Assessing and augmenting SCADA cyber security: a survey of techniques

SCADA systems monitor and control critical infrastructures of national importance such as power generation and distribution, water supply, transportation networks, and manufacturing facilities. The pervasiveness, miniaturisations and declining costs of internet connectivity have transformed these systems from strictly isolated to highly interconnected networks. The connectivity provides immense benefits such as reliability, scalability and remote connectivity, but at the same time exposes an otherwise isolated and secure system, to global cyber security threats. This inevitable transformation to highly connected systems thus necessitates effective security safeguards to be in place as any compromise or downtime of SCADA systems can have severe economic, safety and security ramifications. One way to ensure vital asset protection is to adopt a viewpoint similar to an attacker to determine weaknesses and loopholes in defences. Such mind sets help to identify and fix potential breaches before their exploitation. This paper surveys tools and techniques to uncover SCADA system vulnerabilities. A comprehensive review of the selected approaches is provided along with their applicability

Exploring security controls for ICS/SCADA environments

Trabalho de projeto de mestrado, Segurança Informática, Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Ciências, 2020Os Sistemas de Controlo Industriais (ICS) estão a começar a fundir-se com as soluções de IT, por forma a promover a interconectividade. Embora isto traga inúmeros benefícios de uma perspetiva de controlo, os ICS apresentam uma falta de mecanismos de segurança que consigam evitar possíveis ameaças informáticas, quando comparados aos comuns sistemas de informação [29], [64]. Dada a natureza crítica destes sistemas, e a ocorrências recentes de ciberataques desastrosos, a segurança ´e um tópico que deve ser incentivado. À luz deste problema, na presente dissertação apresentamos uma avaliação de possíveis aplicações e controlos de segurança a serem implantados nestes ambientes críticos e a implementação de uma solução de segurança extensível que dá resposta a certos ataques focados em sistemas industriais, capaz de ser implantada em qualquer rede industrial que permita a sua ligação. Com o auxilio de uma framework extensivel e portátil para testes de ICS, e outros ambientes industriais de testes, foi possível analisar diferentes cenários de ameaças, implantar mecanismos de segurança para os detetar e avaliar os resultados, com o intuito de fornecer uma ideia de como empregar estes mecanismos da melhor maneira possível num ambiente real de controlo industrial.Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are beginning to merge with IT solutions, in order to promote inter-connectivity. Although this brings countless benefits from a control perspective, ICS have been lacking in security mechanisms to ward off potential cyber threats, when compared to common information systems [29], [64]. Given the critical nature of these systems, and the recent occurrences of disastrous cyber-attacks, security is a topic that should be encouraged. In light of this problem, in this dissertation we present an assessment of possible security applications and controls that can be deployed in these critical environments and the implementation of an extensible security solution that responds to certain attacks focused on industrial systems, capable of being deployed in any industrial network that allows its connection. With the help of an extensible and portable framework for ICS testing, and other industrial testing environments, it was possible to analyze different threat scenarios, implement security mechanisms to detect them and evaluate the results in order to provide an idea on how to employ these mechanisms as best as possible in a real industrial control environment, without compromising it’s process

Laboratory Exercises to Accompany Industrial Control and Embedded Systems Security Curriculum Modules

