5,733 research outputs found
Exact Inference Techniques for the Analysis of Bayesian Attack Graphs
Attack graphs are a powerful tool for security risk assessment by analysing
network vulnerabilities and the paths attackers can use to compromise network
resources. The uncertainty about the attacker's behaviour makes Bayesian
networks suitable to model attack graphs to perform static and dynamic
analysis. Previous approaches have focused on the formalization of attack
graphs into a Bayesian model rather than proposing mechanisms for their
analysis. In this paper we propose to use efficient algorithms to make exact
inference in Bayesian attack graphs, enabling the static and dynamic network
risk assessments. To support the validity of our approach we have performed an
extensive experimental evaluation on synthetic Bayesian attack graphs with
different topologies, showing the computational advantages in terms of time and
memory use of the proposed techniques when compared to existing approaches.Comment: 14 pages, 15 figure
Run-time risk management in adaptive ICT systems
We will present results of the SERSCIS project related to risk management and mitigation strategies in adaptive multi-stakeholder ICT systems. The SERSCIS approach involves using semantic threat models to support automated design-time threat identification and mitigation analysis. The focus of this paper is the use of these models at run-time for automated threat detection and diagnosis. This is based on a combination of semantic reasoning and Bayesian inference applied to run-time system monitoring data. The resulting dynamic risk management approach is compared to a conventional ISO 27000 type approach, and validation test results presented from an Airport Collaborative Decision Making (A-CDM) scenario involving data exchange between multiple airport service providers
Assessing Security Risk to a Network Using a Statistical Model of Attacker Community Competence
We propose a novel approach for statistical risk modeling of network attacks that lets an operator perform risk analysis using a data model and an impact model on top of an attack graph in combination with a statistical model of the attacker community exploitation skill. The data model describes how data flows between nodes in the network -- how it is copied and processed by softwares and hosts -- while the impact model models how exploitation of vulnerabilities affects the data flows with respect to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the data. In addition, by assigning a loss value to a compromised data set, we can estimate the cost of a successful attack. The statistical model lets us incorporate real-time monitor data from a honeypot in the risk calculation. The exploitation skill distribution is inferred by first classifying each vulnerability into a required exploitation skill-level category, then mapping each skill-level into a distribution over the required exploitation skill, and last applying Bayesian inference over the attack data. The final security risk is thereafter computed by marginalizing over the exploitation skill
Comprehensive Security Framework for Global Threats Analysis
Cyber criminality activities are changing and becoming more and more professional. With the growth of financial flows through the Internet and the Information System (IS), new kinds of thread arise involving complex scenarios spread within multiple IS components. The IS information modeling and Behavioral Analysis are becoming new solutions to normalize the IS information and counter these new threads. This paper presents a framework which details the principal and necessary steps for monitoring an IS. We present the architecture of the framework, i.e. an ontology of activities carried out within an IS to model security information and User Behavioral analysis. The results of the performed experiments on real data show that the modeling is effective to reduce the amount of events by 91%. The User Behavioral Analysis on uniform modeled data is also effective, detecting more than 80% of legitimate actions of attack scenarios
DAG-Based Attack and Defense Modeling: Don't Miss the Forest for the Attack Trees
This paper presents the current state of the art on attack and defense
modeling approaches that are based on directed acyclic graphs (DAGs). DAGs
allow for a hierarchical decomposition of complex scenarios into simple, easily
understandable and quantifiable actions. Methods based on threat trees and
Bayesian networks are two well-known approaches to security modeling. However
there exist more than 30 DAG-based methodologies, each having different
features and goals. The objective of this survey is to present a complete
overview of graphical attack and defense modeling techniques based on DAGs.
This consists of summarizing the existing methodologies, comparing their
features and proposing a taxonomy of the described formalisms. This article
also supports the selection of an adequate modeling technique depending on user
requirements
Assessing and augmenting SCADA cyber security: a survey of techniques
SCADA systems monitor and control critical infrastructures of national importance such as power generation and distribution, water supply, transportation networks, and manufacturing facilities. The pervasiveness, miniaturisations and declining costs of internet connectivity have transformed these systems from strictly isolated to highly interconnected networks. The connectivity provides immense benefits such as reliability, scalability and remote connectivity, but at the same time exposes an otherwise isolated and secure system, to global cyber security threats. This inevitable transformation to highly connected systems thus necessitates effective security safeguards to be in place as any compromise or downtime of SCADA systems can have severe economic, safety and security ramifications. One way to ensure vital asset protection is to adopt a viewpoint similar to an attacker to determine weaknesses and loopholes in defences. Such mind sets help to identify and fix potential breaches before their exploitation. This paper surveys tools and techniques to uncover SCADA system vulnerabilities. A comprehensive review of the selected approaches is provided along with their applicability
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