78 research outputs found
Quasi-selective ultrafilters and asymptotic numerosities
We isolate a new class of ultrafilters on N, called "quasi-selective" because
they are intermediate between selective ultrafilters and P-points. (Under the
Continuum Hypothesis these three classes are distinct.) The existence of
quasi-selective ultrafilters is equivalent to the existence of "asymptotic
numerosities" for all sets of tuples of natural numbers. Such numerosities are
hypernatural numbers that generalize finite cardinalities to countable point
sets. Most notably, they maintain the structure of ordered semiring, and, in a
precise sense, they allow for a natural extension of asymptotic density to all
sequences of tuples of natural numbers.Comment: 27 page
Quasi-selective ultrafilters and asymptotic numerosities
We isolate a new class of ultrafilters on N, called âquasi-selectiveâ because they are intermediate between selective ultrafilters and P-points. (Under the Continuum Hypothesis these three classes are distinct.) The existence of quasi-selective ultrafilters is equivalent to the existence of âasymptotic numerositiesâ for all sets of tuples A â N^k. Such numerosities are hypernatural numbers that generalize finite cardinalities to countable point sets. Most notably, they maintain the structure of ordered semiring, and, in a precise sense, they allow for a natural extension of asymptotic density to all sets of tuples of natural numbers
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A defence of predicativism as a philosophy of mathematics
A specification of a mathematical object is impredicative if it essentially involves quantification over a domain which includes the object being specified (or sets which contain that object, or similar). The basic worry is that we have no non-circular way of
understanding such a specification. Predicativism is the view that mathematics should be limited to the study of objects which can be specified predicatively.
There are two parts to predicativism. One is the criticism of the impredicative aspects of classical mathematics. The other is the
positive project, begun by Weyl in Das Kontinuum (1918), to reconstruct as much as possible of classical mathematics on the basis of a predicatively acceptable set theory, which accepts only countably infinite objects. This is a revisionary project, and certain parts of mathematics will not be saved.
Chapter 2 contains an account of the historical background to the predicativist project. The rigorization of analysis led to Dedekind's and Cantor's theories of the real numbers, which relied on the new notion of abitrary infinite sets; this became a central part of modern classical set theory. Criticism began with Kronecker; continued in the debate about the acceptability of Zermelo's Axiom of Choice; and was somewhat clarified by Poincaré and Russell. In the
light of this, chapter 3 examines the formulation of, and motivations behind the predicativist position.
Chapter 4 begins the critical task by detailing the epistemological problems with the classical account of the continuum. Explanations of classicism which appeal to second-order logic, set theory, and
primitive intuition are examined and are found wanting.
Chapter 5 aims to dispell the worry that predicativism might collapses into mathematical intuitionism. I assess some of the arguments for intuitionism, especially the Dummettian argument from indefinite
extensibility. I argue that the natural numbers are not indefinitely extensible, and that, although the continuum is, we can nonetheless make some sense of classical quantification over it. We need not reject the Law of Excluded Middle.
Chapter 6 begins the positive work by outlining a predicatively acceptable account of mathematical objects which justifies the Vicious Circle Principle. Chapter 7 explores the appropriate shape of formalized predicative mathematics, and the question of just how much mathematics is predicatively acceptable.
My conclusion is that all of the mathematics which we need can be predicativistically justified, and that such mathematics is
particularly transparent to reason. This calls into question one currently prevalent view of the nature of mathematics, on which
mathematics is justified by quasi-empirical means.Supported by the Arts and Humanities Research Council [grant number 111315]
Poincaré's philosophy of mathematics
The primary concern of this thesis is to investigate
the explicit philosophy of mathematics in the work of
Henri Poincare. In particular, I argue that there is
a well-founded doctrine which grounds both Poincare's
negative thesis, which is based on constructivist
sentiments, and his positive thesis, via which he retains
a classical conception of the mathematical continuum.
The doctrine which does so is one which is founded on
the Kantian theory of synthetic a priori intuition.
I begin, therefore, by outlining Kant's theory of the
synthetic a priori, especially as it applies to mathematics.
Then, in the main body of the thesis, I explain how the
various central aspects of Poincare's philosophy of
mathematics - e.g. his theory of induction; his theory
of the continuum; his views on impredicativiti his
theory of meaning - must, in general, be seen as an
adaptation of Kant's position. My conclusion is that
not only is there a well-founded philosophical core to
Poincare's philosophy, but also that such a core provides
a viable alternative in contemporary debates in
the philosophy of mathematics. That is, Poincare's
theory, which is secured by his doctrine of a priori
intuitions, and which describes a position in between
the two extremes of an "anti-realist" strict constructivism
and a "realist" axiomatic set theory, may indeed be
true
Semantic and Mathematical Foundations for Intuitionism
Thesis (Ph.D.) - Indiana University, Philosophy, 2013My dissertation concerns the proper foundation for the intuitionistic mathematics whose development began with L.E.J. Brouwer's work in the first half of the 20th Century. It is taken for granted by most philosophers, logicians, and mathematicians interested in foundational questions that intuitionistic mathematics presupposes a special, proof-conditional theory of meaning for mathematical statements. I challenge this commonplace. Classical mathematics is very successful as a coherent body of theories and a tool for practical application. Given this success, a view like Dummett's that attributes a systematic unintelligibility to the statements of classical mathematicians fails to save the relevant phenomena. Furthermore, Dummett's program assumes that his proposed semantics for mathematical language validates all and only the logical truths of intuitionistic logic. In fact, it validates some intuitionistically invalid principles, and given the lack of intuitionistic completeness proofs, there is little reason to think that every intuitionistic logical truth is valid according to his semantics.