The daily intrusion attempts and attacks on industrial control systems (ICS) and embedded systems (ES) underscore the criticality of the protection of our Critical Infrastructures (CIs). As recent as mid-July 2018, numerous reports on the infiltration of US utility control rooms by Russian hackers have been published. These successful infiltration and possible manipulation of the utility companies could easily translate to a devastating attack on our nation’s power grid and, consequently, our economy and well-being. Indeed, the need to secure the control and embedded systems which operate our CIs has never been so pronounced. In our attempt to address this critical need, we designed, developed and implemented ICS and ES security curriculum modules with pertinent hands-on laboratory exercises that can be freely adopted across the national setting. This paper describes in detail the modules and the accompanying exercises and proposes future enhancements and extensions to these pedagogical instruments. It highlights the interaction between control and embedded systems security with Presidential Policy Directive 8- the National Preparedness Plan (NPP), cyber risk management, incident handling. To establish the premise the laboratory exercises were developed. This paper outlines the description and content of the modules in the areas of (1) Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security, (2) embedded systems (ES), and (3) guidelines, standards, and policy. The ICS security modules cover the predominant ICS protocols, ladder logic programming, Human Machine Interface (HMI), defensive techniques, ICS reconnaissance, vulnerability assessment, Intrusion detection, and penetration testing. The ES security modules include topics such as secure firmware programming and authentication mechanisms. In the guidelines, standards, and policy section, the topics covered by the modules include the NPP as it relates to CI protection, risk management, system protection and policy design, and managing operations and controls. An overview of the various hands-on exercises that accompany the course modules is also presented. Further, to evaluate the effectiveness of the pedagogical materials, an initial evaluation was conducted and the survey data were collected, analyzed, and presented. The paper concludes with future enhancements and directives on opportunities for module extensions and course adoption

Towards an In-depth Understanding of Deep Packet Inspection Using a Suite of Industrial Control Systems Protocol Packets

Industrial control systems (ICS) are increasingly at risk and vulnerable to internal and external threats. These systems are integral part of our nation’s critical infrastructures. Consequently, a successful cyberattack on one of these could present disastrous consequences to human life and property as well. It is imperative that cybersecurity professionals gain a good understanding of these systems particularly in the area of communication protocols. Traditional Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) are made to encapsulate some of these ICS protocols which may enable malicious payload to get through the network firewall and thus, gain entry into the network. This paper describes technical details on various ICS protocols and a suite of ICS protocol packets for the purpose of providing digital forensic materials for laboratory exercises toward a better understanding of the inner workings of ICS communications. Further, these artifacts can be useful in devising deep packet inspection (DPI) strategies that can be implemented in network firewalls, in expanding challenge materials for cyber competitions, and in attribution, vulnerability assessment, and penetration testing research in ICS security. We also present software tools that are available for free download on the Internet that could be used to generate simulated ICS and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) communication packets for research and pedagogical purposes. Finally, we conclude the paper by presenting possible research avenues that can be pursued as extensions to this seminal work on ICS security. Prominent among these possible extensions is the expansion of the ICS packet suite to include those protocols in the wireless domain such as Wi-Fi (802.11), Bluetooth, Zigbee, and other protocols that utilizes proprietary Radio Frequency

Design of Platforms for Experimentation in Industrial Cybersecurity

[EN] The connectivity advances in industrial control systems have also increased the possibility of cyberattacks in industry. Thus, security becomes crucial in critical infrastructures, whose services are considered essential in fields such as manufacturing, energy or public health. Although theoretical and formal approaches are often proposed to advance in the field of industrial cybersecurity, more experimental efforts in realistic scenarios are needed to understand the impact of incidents, assess security technologies or provide training. In this paper, an approach for cybersecurity experimentation is proposed for several industrial areas. Aiming at a high degree of flexibility, the Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Laboratory (CICLab) is designed to integrate both real physical equipment with computing and networking infrastructure. It provides a platform for performing security experiments in control systems of diverse sectors such as industry, energy and building management. They allow researchers to perform security experimentation in realistic environments using a wide variety of technologies that are common in these control systems, as well as in the protection or security analysis of industrial networks. Furthermore, educational developments can be made to meet the growing demand of security-related professionals.SIMinisterio de Economía y Competitividad Spain UNLE13-3E-157

Advanced security aspects on Industrial Control Network.

