Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players

This note examines the structure of stationary bargaining equilibria in the finite framework of Anesi (2010). The main result establishes a tight connection between the set of equilibrium absorbing points and the von Neumann-Morgestern solutions: assuming that players are patient, that the voting rule is oligarchical, and that there is at least one veto player with positive recognition probability, a set of alternatives corresponds to the absorbing points of an equilibrium if and only if it is a von Neumann-Morgenstern solution. We also apply our analysis of ergodic properties of equilibria to the persistent agenda setter environment of Diermeier and Fong (2012). We show that all equilibria are essentially pure, and we extend their characterization of absorbing sets to allow an arbitrary voting rule and by removing the restriction to pure strategy equilibira

Stable cores in information graph games

Stable cores in information graph games Abstract: In an information graph situation, some agents that are connected by an undirected graph can share with no cost some information or technology that can also be obtained from a source. If an agent is not connected to an informed player, this agent pays a unitary cost to obtain this technology. A coalitional cost game can be defined from this situation, and the core of this game is known to be non- empty. We prove that the core of an information graph game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if the graph is cycle- complete, or equivalently if the information graph game is concave. When the graph is not cycle-complete, whether there always exists a stable set is an open question. In this regard, we show that if the information graph consists of a ring that contains the source, then a stable set always exists and it is the core of a related information graph situation where one edge has been deleted

Stable cores in information graph games

In an information graph situation, a finite set of agents and a source are the set of nodes of an undirected graph with the property that two adjacent nodes can share information at no cost. The source has some information (or technology), and agents in the same component as the source can reach this information for free. In other components, some agent must pay a unitary cost to obtain the information. We prove that the core of the derived information graph game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if the information graph is cycle-complete, or equivalently if the game is concave. Otherwise, whether there always exists a stable set is an open question. If the information graph consists of a ring that contains the source, a stable set always exists and it is the core of a related situation where one edge has been deleted

Stable cores in information graph games

In an information graph situation, a finite set of agents and a source are the set of nodes of an undirected graph with the property that two adjacent nodes can share information at no cost. The source has some information (or technology), and agents in the same component as the source can reach this information for free. In other components, some agent must pay a unitary cost to obtain the information. We prove that the core of the derived information graph game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if the information graph is cycle-complete, or equivalently if the game is concave. Otherwise, whether there always exists a stable set is an open question. If the information graph consists of a ring that contains the source, a stable set always exists and it is the core of a related situation where one edge has been deleted.Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431B 2019/34Generalitat de Catalunya | Ref. 2017SGR778Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017-82241-RAgencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2020-113110GB-I0

Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments

In many domains, committees bargain over a sequence of policies and a policy remains in effect until a new agreement is reached. In this paper, I argue that, in order to assess the consequences of veto power, it is important to take into account this dynamic aspect. I analyze an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar game with an endogenous status quo policy. I show that full appropriation by the veto player is the only stable policy when legislators are sufficiently impatient; and that, irrespective of legislators' patience and the initial division of resources, there is always an equilibrium where policy eventually gets arbitrarily close to full appropriation by the veto player. In this equilibrium, increasing legislators' patience or decreasing the veto player's proposal power makes convergence to this outcome slower and the veto player supports reforms that decrease his allocation. The main predictions of the theory find support in controlled laboratory experiments

Bargaining in standing committees with an endogenous default

Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard Baron–Ferejohn model of bargaining over the division of a pie, in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement. In standing committees, however, existing agreements can be amended. This article studies an extension of the Baron–Ferejohn framework to a model with an evolving default that reflects this important feature of policymaking in standing committees: In each of an infinite number of periods, the ongoing default can be amended to a new policy (which is, in turn, the default for the next period). The model provides a number of quite different predictions. (i) From a positive perspective, the key distinction turns on whether the quota is less than unanimity. In that case, patient enough players waste substantial shares of the pie each period and the size principle fails in some pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria. In contrast, the unique Markov perfect equilibrium payoffs in a unanimity committee coincide with those in the corresponding Baron–Ferejohn framework. (ii) If players have heterogeneous discount factors then a large class of subgame perfect equilibria (including all Markov perfect equilibria) are inefficient

Nine Lives of Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism is dead. Again. Yet the philosophy of the free market and the strong state has an uncanny capacity to survive and even thrive in crisis. This volume breaks with the caricature of neoliberalism as a simple belief in market fundamentalism to show how neoliberal thinkers developed concepts and approaches in economic theory, welfare regimes and science philosophy, perceived institutions from the family to the university, disagreed over issues from intellectual property rights and human behaviour to social complexity and monetary order, and sought to win consent for their project through new honours, disciples, and networks

Collective Decisions on Conditional Topics - An Empirical Study of the Impact of Nonseparable Preferences

