73,196 research outputs found
Coevolutionary games - a mini review
Prevalence of cooperation within groups of selfish individuals is puzzling in
that it contradicts with the basic premise of natural selection. Favoring
players with higher fitness, the latter is key for understanding the challenges
faced by cooperators when competing with defectors. Evolutionary game theory
provides a competent theoretical framework for addressing the subtleties of
cooperation in such situations, which are known as social dilemmas. Recent
advances point towards the fact that the evolution of strategies alone may be
insufficient to fully exploit the benefits offered by cooperative behavior.
Indeed, while spatial structure and heterogeneity, for example, have been
recognized as potent promoters of cooperation, coevolutionary rules can extend
the potentials of such entities further, and even more importantly, lead to the
understanding of their emergence. The introduction of coevolutionary rules to
evolutionary games implies, that besides the evolution of strategies, another
property may simultaneously be subject to evolution as well. Coevolutionary
rules may affect the interaction network, the reproduction capability of
players, their reputation, mobility or age. Here we review recent works on
evolutionary games incorporating coevolutionary rules, as well as give a
didactic description of potential pitfalls and misconceptions associated with
the subject. In addition, we briefly outline directions for future research
that we feel are promising, thereby particularly focusing on dynamical effects
of coevolutionary rules on the evolution of cooperation, which are still widely
open to research and thus hold promise of exciting new discoveries.Comment: 24 two-column pages, 10 figures; accepted for publication in
BioSystem
Reach and speed of judgment propagation in the laboratory
In recent years, a large body of research has demonstrated that judgments and
behaviors can propagate from person to person. Phenomena as diverse as
political mobilization, health practices, altruism, and emotional states
exhibit similar dynamics of social contagion. The precise mechanisms of
judgment propagation are not well understood, however, because it is difficult
to control for confounding factors such as homophily or dynamic network
structures. We introduce a novel experimental design that renders possible the
stringent study of judgment propagation. In this design, experimental chains of
individuals can revise their initial judgment in a visual perception task after
observing a predecessor's judgment. The positioning of a very good performer at
the top of a chain created a performance gap, which triggered waves of judgment
propagation down the chain. We evaluated the dynamics of judgment propagation
experimentally. Despite strong social influence within pairs of individuals,
the reach of judgment propagation across a chain rarely exceeded a social
distance of three to four degrees of separation. Furthermore, computer
simulations showed that the speed of judgment propagation decayed exponentially
with the social distance from the source. We show that information distortion
and the overweighting of other people's errors are two individual-level
mechanisms hindering judgment propagation at the scale of the chain. Our
results contribute to the understanding of social contagion processes, and our
experimental method offers numerous new opportunities to study judgment
propagation in the laboratory
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Clusters and clustering in biotechnology: stylised facts, issues and theories
Coevolution of Cooperation and Partner Rewiring Range in Spatial Social Networks
In recent years, there has been growing interest in the study of
coevolutionary games on networks. Despite much progress, little attention has
been paid to spatially embedded networks, where the underlying geographic
distance, rather than the graph distance, is an important and relevant aspect
of the partner rewiring process. It thus remains largely unclear how individual
partner rewiring range preference, local vs. global, emerges and affects
cooperation. Here we explicitly address this issue using a coevolutionary model
of cooperation and partner rewiring range preference in spatially embedded
social networks. In contrast to local rewiring, global rewiring has no distance
restriction but incurs a one-time cost upon establishing any long range link.
We find that under a wide range of model parameters, global partner switching
preference can coevolve with cooperation. Moreover, the resulting partner
network is highly degree-heterogeneous with small average shortest path length
while maintaining high clustering, thereby possessing small-world properties.
We also discover an optimum availability of reputation information for the
emergence of global cooperators, who form distant partnerships at a cost to
themselves. From the coevolutionary perspective, our work may help explain the
ubiquity of small-world topologies arising alongside cooperation in the real
world
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