Succinctness in subsystems of the spatial mu-calculus

In this paper we systematically explore questions of succinctness in modal logics employed in spatial reasoning. We show that the closure operator, despite being less expressive, is exponentially more succinct than the limit-point operator, and that the $\mu$-calculus is exponentially more succinct than the equally-expressive tangled limit operator. These results hold for any class of spaces containing at least one crowded metric space or containing all spaces based on ordinals below $\omega^\omega$, with the usual limit operator. We also show that these results continue to hold even if we enrich the less succinct language with the universal modality

MFCS\u2798 Satellite Workshop on Cellular Automata

For the 1998 conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS\u2798) four papers on Cellular Automata were accepted as regular MFCS\u2798 contributions. Furthermore an MFCS\u2798 satellite workshop on Cellular Automata was organized with ten additional talks. The embedding of the workshop into the conference with its participants coming from a broad spectrum of fields of work lead to interesting discussions and a fruitful exchange of ideas. The contributions which had been accepted for MFCS\u2798 itself may be found in the conference proceedings, edited by L. Brim, J. Gruska and J. Zlatuska, Springer LNCS 1450. All other (invited and regular) papers of the workshop are contained in this technical report. (One paper, for which no postscript file of the full paper is available, is only included in the printed version of the report). Contents: F. Blanchard, E. Formenti, P. Kurka: Cellular automata in the Cantor, Besicovitch and Weyl Spaces K. Kobayashi: On Time Optimal Solutions of the Two-Dimensional Firing Squad Synchronization Problem L. Margara: Topological Mixing and Denseness of Periodic Orbits for Linear Cellular Automata over Z_m B. Martin: A Geometrical Hierarchy of Graph via Cellular Automata K. Morita, K. Imai: Number-Conserving Reversible Cellular Automata and Their Computation-Universality C. Nichitiu, E. Remila: Simulations of graph automata K. Svozil: Is the world a machine? H. Umeo: Cellular Algorithms with 1-bit Inter-Cell Communications F. Reischle, Th. Worsch: Simulations between alternating CA, alternating TM and circuit families K. Sutner: Computation Theory of Cellular Automat

Hilbert Mathematics Versus Gödel Mathematics. IV. The New Approach of Hilbert Mathematics Easily Resolving the Most Difficult Problems of Gödel Mathematics

The paper continues the consideration of Hilbert mathematics to mathematics itself as an additional “dimension” allowing for the most difficult and fundamental problems to be attacked in a new general and universal way shareable between all of them. That dimension consists in the parameter of the “distance between finiteness and infinity”, particularly able to interpret standard mathematics as a particular case, the basis of which are arithmetic, set theory and propositional logic: that is as a special “flat” case of Hilbert mathematics. The following four essential problems are considered for the idea to be elucidated: Fermat’s last theorem proved by Andrew Wiles; Poincaré’s conjecture proved by Grigori Perelman and the only resolved from the seven Millennium problems offered by the Clay Mathematics Institute (CMI); the four-color theorem proved “machine-likely” by enumerating all cases and the crucial software assistance; the Yang-Mills existence and mass gap problem also suggested by CMI and yet unresolved. They are intentionally chosen to belong to quite different mathematical areas (number theory, topology, mathematical physics) just to demonstrate the power of the approach able to unite and even unify them from the viewpoint of Hilbert mathematics. Also, specific ideas relevant to each of them are considered. Fermat’s last theorem is shown as a Gödel insoluble statement by means of Yablo’s paradox. Thus, Wiles’s proof as a corollary from the modularity theorem and thus needing both arithmetic and set theory involves necessarily an inverse Grothendieck universe. On the contrary, its proof in “Fermat arithmetic” introduced by “epoché to infinity” (following the pattern of Husserl’s original “epoché to reality”) can be suggested by Hilbert arithmetic relevant to Hilbert mathematics, the mediation of which can be removed in the final analysis as a “Wittgenstein ladder”. Poincaré’s conjecture can be reinterpreted physically by Minkowski space and thus reduced to the “nonstandard homeomorphism” of a bit of information mathematically. Perelman’s proof can be accordingly reinterpreted. However, it is valid in Gödel (or Gödelian) mathematics, but not in Hilbert mathematics in general, where the question of whether it holds remains open. The four-color theorem can be also deduced from the nonstandard homeomorphism at issue, but the available proof by enumerating a finite set of all possible cases is more general and relevant to Hilbert mathematics as well, therefore being an indirect argument in favor of the validity of Poincaré’s conjecture in Hilbert mathematics. The Yang-Mills existence and mass gap problem furthermore suggests the most general viewpoint to the relation of Hilbert and Gödel mathematics justifying the qubit Hilbert space as the dual counterpart of Hilbert arithmetic in a narrow sense, in turn being inferable from Hilbert arithmetic in a wide sense. The conjecture that many if not almost all great problems in contemporary mathematics rely on (or at least relate to) the Gödel incompleteness is suggested. It implies that Hilbert mathematics is the natural medium for their discussion or eventual solutions

