vs. system threat) condition. Based on a similar logic, male participants in the system affirmation condition were expected to have the lowest JWBs, as they will have lower levels of system justifying tendencies and would likely not be strongly affected by the false feedback on the IAT (at least in terms of their level of just word beliefs). That is, it would likely not come as a surprise to men that they favor women unconsciously, as it may be what they expect based on societal norms.

Method

Participants

Two hundred and ninety-four participants (140 women, 154 men; mean age=18.62 years, *SD*=1.84 years, range: 17-43) were recruited through an Introduction to Psychology participant pool. In return for their time, participants received credit for completing a research participation requirement. Variation in degrees of freedom reported below is due to missing data.

Procedure

The study employed a 2×2 between-subjects design. The two factors were System Justification Condition (system threat vs. system affirmation) and participant gender (male vs.

female). Participants were told that the study examined people's gender attitudes and their attitudes about the world more generally.

In the System Threat condition, participants read an essay that was intended to increase system justification. Prior work has shown that threatening the status quo will increase people's motivation to justify the system (Wakslak, Jost, & Bauer, 2011). Participants in the System Affirmation condition read an essay that was intended to alleviate the motivation to justify the system. All participants were then given two questions about the essay they read as a manipulation check to ensure that they read the essay in sufficient detail. They were told that this was a "memory quiz." Next, participants were told that they would take a measure of their unconscious gender attitudes and completed a gender IAT. Actual IAT data were collected, but all participants were told that their results showed that they had an unconscious bias favoring the "opposite" gender (i.e., women were told that they favored men and men were told that they favored women). Participants then completed a self-report measure of just world beliefs and rated two sexist jokes to ascertain their approval of sexist humor. Finally, participants were given several manipulation check questions, reported basic demographic information, and were debriefed and thanked for their time.

Materials and Measures

System Justification Manipulation. This manipulation was taken from Brescoll et al. (2013). The essay given to participants in the System Threat condition read as follows: "These days, many people in the United States feel disappointed with the nation's condition. Many citizens feel that the country has reach a low point in terms of social, economic, and political factors. It seems that many countries are enjoying better social, economic, and political conditions than the U.S. More and more Americans express a willingness to leave the United

States and immigrate to other nations." The essay given to participants in the System Affirmation

condition read as follows: "These days, despite the difficulties the nation is facing, many people

in the United States feel safer and more secure relative to the past. Many citizens feel that the

country is relatively stable in terms of social, economic, and political factors. It seems that

compared with many countries in the world the social, economic, and political conditions in the

U.S. are relatively good. Very few Americans express a willingness to leave the United States

and immigrate to other nations."

   After reading the essays, participants responded to two manipulation check questions,

also taken from Brescoll et al. (2013): "How did the article report that the United States is doing

relative to other countries?" and "According to the article, how do most Americans feel about the

condition of the United States?" Participants responded to these questions on a seven-point scale

ranging from 1 (*much worse*) to 7 (*much better*). These two items were strongly correlated,

$r(291)=.85$, $p<.001$, and were averaged into a single manipulation check index.

   Implicit Association Test. The IAT measures how fast participants categorize a pair of

concepts to measure their implicit, or unconscious, association between the two categories. In the

gender IAT, participants pair words traditionally associated with women (e.g., woman, lady) and

men (e.g., man, husband) with positive (e.g., love, pleasure) and negative (e.g., death, evil)

words. Stimulus words were taken from the IAT website (https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/)

and from Greenwald et al. (1998). See Appendix A for a complete list of stimulus words.

   The IAT consisted of five blocks in which participants categorized: (a) gendered words;

(b) positive and negative words; (c) "male" words and positive words, and "female" words and

negative words; (d) gendered words, now on the opposite sides than in the first block; and (e)

"male" words and negative words, and "female" words and positive words. The stimuli's

position on the screen (left or right) was counterbalanced. To provide an example, in the third

block participants would see words associated with women and men as well as positive and

negative words appearing in the middle of the computer screen. Participants' task would be to

press a specific key as quickly as possible in response to a "male" word *or* a positive word, and

to press a different key as quickly as possibly in response to a "female" word *or* a negative word.