In light of the failure of Dummett's foundation for intuitionism, I propose and carry out a reexamination of Brouwer's own writings. Brouwer is frequently interpreted as a proto-Dummettian about his own mathematics. This is due to excessive emphasis on some of his more polemical writings and idiosyncratic philosophical views at the expense of his distinctively mathematical work. These polemical writings do not concern mathematical language, and their principal targets are Russell and Hilbert's foundational programs, not the semantic principle of bivalence. The failures of these foundational programs has diminished the importance of Brouwer's philosophical writings, but his work on reconstructing mathematics itself from intuitionistic principles continues to be worth studying.
When one studies this work relieved of its philosophical burden, it becomes clear that an intuitionistic mathematician can make sense of her mathematical work and activity without relying on special philosophical or linguistic doctrines. Core intuitionistic results, especially the invalidity of the logical principle tertium non datur, can be demonstrated from basic mathematical principles; these principles, in turn, can be defended in ways akin to the basic axioms of other mathematical theories. I discuss three such principles: Brouwer's Continuity Principle, the Principle of Uniformity, and Constructive Church's Thesis
Diagonal arguments and fixed points
âA universal schema for diagonalization was popularized by N. Sâ. âYanofsky (2003)â, âbased on a pioneering work of F.Wâ. âLawvere (1969)â, âin which the existence of a (diagonolized-out and contradictory) object implies the existence of a fixed-point for a certain functionâ. âIt was shown that many self-referential paradoxes and diagonally proved theorems can fit in that schemaâ. âHereâ, âwe fit more theorems in the universalâ âschema of diagonalizationâ, âsuch as Euclid's proof for the infinitude of the primes and new proofs of G. Boolos (1997) for Cantor's theorem on the non-equinumerosity of a set with its powersetâ. âThenâ, âin Linear Temporal Logicâ, âwe show the non-existence of a fixed-point in this logic whose proof resembles the argument of Yablo's paradox (1985â, â1993)â. âThusâ, âYablo's paradox turns for the first time into a genuine mathematico-logical theorem in the framework of Linear Temporal Logicâ. âAgain the diagonal schema of the paper is used in this proof; and it is also shown that G. Priest's inclosure schema (1997) can fit in our universal diagonal / fixed-point schemaâ. âWe also show the existence of dominating (Ackermann-like) functions (which dominate a given countable set of functionsâ, âsuch as primitive recursive functions) in the schema
The Creating Subject, the Brouwer-Kripke Schema, and infinite proofs
Kripke's Schema (better the Brouwer-Kripke Schema) and the Kreisel-Troelstra Theory of the Creating Subject were introduced around the same time for the same purpose, that of analysing Brouwer's 'Creating Subject arguments'; other applications have been found since. I first look in detail at a representative choice of Brouwer's arguments. Then I discuss the original use of the Schema and the Theory, their justification from a Brouwerian perspective, and instances of the Schema that can in fact be found in Brouwer's own writings. Finally, I defend the Schema and the Theory against a number of objections that have been made
Space, points and mereology. On foundations of point-free Euclidean geometry
This article is devoted to the problem of ontological foundations of three-dimensional Euclidean geometry. Starting from Bertrand Russellâs intuitions concerning the sensual world we try to show that it is possible to build a foundation for pure geometry by means of the so called regions of space. It is not our intention to present mathematically developed theory, but rather demonstrate basic assumptions, tools and techniques that are used in construction of systems of point-free geometry and topology by means of mereology (resp. Boolean algebras) and Whitehead-like connection structures. We list and briefly analyze axioms for mereological structures, as well as those for connection structures. We argue that mereology is a good tool to model so called spatial relations. We also try to justify our choice of axioms for connection relation. Finally, we briefly discuss two theories: Grzegorczykâs point-free topology and Tarskiâs geometry of solids
Conceptions of Proof â In Research and Teaching
This chapter first analyses and compares mathematicians' and mathematics educators' different conceptualisations of proof and shows how these are formed by different professional backgrounds and research interests. This diversity of views makes it difficult to precisely explain what a proof is, especially to a novice at proving. In the second section, we examine teachers', student teachers' and pupils' proof conceptions and beliefs as revealed by empirical research. We find that the teachers' beliefs clearly revolve around the questions of what counts as proof in the classroom and whether the teaching of proof should focus on the product or on the process. The third section discusses which type of metaknowledge about proof educators should provide to teachers and thus to students, how they can do this and what the intrinsic difficulties of developing adequate metaknowledge are
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