Advances in wireless community networks with the community-lab testbed

Beyond traditional telecom providers, citizens and organizations pool their own resources and coordinate in order to build local network infrastructures to address the digital divide in many parts of the world. These crowdsourced network infrastructures can be self-organized and shared by a community for the collective benefit of its members. Several of these networks have developed open, free, and neutral agreements, and are governed as a common-pool resource: community networks. These are built using a variety of commodity wireless hardware (e.g., Wi-Fi long-range point-to-point links, Wi-Fi and GSM access points, and mesh networks), sometimes optical fiber links, heterogeneous nodes, routing protocols, and applications. A group of researchers, developers, and community networks developed the Community-Lab testbed, and for the last five years have worked together to overcome obstacles, improve the technologies, tools, and operational models being used, as well as model best practices for more effective and sustainable community networks. This article presents the challenges for experimentation, the testbeds built, results, lessons learned, and the impact of that work to place wireless community networks as one sustainable way toward an Internet accessible to all.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

Fundamental Design Issues in Anonymous Peer-to-peer Distributed Hash Table Protocols

Ph.D

Economic issues in distributed computing

textOn the Internet, one of the essential characteristics of electronic commerce is the integration of large-scale computer networks and business practices. Commercial servers are connected through open and complex communication technologies, and online consumers access the services with virtually unpredictable behavior. Both of them as well as the e-Commerce infrastructure are vulnerable to cyber attacks. Among the various network security problems, the Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack is a unique example to illustrate the risk of commercial network applications. Using a massive junk traffic, literally anyone on the Internet can launch a DDoS attack to flood and shutdown an eCommerce website. Cooperative technological solutions for Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks are already available, yet organizations in the best position to implement them lack incentive to do so, and the victims of DDoS attacks cannot find effective methods to motivate the organizations. Chapter 1 discusses two components of the technological solutions to DDoS attacks: cooperative filtering and cooperative traffic smoothing by caching, and then analyzes the broken incentive chain in each of these technological solutions. As a remedy, I propose usage-based pricing and Capacity Provision Networks, which enable victims to disseminate enough incentive along attack paths to stimulate cooperation against DDoS attacks. Chapter 2 addresses possible Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks toward the wireless Internet including the Wireless Extended Internet, the Wireless Portal Network, and the Wireless Ad Hoc network. I propose a conceptual model for defending against DDoS attacks on the wireless Internet, which incorporates both cooperative technological solutions and economic incentive mechanisms built on usage-based fees. Cost-effectiveness is also addressed through an illustrative implementation scheme using Policy Based Networking (PBN). By investigating both technological and economic difficulties in defense of DDoS attacks which have plagued the wired Internet, our aim here is to foster further development of wireless Internet infrastructure as a more secure and efficient platform for mobile commerce. To avoid centralized resources and performance bottlenecks, online peer-to-peer communities and online social network have become increasingly popular. In particular, the recent boost of online peer-to-peer communities has led to exponential growth in sharing of user-contributed content which has brought profound changes to business and economic practices. Understanding the dynamics and sustainability of such peer-to-peer communities has important implications for business managers. In Chapter 3, I explore the structure of online sharing communities from a dynamic process perspective. I build an evolutionary game model to capture the dynamics of online peer-to-peer communities. Using online music sharing data collected from one of the IRC Channels for over five years, I empirically investigate the model which underlies the dynamics of the music sharing community. Our empirical results show strong support for the evolutionary process of the community. I find that the two major parties in the community, namely sharers and downloaders, are influencing each other in their dynamics of evolvement in the community. These dynamics reveal the mechanism through which peer-to-peer communities sustain and thrive in a constant changing environment.Information, Risk, and Operations Management (IROM

Private and censorship-resistant communication over public networks

Society’s increasing reliance on digital communication networks is creating unprecedented opportunities for wholesale surveillance and censorship. This thesis investigates the use of public networks such as the Internet to build robust, private communication systems that can resist monitoring and attacks by powerful adversaries such as national governments. We sketch the design of a censorship-resistant communication system based on peer-to-peer Internet overlays in which the participants only communicate directly with people they know and trust. This ‘friend-to-friend’ approach protects the participants’ privacy, but it also presents two significant challenges. The first is that, as with any peer-to-peer overlay, the users of the system must collectively provide the resources necessary for its operation; some users might prefer to use the system without contributing resources equal to those they consume, and if many users do so, the system may not be able to survive. To address this challenge we present a new game theoretic model of the problem of encouraging cooperation between selfish actors under conditions of scarcity, and develop a strategy for the game that provides rational incentives for cooperation under a wide range of conditions. The second challenge is that the structure of a friend-to-friend overlay may reveal the users’ social relationships to an adversary monitoring the underlying network. To conceal their sensitive relationships from the adversary, the users must be able to communicate indirectly across the overlay in a way that resists monitoring and attacks by other participants. We address this second challenge by developing two new routing protocols that robustly deliver messages across networks with unknown topologies, without revealing the identities of the communication endpoints to intermediate nodes or vice versa. The protocols make use of a novel unforgeable acknowledgement mechanism that proves that a message has been delivered without identifying the source or destination of the message or the path by which it was delivered. One of the routing protocols is shown to be robust to attacks by malicious participants, while the other provides rational incentives for selfish participants to cooperate in forwarding messages