The mathematicization of nature.

This thesis defends the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument for mathematical realism and introduces a new indispensability argument for a substantial conception of truth. Chapters 1 and 2 formulate the main components of the Quine-Putnam argument, namely that virtually all scientific laws quantify over mathematical entities and thus logically presuppose the existence thereof. Chapter 2 contains a detailed discussion of the logical structure of some scientific theories that incorporate or apply mathematics. Chapter 3 then reconstructs the central assumptions of Quine's argument, concluding (provocatively) that "science entails platonism". Chapter 4 contains a brief discussion of some major theories of truth, including deflationary views (redundancy, disquotation). Chapter 5 introduces a new argument against such deflationary views, based on certain logical properties of truth theories. Chapter 6 contains a further discussion of mathematical truth. In particular, non-standard conceptions of mathematical truth such as "if-thenism" and "hermeneuticism". Chapter 7 introduces the programmes of reconstrual and reconstruction proposed by recent nominalism. Chapters 8 discusses modal nominalism, concluding that modalism is implausible as an interpretation of mathematics (if taken seriously, it suffers from exactly those epistemological problems allegedly suffered by realism). Chapter 9 discusses Field's deflationism, whose central motivating idea is that mathematics is (pace Quine and Putnam) dispensable in applications. This turns on a conservativeness claim which, as Shapiro pointed out in 1983, must be incorrect (using Godel's Theorems). I conclude in Chapter 10 that nominalistic views of mathematics and deflationist views of truth are both inadequate to the overall explanatory needs of science

Multicoloured Random Graphs: Constructions and Symmetry

This is a research monograph on constructions of and group actions on countable homogeneous graphs, concentrating particularly on the simple random graph and its edge-coloured variants. We study various aspects of the graphs, but the emphasis is on understanding those groups that are supported by these graphs together with links with other structures such as lattices, topologies and filters, rings and algebras, metric spaces, sets and models, Moufang loops and monoids. The large amount of background material included serves as an introduction to the theories that are used to produce the new results. The large number of references should help in making this a resource for anyone interested in beginning research in this or allied fields.Comment: Index added in v2. This is the first of 3 documents; the other 2 will appear in physic

The Universality Problem

The theme of this thesis is to explore the universality problem in set theory in connection to model theory, to present some methods for finding universality results, to analyse how these methods were applied, to mention some results and to emphasise some philosophical interrogations that these aspects entail. A fundamental aspect of the universality problem is to find what determines the existence of universal objects. That means that we have to take into consideration and examine the methods that we use in proving their existence or nonexistence, the role of cardinal arithmetic, combinatorics etc. The proof methods used in the mathematical part will be mostly set-theoretic, but some methods from model theory and category theory will also be present. A graph might be the simplest, but it is also one of the most useful notions in mathematics. We show that there is a faithful functor F from the category L of linear orders to the category G of graphs that preserves model theoretic-related universality results (classes of objects having universal models in exactly the same cardinals, and also having the same universality spectrum). Trees constitute combinatorial objects and have a central role in set theory. The universality of trees is connected to the universality of linear orders, but it also seems to present more challenges, which we survey and present some results. We show that there is no embedding between an ℵ2-Souslin tree and a non-special wide ℵ2 tree T with no cofinal branches. Furthermore, using the notion of ascent path, we prove that the class of non-special ℵ2-Souslin tree with an ω-ascent path a has maximal complexity number, 2ℵ2 = ℵ3. Within the general framework of the universality problem in set theory and model theory, while emphasising their approaches and their connections with regard to this topic, we examine the possibility of drawing some philosophical conclusions connected to, among others, the notions of mathematical knowledge, mathematical object and proof