Extending the Bounded Rationality Model: The Distributed Cognition Approach

The way Simon, and the major part of the scholars, presented and used bounded rationality directly refers to human computational capabilities (or “brute-force”). Despite its broad powers of explanation, some problems arise when taking into account the way the human cognitive system really works. In order to avoid these problems, we present an alternative model of rationality, where computation plays only a part, together with the implemented role of external resources, emotional and other non-strictly-rational variables.bounded rationality, distributed cognition, external resources, decision-making, problem solving, emotions

Sherlock Holmes and the adventure of the rational manager: Organizational reason and its discontents

Rationality has since long been one of the central been issues in the discourse of management. Among the classics voices propagating a reductionist rationalism dominated and there are still many contexts where such a view is taken for granted. On the other hand, critics since the times of classics have been arguing for a less linear approach to management and management thinking. However, little attention has been paid to some of the different dimensions of management rationality, such as imagination. This paper sets out to address this gap in knowledge through presenting a narrative study focused on a literary character well known for his rationality, Sherlock Holmes, and revealing that this, to many, very epitome of rationality is actually an example of an extended type of rationality, including imagination. Following the fictional protagonist of our study, we consider some aspects of its relevance for management thought and practice. © 2012 Elsevier Ltd

János Kornai and general equilibrium theory

This paper explores the evolution of Kornai’s thought on general equilibrium theory (GET) and his position on mainstream economics. Three moments in this evolution will be highlighted, starting by his rejection of GET and advocating disequilibrium in Anti-Equilibrium (1971). While Kornai does not treat the “equilibrium paradigm” as irrelevant, he suggests an alternative paradigm, namely economic systems theory that he further develops in the 1980s as “system paradigm”. Economics of Shortage (1980) marks a second phase in which Kornai distinguishes Walrasian equilibrium from normal state or Marshallian equilibrium. In this phase, he supports Marshallian equilibrium rather than disequilibrium. Finally, By Force of Thought (2006) is a critical self-appraisal in which Kornai considers Anti-Equilibrium as a “failure” and acknowledges GET as a benchmark of an ideal competitive market. He now advocates a Walrasian equilibrium as an abstract reference model, but refuses to consider this model as a description of reality. In this sense, he rejects the New Classical economics. Paradoxically, however, his original heterodox concept of “soft budget constraint”, irreconcilable with standard microeconomics, has been integrated into new microeconomics as an optimal intertemporal strategy of a maximizing agent in the absence of credible commitments. It will be argued that Kornai’s so-called failure is rather related to his half-in, half-out mainstream position, while his institutionalist system paradigm is still a heterodox research project of the future

Rethinking Rationality

We seek to understand rational decision making and if it exists whether finite (bounded) agents may be able to achieve its principles. This aim has been a singular objective throughout much of human science and philosophy, with early discussions identified since antiquity. More recently, there has been a thriving debate based on differing perspectives on rationality, including adaptive heuristics, Bayesian theory, quantum theory, resource rationality, and probabilistic language of thought. Are these perspectives on rationality mutually exclusive? Are they all needed? Do they undermine an aim to have rational standards in decision situations like politics, medicine, legal proceedings, and others, where there is an expectation and need for decision making as close to “optimal” as possible? This special issue brings together representative contributions from the currently predominant views on rationality, with a view to evaluate progress on these and related questions

The problem and possibility of animal minds in Brandom\u27s work: revisiting Heidegger, rationality and normativity

Robert Brandom denies animals implicit reasoning by emphasizing their inability to make inferences explicit, and in so doing, denigrates animals by likening their behavior to that of machines and artifacts. I contest, however, that animals are paradigmatically more than any similarity or analogy to mechanical processing, just as humans are paradigmatically more than any reductive analogy to animals. The human/animal distinction need not come at the cost of ignoring the difference between animals and artifacts, and I believe we can largely subscribe to Brandom’s differentiation of the human in terms of expressionism if we allow that animals can make implicit inferences without making them explicit. After exposing in Chapter One Brandom’s ghettoizing of animal minds, I show in the following chapters what it might look like for humans to perform explication on behalf of implicit animal inferences. In Chapter Two I show where Brandom departs from Heidegger, and how there would otherwise be a place for animals in his thought. After revising Brandom along more orthodox Heideggerian lines, I explore in Chapter Three the early Heidegger’s concept of the world in terms of Dasein, animals, and unworlded things with an eye towards Brandom’s inferentialism. In Chapter Four I employ Mark Okrent’s teleological understanding of rationality to fill out Heidegger’s suggested view of animals. I conclude the thesis by showing how humans make explicit the implicit inferences of animals

The Dialectic of Progress and the Cultivation of Resistance in Critical Social Theory