Incentive Mechanisms in Peer-to-Peer Networks — A Systematic Literature Review

Centralized networks inevitably exhibit single points of failure that malicious actors regularly target. Decentralized networks are more resilient if numerous participants contribute to the network’s functionality. Most decentralized networks employ incentive mechanisms to coordinate the participation and cooperation of peers and thereby ensure the functionality and security of the network. This article systematically reviews incentive mechanisms for decentralized networks and networked systems by covering 165 prior literature reviews and 178 primary research papers published between 1993 and October 2022. Of the considered sources, we analyze 11 literature reviews and 105 primary research papers in detail by categorizing and comparing the distinctive properties of the presented incentive mechanisms. The reviewed incentive mechanisms establish fairness and reward participation and cooperative behavior. We review work that substitutes central authority through independent and subjective mechanisms run in isolation at each participating peer and work that applies multiparty computation. We use monetary, reputation, and service rewards as categories to differentiate the implementations and evaluate each incentive mechanism’s data management, attack resistance, and contribution model. Further, we highlight research gaps and deficiencies in reproducibility and comparability. Finally, we summarize our assessments and provide recommendations to apply incentive mechanisms to decentralized networks that share computational resources

A Comprehensive Survey of Voice over IP Security Research

We present a comprehensive survey of Voice over IP security academic research, using a set of 245 publications forming a closed cross-citation set. We classify these papers according to an extended version of the VoIP Security Alliance (VoIPSA) Threat Taxonomy. Our goal is to provide a roadmap for researchers seeking to understand existing capabilities and to identify gaps in addressing the numerous threats and vulnerabilities present in VoIP systems. We discuss the implications of our findings with respect to vulnerabilities reported in a variety of VoIP products. We identify two specific problem areas (denial of service, and service abuse) as requiring significant more attention from the research community. We also find that the overwhelming majority of the surveyed work takes a black box view of VoIP systems that avoids examining their internal structure and implementation. Such an approach may miss the mark in terms of addressing the main sources of vulnerabilities, i.e., implementation bugs and misconfigurations. Finally, we argue for further work on understanding cross-protocol and cross-mechanism vulnerabilities (emergent properties), which are the byproduct of a highly complex system-of-systems and an indication of the issues in future large-scale systems

Analysis of bandwidth attacks in a bittorrent swarm

The beginning of the 21st century saw a widely publicized lawsuit against Napster. This was the first Peer-to-Peer software that allowed its users to search for and share digital music with other users. At the height of its popularity, Napster boasted 80 million registered users. This marked the beginning of a Peer-to-Peer paradigm and the end of older methods of distributing cultural possessions. But Napster was not entirely rooted in a Peer-to-Peer paradigm. Only the download of a file was based on Peer-to-Peer interactions; the search process was still based on a central server. It was thus easy to shutdown Napster. Shortly after the shutdown, Bram Cohen developed a new Peer-to-Peer protocol called BitTorrent. The main principle behind BitTorrent is an incentive mechanism, called a choking algorithm, which rewards peers that share. Currently, BitTorrent is one of the most widely used protocols on the Internet. Therefore, it is important to investigate the security of this protocol. While significant progress has been made in understanding the Bit- Torrent choking mechanism, its security vulnerabilities have not yet been thoroughly investigated. This dissertation provides a security analysis of the Peer-to-Peer protocol BitTorrent on the application and transport layer. The dissertation begins with an experimental analysis of bandwidth attacks against different choking algorithms in the BitTorrent seed state. I reveal a simple exploit that allows malicious peers to receive a considerably higher download rate than contributing leechers, thereby causing a significant loss of efficiency for benign peers. I show the damage caused by the proposed attack in two different environments—a lab testbed comprised of 32 peers and a global testbed called PlanetLab with 300 peers. Our results show that three malicious peers can degrade the download rate by up to 414.99 % for all peers. Combined with a Sybil attack with as many attackers as leechers, it is possible to degrade the download rate by more than 1000 %. I propose a novel choking algorithm which is immune against bandwidth attacks and a countermeasure against the revealed attack. This thesis includes a security analysis of the transport layer. To make BitTorrent more Internet Service Provider friendly, BitTorrent Inc. invented the Micro Transport Protocol. It is based on User Datagram Protocol with a novel congestion control called Low Extra Delay Background Transport. This protocol assumes that the receiver always provides correct feedback, otherwise this deteriorates throughput or yields to corrupted data. I show through experimental evaluation, that a misbehaving Micro Transport Protocol receiver which is not interested in data integrity, can increase the bandwidth of the sender by up to five times. This can cause a congestion collapse and steal a large share of a victim’s bandwidth. I present three attacks, which increase bandwidth usage significantly. I have tested these attacks in real world environments and demonstrate their severity both in terms of the number of packets and total traffic generated. I also present a countermeasure for protecting against these attacks and evaluate the performance of this defensive strategy. In the last section, I demonstrate that the BitTorrent protocol family is vulnerable to Distributed Reflective Denial-of-Service attacks. Specifically, I show that an attacker can exploit BitTorrent protocols (Micro Transport Protocol, Distributed Hash Table, Message Stream Encryption and BitTorrent Sync to reflect and amplify traffic from Bit- Torrent peers to any target on the Internet. I validate the efficiency, robustness, and the difficulty of defence of the exposed BitTorrent vulnerabilities in a Peer-to-Peer lab testbed. I further substantiate lab results by crawling more than 2.1 million IP addresses over Mainline Distributed Hash Table and analyzing more than 10,000 BitTorrent handshakes. The experiments suggest that an attacker is able to exploit BitTorrent peers to amplify traffic by a factor of 50, and in the case of BitTorrent Sync 120. Additionally, I observe that the most popular BitTorrent clients are the most vulnerable ones