The correct categories were labeled on the top right and left corners of the computer screen and

remained visible throughout the entire task. Response errors (i.e., pressing the incorrect key for

any stimulus, for example categorizing "love" as a negative word) were indicated by a red cross,

after which the participant was asked to correct the response. At the end of the IAT, a message

on the computer screen informed participants that their responses indicated that they had an

implicit bias in favor of the "opposite" gender (i.e., male participants were told that they favored

women and female participants were told that they favored men). See Appendix B for the full

text of this false feedback.

Responses to False Feedback on IAT Performance. After participants received the

false feedback on their performance on the gender IAT, they responded to seven items gauging

their reactions to the feedback (1=*strongly disagree* to 7=*strongly agree*). Specifically, six items

(taken from the IAT website, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/) assessed the extent to which

participants found the feedback believable (e.g., "I agree with the feedback I received about my

results on the unconscious gender attitudes task"; "My results on the unconscious gender

attitudes task reflect something about my unconscious thoughts and feelings about gender";

α=.83). One item assessed how interesting participants found the gender IAT ("I found the

unconscious gender attitudes task interesting").

Just World Beliefs. The scale used to measure just world beliefs was taken from Rubin

and Peplau (1975) and is the most popular measure of just world beliefs (Bègue & Hafer, 2005).

Participants rated 20 statements on a scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly

agree*). Low scores on statements such as "The political candidate who sticks up for her or his

principles rarely gets elected" and high scores on statements such as "It is rare for an innocent

person to be wrongly sent to jail" indicated higher just world beliefs (α=.59; see Appendix C for

the complete scale).

Responses to Sexist Jokes. Participants read two sexist jokes (see Appendix D) and rated

them on: how appropriate it would be for a well-known comedian to include them in their

comedy show (1=*extremely inappropriate* to 7=*extremely appropriate*), how funny they were

(1=*definitely not funny* to 7=*very funny*), and how offensive they were (1=*not at all offensive* to

7=*very offensive*). This task was intended as an indirect measure of participants' JWBs, with the

assumption that higher appropriateness and funniness ratings and lower offensiveness ratings

would indicate higher JWBs. Ratings of offensiveness were reverse-scored, and a mean

composite of all three items was computed separately for both jokes (αs=.70 and .73); higher

scores indicated a more favorable response.

Results

System Justification Manipulation Check

To test the effectiveness of the system justification manipulation, we conducted a 2

(Condition: System Threat vs. System Affirmation) × 2 (Participant Gender: Male vs. Female)

between-subjects ANOVA on responses to the memory quiz (which was completed directly after

reading the system justification manipulation text). This analysis revealed the expected main

effect of Condition, $F(1, 290)=887.09$, $p<.001$, $\eta^2_p=.75$. Participants recalled that the essay stated

that the United States is doing more poorly relative to other countries and that most Americans

feel worse about the state of America in the System Threat condition (*M*=2.14, *SD*=1.16) than in

the System Affirmation condition (*M*=6.02, *SD*=1.06), confirming the success of the

manipulation. There was no main effect of participant gender, *p*=.399, and no interaction,

p=.377. Thus, system threat was substantially higher in the System Threat (vs. System

Affirmation) condition for both male and female participants, as intended.

Responses to False Feedback on IAT Performance

To examine whether participants found the false feedback on IAT performance to be

believable, we conducted a 2 (Condition: System Threat vs. System Affirmation) × 2 (Participant

Gender: Male vs. Female) between-subjects ANOVA. This analysis revealed a main effect of

participant gender, $F(1, 288)$=9.76, *p*=.002, η^2_p=.03, indicating that men (*M*=4.60, *SD*=1.14)

found the IAT feedback more believable than did women (*M*=4.16, *SD*=1.25). There was no

main effect of condition, *p*=.298, and no interaction, *p*=.969.

Next, to examine whether participants found the IAT to be interesting, we conducted a 2

(Condition: System Threat vs. System Affirmation) × 2 (Participant Gender: Male vs. Female)

between-subjects ANOVA on this single-item measure. This analysis revealed a main effect of

participant gender, $F(1, 288)$=8.64, *p*=.004, η^2_p=.03, such that women (*M*=5.86, *SD*=1.39) found

the IAT more interesting than did men (*M*=5.38, *SD*=1.41). There was no main effect of

condition, *p*=.258, and no interaction, *p*=.456.