Security threats are one of the main problems of this computer-based era. All systems making use of information and communication technologies (ICT) are prone to failures and vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malicious software and agents. In the latest years, Industrial Critical Installations started to use massively network interconnections as well, and what it is worst they came in contact with the public network, i.e. with Internet. Industrial networks are responsible for process and manufacturing operations of almost every scale, and as a result the successful penetration of a control system network can be used to directly impact those processes. Consequences could potentially range from relatively benign disruptions, such as the disruption of the operation (taking a facility offline), the alteration of an operational process (changing the formula of a chemical process), all the way to deliberate acts of sabotage that are intended to cause harm. The interconnectivity of Industrial Control Systems with corporate networks and the Internet has significantly increased the threats to critical infrastructure assets. Meanwhile, traditional IT security solutions such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems and antivirus software are relatively ineffective against attacks that specifically target vulnerabilities in SCADA protocols. This presents presents an innovative approach to Intrusion Detection in SCADA systems based on the concept of Critical State Analysis and State Proximity. The theoretical framework is supported by tests conducted with an Intrusion Detection System prototype implementing the proposed detection approach

Advanced security aspects on Industrial Control Network.

Security threats are one of the main problems of this computer-based era. All systems making use of information and communication technologies (ICT) are prone to failures and vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malicious software and agents. In the latest years, Industrial Critical Installations started to use massively network interconnections as well, and what it is worst they came in contact with the public network, i.e. with Internet. Industrial networks are responsible for process and manufacturing operations of almost every scale, and as a result the successful penetration of a control system network can be used to directly impact those processes. Consequences could potentially range from relatively benign disruptions, such as the disruption of the operation (taking a facility offline), the alteration of an operational process (changing the formula of a chemical process), all the way to deliberate acts of sabotage that are intended to cause harm. The interconnectivity of Industrial Control Systems with corporate networks and the Internet has significantly increased the threats to critical infrastructure assets. Meanwhile, traditional IT security solutions such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems and antivirus software are relatively ineffective against attacks that specifically target vulnerabilities in SCADA protocols. This presents presents an innovative approach to Intrusion Detection in SCADA systems based on the concept of Critical State Analysis and State Proximity. The theoretical framework is supported by tests conducted with an Intrusion Detection System prototype implementing the proposed detection approach

Advanced security aspects on Industrial Control Network.

Security threats are one of the main problems of this computer-based era. All systems making use of information and communication technologies (ICT) are prone to failures and vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malicious software and agents. In the latest years, Industrial Critical Installations started to use massively network interconnections as well, and what it is worst they came in contact with the public network, i.e. with Internet. Industrial networks are responsible for process and manufacturing operations of almost every scale, and as a result the successful penetration of a control system network can be used to directly impact those processes. Consequences could potentially range from relatively benign disruptions, such as the disruption of the operation (taking a facility offline), the alteration of an operational process (changing the formula of a chemical process), all the way to deliberate acts of sabotage that are intended to cause harm. The interconnectivity of Industrial Control Systems with corporate networks and the Internet has significantly increased the threats to critical infrastructure assets. Meanwhile, traditional IT security solutions such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems and antivirus software are relatively ineffective against attacks that specifically target vulnerabilities in SCADA protocols. This presents presents an innovative approach to Intrusion Detection in SCADA systems based on the concept of Critical State Analysis and State Proximity. The theoretical framework is supported by tests conducted with an Intrusion Detection System prototype implementing the proposed detection approach

Emulation of Industrial Control Field Device Protocols

It has been shown that thousands of industrial control devices are exposed to the Internet, however, the extent and nature of attacks on such devices remains unknown. The first step to understanding security problems that face modern supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) and industrial controls networks is to understand the various attacks launched on Internet-connected field devices. This thesis describes the design and implementation of an industrial control emulator on a Gumstix single-board computer as a solution. This emulator acts as a decoy field device, or honeypot, intended to be probed and attacked via an Internet connection. Evaluation techniques are developed to assess the accuracy of the emulation implemented on the Gumstix and are compared against the implementation on a standard PC and the emulation target, a Koyo DirectLogic 405 programmable logic controller. The results show that both the Gumstix and PC emulator platforms are very accurate to the workloads presented. This suggests that a honeypot implemented on a Gumstix emulator and a standard PC are both suitable for applications in SCADA attack-landscape research