Beginning with the influential discussion of the dialectic of progress found in Amy Allen’s The End of Progress, this paper outlines some difficulties encountered by critical theories of normative justification drawing on the early Frankfurt School. Characterizing Adorno and Horkheimer’s critical social theory as a dialectical reflection eschewing questions of normative foundations, I relate their well-known treatment of the dialectic of enlightenment reason and myth to their critique of capitalist society as a negative totality. By exploring the concepts of historical development used by Adorno and Horkheimer to describe both the progressive domination of capitalism, and the formation and cultivation of reflective consciousness, I trace the importance of progression and its inseparable relationship to regression in these early versions of critical theory. The dialectical social theory found here recognizes the persistence of social contradictions on both a methodological level and on the level of theory’s development and expression, a connection potentially obscured by a division of historical progress according to its temporal orientation. Particularly in Adorno’s later work, an opposition to the negative social totality requires notions of cultivation and learning which work against the prevailing forms of conceptual thinking, including the concern for the stability of rational foundations

Overcoming Individual Limitations Through Distributed Computation: Rational Information Accumulation in Multigenerational Populations

Many of the computational problems people face are difficult to solve under the limited time and cognitive resources available to them. Overcoming these limitations through social interaction is one of the most distinctive features of human intelligence. In this paper, we show that information accumulation in multigenerational social networks can be produced by a form of distributed Bayesian inference that allows individuals to benefit from the experience of previous generations while expending little cognitive effort. In doing so, we provide a criterion for assessing the rationality of a population that extends traditional analyses of the rationality of individuals. We tested the predictions of this analysis in two highly controlled behavioral experiments where the social transmission structure closely matched the assumptions of our model. Participants made decisions on simple categorization tasks that relied on and contributed to accumulated knowledge. Success required these microsocieties to accumulate information distributed across people and time. Our findings illustrate how in certain settings, distributed computation at the group level can pool information and resources, allowing limited individuals to perform effectively on complex tasks

What's a face worth: Noneconomic factors in game playing

Where behavior defies economic analysis, one explanation is that individuals consider more than the immediate payoff. We present evidence that noneconomic factors influence behavior. Attractiveness influences offers in the Ultimatum and Dictator Games. Facial resemblance, a cue of relatedness, increases trusting in a two-node trust game. Only by considering the range of possible influences will game-playing behavior be explained

Farewell to Media Studies as a Science: An Analysis and Critique of Media Studies, Human Sciences and their Methodology

Ihmistieteissä on jatkunut jo pitkään kahden tiedenäkemyksen vastakkainasettelu. Dikotomiat positivismi–hermeneutiikka ja kvantitatiivinen–kvalitatiivinen ovat tuon vastakkainasettelun muunnelmia. Niiden ydinajatukset ovat säilyneet samoina, vaikka ne aika ajoin esiintyvät ikään kuin uusina. Tämän työn keskeinen kanta on se, että hermeneuttinen ja kvalitatiivinen tutkimusote sekä niiden uudemmat muunnelmat kuten postmodernismi ja sosiaalinen konstruktionismi ovat tieteenfilosofisesti ja käytännöllisesti kestämättömiä. Kysymys ei ole niinkään siitä, mikä on ”ainut ja oikea” kanta, vaan siitä mikä toimii paremmin ja mikä on paremmin perusteltu. Tarkoituksena on tarkastella, miten mediatutkimus sopii tähän kuvaan. Tämä tapahtuu vertailemalla mediatutkimusta suhteessa muihin ihmistieteisiin sekä niissä harjoitettuun tieteenfilosofiseen argumentaatioon. Tällainen laaja tarkastelu on sikäli oikeutettua, että mediatutkimuksen metodologia ei ole ainutlaatuinen eikä se ole syntynyt itsestään itseään varten. Se on päinvastoin läpikyllästetty niin ihmistieteiden kuin yleisen tieteenfilosofian ja tieteen käytännöillä. Mediatutkimuksen tarkastelussa on siis välttämättä otettava huomioon laajempi kokonaisuus. Mediatutkimuksen analyysi perustuu tässä tutkimuksessa kahteen osaan: mediatutkimuksesta alana otettuihin esimerkkeihin ja Vaasan yliopiston mediatutkimuksesta tehtyjen pro gradu -töiden tarkasteluun. Osittain on siis kyse case-tutkimuksesta, jossa Vaasan yliopisto on tarkasteltu tapaus. Testattavana hypoteesina on oletus, että pro gradu -töiden tieteellinen taso ja arvosana korreloivat keskenään. Vaikka eroja löytyi siinä, miten esimerkiksi eri ajatuksia kehiteltiin ja käsiteltiin, ei tieteellisen argumentaation, tieteellisten periaatteiden, toisin sanoen tieteellisyyden sinänsä tasolla eroa pystytty havaitsemaan. Lisäksi pro gradu -työt eivät yleisesti ottaen täyttäneet tieteellisyyden vaatimuksia, vaikka arvosanan perusteella olisi syytä olettaa toisin. Jos yhtäältä pro gradu -työt eivät täyttäneet ”perinteisen” (positivistisen, kvantitatiivisen) tiedenäkemyksen kriteerejä, ne toisaalta vastasivat hermeneuttis–kvalitatiivisen jne. ihmistiedesuuntauksen ihanteita.fi=Opinnäytetyö kokotekstinä PDF-muodossa.|en=Thesis fulltext in PDF format.|sv=Lärdomsprov tillgängligt som fulltext i PDF-format