Just World Beliefs

To test the hypothesis that exposure to system threat (vs. system affirmation) would

increase just world beliefs, perhaps especially among female participants (due to the false

feedback on the IAT), we conducted a 2 (Condition: System Threat vs. System Affirmation) × 2

(Participant Gender: Male vs. Female) between-subjects ANOVA on self-reported JWBs. We observed a main effect of participant gender, $F(1, 290)=8.59$, $p=.004$, $\eta^2_p=.03$, with men ($M=4.09$, $SD=0.50$) reporting higher just world beliefs than women ($M=3.92$, $SD=0.51$). Contrary to hypotheses, there was no main effect of condition, $p=.311$, and no interaction, $p=.728$.

Responses to Sexist Jokes

To test the hypothesis that exposure to system threat (vs. system affirmation) would result in more favorable responses to sexist jokes, we conducted a 2 (Condition: System Threat vs. System Affirmation) × 2 (Participant Gender: Male vs. Female) × 2 (Joke 1 vs. Joke 2) mixed-model ANOVA, with the third factor varying within-subjects. We observed a main effect of joke, $F(1, 290)=13.22$, $p<.001$, $\eta^2_p=.04$, with Joke 1 ($M=4.15$, $SD=1.47$) being rated more favorably than Joke 2 ($M=3.86$, $SD=1.44$). We also observed a main effect of participant gender, $F(1, 290)=38.95$, $p<.001$, $\eta^2_p=.12$, such that men ($M=4.42$, $SD=1.06$) rated the jokes more favorably than did women ($M=3.55$, $SD=1.35$). Finally, there was a marginally significant main effect of condition, $F(1, 290)=2.75$, $p=.098$, $\eta^2_p=.01$, indicating that participants in the System Threat condition ($M=4.12$, $SD=1.31$) rated the jokes somewhat more favorably than did participants in the System Affirmation condition ($M=3.89$, $SD=1.25$). All 2-way and 3-way interactions were nonsignificant, $.228 \leq p \leq .761$.

Discussion

There is significant evidence demonstrating that gender biases remain pervasive in contemporary society. In the present research, we investigated whether women who were reminded of their disadvantaged position and were experimentally induced to be motivated to justify the system would have particularly high just world beliefs. This is not what we found;

indeed, the system justification manipulation did not significantly affect JWBs. The only variable that was associated with JWBs was participants' gender—men reported significantly higher JWBs than did women, which is both in line with past research (Hafer & Bègue, 2005) and intuitive, because men are advantaged by society and therefore have an incentive to believe the world is just. The system justification manipulation did, however, marginally affect how participants responded on an indirect measure of just world beliefs: Specifically, participants in the system threat condition were somewhat more approving of sexist humor than were participants in the system affirmation condition. Thus, our results indicate that motivation to justify the existing state of affairs in the world may make people less concerned about existing group-based inequalities.

The null effect we observed on explicit, self-report JWBs was likely not due to the ineffectiveness of the system justification manipulation we employed, as our manipulation check suggested that the manipulation was effective. Our data may suggest that JWBs are stable over time and difficult to manipulate in the short-term. Just world beliefs may either be a stable personality trait or a way of thinking people develop over time through their upbringing, both of which would make them difficult to alter based on experimental manipulations. Perhaps changing JWBs requires long-term exposure to stimuli that contradict the idea that the world is just. These kinds of stimuli might include education in areas such as social justice, high-minded media, and entertainment that exposes the injustices of the world. The entertainment industry— in the form of movies, television shows, novels, and plays—may play a large part in this, as many stories that end with the classic "and they lived happily ever after" promote the idea that good people are rewarded and bad people are vanquished. Being exposed to such stories regularly may indoctrinate people into believing that what happens in the stories they are told

happens in the real world (see Kay et al., 2009). Finding ways to decrease JWBs will be

important in attempting to avoid the negative effects these beliefs have on people's perceptions

of those who suffer. If we were able to decrease JWBs on a societal level then it is possible that

more people will be inclined to help others on a daily basis and be more supportive of social

policies that decrease suffering, such as social security and universal healthcare.

The marginal effect of system justification that we observed on participants' responses to

sexist humor provides some evidence that when people are more likely to justify the status quo,

they are more accepting of humor that is derisive of a disadvantaged group. This may be an

indirect indicator that their JWBs have been changed by the system justification manipulation. If

people condone derogatory humor targeting disadvantaged groups, they may think that those

groups are disadvantaged because they are less competent, and therefore less deserving, in *truth*.

Future research should seek to replicate this finding with a control condition to acquire baseline

data to demonstrate whether participants in the system threat condition rated the sexist humor

more favorably or whether participants in the system affirmation condition rated it less

favorably. This would inform us of which of the groups is the abnormal one; that is, which group

rates it differently than the general population or if both are. More generally, future work should

also look at whether exposure to humor at the expense of women and minorities via the media or

entertainment affects people's system justifying tendencies. Such research would shed light on

how the relationship between humor and system justifying tendencies operates in the real world,

and would provide ways in which these negative effects can be counteracted by raising

awareness to producers of media and entertainment.

Our study suggests that system justifying tendencies predict acceptance of the derision of

disadvantaged groups. It is possible that this means that when people are more likely to want to

rationalize the status quo they do not take disadvantaged groups' condition seriously and would

therefore not be as inclined to work to improve the status quo. Future research in this area would

provide valuable insights into how the media and entertainment act to perpetuate existing group-

based inequalities by making citizens complacent and encouraging them to believe that there is

no need to work towards social justice.

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Appendix A: A Full List of the Stimulus Words Used in the Gender Implicit Association

Test

Positive Words:

Freedom, health, love, peace, cheer, loyal, pleasure, lucky, smile, happiness

Negative Words:

Crash, filth, sick, accident, grief, disaster, tragedy, evil, rotten, agony

Words Associated with Men:

Male, man, boy, he, sir, father, grandpa, husband, son, uncle

Words Associated with Women:

Female, woman, girl, she, lady, aunt, daughter, wife, mother, grandma

Appendix B: Full Text of the False Feedback on IAT Performance

For female participants:

Your data suggest a strong automatic preference for males over females.

The interpretation is described as "automatic preference for males" if you responded faster when words associated with males (e.g. boy, uncle) and good words were classified with the same key than when words associated with females (e.g. girl, lady) and good words were classified with the same key. Depending on the magnitude of your result, your automatic preference may be described as 'slight', 'moderate', 'strong', or 'little to no preference'. Alternatively, you may have received feedback that "there were too many errors to determine a result".

For male participants:

Your data suggest a strong automatic preference for females over males.

The interpretation is described as "automatic preference for females" if you responded faster when words associated with females (e.g. girl, lady) and good words were classified with the same key than when words associated with males (e.g. boy, uncle) and good words were classified with the same key. Depending on the magnitude of your result, your automatic preference may be described as 'slight', 'moderate', 'strong', or 'little to no preference'. Alternatively, you may have received feedback that "there were too many errors to determine a result".

Appendix C: Just World Beliefs Measure (Rubin & Peplau, 1975)

1.   I've found that a person rarely deserves the reputation she or he has. (reverse-scored)

2.   Basically, the world is a just place.

3.   People who get "lucky breaks" have usually earned their good fortune.

4.   Careful drivers are just as likely to get hurt in traffic accidents as careless ones. (reverse-scored)

5.   It is a common occurrence for a guilty person to get off free in American courts. (reverse-scored)

6.   Students almost always deserve the grades they receive in school.

7.   People who keep in shape have little chance of suffering a heart attack.

8.   The political candidate who sticks up for her or his principles rarely gets elected. (reverse-scored)

9.   It is rare for an innocent person to be wrongly sent to jail.

10.   In professional sports, many fouls and infractions never get called by the referee. (reverse-scored)

11.   By and large, people deserve what they get.

12.   When parents punish their children, it is almost always for good reasons.

13.   Good deeds often go unnoticed and unrewarded. (reverse-scored)

14.   Although evil people may hold political power for a while, in the general course of history good wins out.

15.   In almost any business or profession, people who do their job well rise to the top.

16.   American parents tend to not appreciate their children enough. (reverse-scored)

17.   It is often impossible for a person to receive a fair trial in the USA. (reverse-scored)

18. People who meet with misfortune have often brought it on themselves.

19. Crime doesn't pay.

20. Many people suffer through absolutely no fault of their own. (reverse-scored)

Appendix D: Sexist Jokes

Directions: Please read the following jokes and rate them on the extent to which you think they are appropriate for a well-known comedian to include in their comedy show from 1 (extremely inappropriate) to 7 (extremely appropriate).

Please also rate the jokes on the following dimensions:

1=definitely not funny to 7=very funny

1=not at all offensive to 7=very offensive

Joke 1:

Q: What do you call a letter from a feminist?

A: Hate male.

Joke 2:

Q: Did you hear about the guy who finally figured out women?

A: He died laughing before he could tell anybody.