Analytical politics investigates collective decision-making in political systems. Such voting behavior in groups takes place in parliaments, committees or the board of local football clubs. It is a frequent object of study for theoretical as well as empirical analysis. Previous contributions have demonstrated well the stabilizing effect of procedural rules, such as agenda-setting or multi-chamber systems, for collective decisions. These rules are applied in many institutions, such as the European Parliament or the German Bundestag. Their main purpose is to ensure reliable policy. Previous work continually used the restrictive assumption of separable preferences. This assumption implies that different aspects of a question do not influence each other. The limited validity of this hypothesis is apparent even in everyday situations. For example, the enjoyment of a delicious meal depends on the combination of food and drink. When choosing between fish and venison for dinner you also have to consider the question of which sort of wine to have with the meal; white with fish, and red with venison. This form of interdependence also occurs in legislation. For example, the savings determined in the Greek budget influence the preferences of the German public for financial assistance to Greece. The assumption of separable preferences is therefore in the critical focus of theoretical research. This literature discusses the impacts of and solutions to nonseparable preferences in detail. The analysis suggests an increased complexity for every decision-making process affected by nonseparable preferences. This complexity leads to difficulties in the operationalization of nonseparable preferences and is one of the reasons that there are too few empirical examinations. In addition, the stabilizing properties of institutional arrangements identified under the assumption of separable preferences are in question. The goal of this study is to close this gap between theory and empiricism. I investigate nonseparable preferences by conducting a laboratory experiment, which allows comprehensive environmental control. This facilitates the operationalization of nonseparable preferences. First, I prove the relevance of nonseparable preferences for analytical research on social interaction. The experiment is therefore completed by empirical case studies. Next, I investigate the effects of nonseparable preferences on collective and individual decision-making in the laboratory. Finally, I assess my contribution with respect to current research in social science and discuss possibilities to more accurately model of human behavior. The dissertation is structured as follows. I start in chapter 1 with the presentation of my research question and design. In chapter 2 the concept of nonseparable preferences is further clarified by means of exemplary case studies. It also discusses the theoretical foundations of nonseparable preferences. My hypotheses are specified along common concepts used in the literature. Based on empirical data the relevance of nonseparable preferences for political science research is demonstrated in chapter 3. Next, chapter 4 presents the design of the laboratory experiment. The effects of nonseparable preferences on collective decision-making are examined in chapter 5. Subsequently, determinants for the motivation function of individuals are scrutinized in chapter 6. In chapter 7 I report the results of the post-experiment survey. All findings are evaluated in chapter 8, where I focus on detailing their usefulness to future research on human behavior. Finally, chapter 9 summarizes the study and lists possibilities to further expand research in this area

Collective decision-making under the influence of bribers and temporal constraints

Jo estudio la connexió entre la corrupció i les característiques estructurals dels parlaments: nombre de seients, el nombre de partits representats, i regles de decisió adoptades. Amb l'aplicació d'enfocaments analítics i computacionals, a més de simulacions, mostro que el nombre mitjà de diputats que han de ser subornats disminueix a mesura que el nombre de partits augmenta, de manera que el suborn se sent encoratjat per un nombre cada vegada més gran de parts. També investigo dues formes en que pot afectar el temps a la presa de decisions. En primer lloc, suggereixo un procediment de votació iteratiu en el que el retard en prendre una decisió és costós. Amb dos electors, dues opcions i un ordre de votació fix, demostro que en l’únic equilibri perfecte en subjocs, l’elector que vota primer, obté la seva opció preferida a l'inici del procediment. Si l'ordre s'inverteix en algun moment, identifico la condició sota la qual el votant que vota segon pot obtenir la seva opció preferida al principi. En segon lloc, proposo un altre procediment de votació iterativa, permetent que els votants canvien els seus vots, però ara amb una data límit: una etapa que, si no s'ha pres una decisió, els resultats de la votació són pitjors. Mostro que (i) si hi ha temps suficient perquè tots els votants canviïn el seu vot, es prendrà una decisió, i (ii) si hi ha una alternativa preferida per la majoria dels votants, aquesta alternativa serà finalment triada. Afegeixo un estudi experimental que indica que fins i tot amb menys temps del necessari per a què cada votant pugui canviar el seu vot, els electors estaran d'acord amb una decisió de totes maneres.Estudio la conexión entre la corrupción y las características estructurales de los parlamentos: número de asientos, el número de partidos representados, y reglas de decisión adoptadas. Con la aplicación de enfoques analíticos y computacionales, además de simulaciones, muestro que el número medio de diputados que deben ser sobornados disminuye a medida que el número de partidos aumenta, por lo que el soborno se siente alentado por un número cada vez mayor de partes. También investigo dos formas en que puede afectar el tiempo en la toma de decisiones. En primer lugar, sugiero un procedimiento de votación iterativo en el que el retraso en tomar una decisión es costoso. Con dos electores, dos opciones y un orden de votación fijo, demuestro que en el único equilibrio perfecto en subjuegos, el elector que vota primero obtiene su opción preferida al inicio del procedimiento. Si el orden se invierte en algún momento, identifico la condición bajo la cual el votante que vota segundo puede obtener su opción preferida al principio. En segundo lugar, propongo otro procedimiento de votación iterativa, permitiendo que los votantes cambian sus votos, pero ahora con una fecha límite: una etapa que, si no se ha tomado una decisión, los resultados de la votación son peores. Muestro que (i) si hay tiempo suficiente para que todos los votantes cambien su voto, se tomará una decisión, y (ii) si hay una alternativa preferida por la mayoría de los votantes, esta alternativa será finalmente elegida. Añado un estudio experimental que indica que los electores estarán de acuerdo con una decisión aunque no haya tiempo sufficiente para que cada votante pueda cambiar su voto.I study the connection between corruption and structural characteristics of parliaments: number of seats, the number of parties represented, and decision rules adopted. Applying analytical and computational approaches, and running simulations, I show that the average number of deputies needed to be bribed decreases as the number of parties increases, so bribery is encouraged by a growing number of parties. I also investigate two ways in which time may affect decision-making. First, I suggest an iterative voting procedure in which delay to reach a decision is costly. For two voters and two options, with a fixed voting order, I prove that in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium the voter who votes first obtains his most preferred option at the beginning of the procedure. If the fixed order is reversed once at some stage, I identify the condition under which the voter initially voting the second obtains this most preferred option, also at the beginning. Second, I propose another iterative voting procedure, allowing voters to change their votes, but now with a deadline: a stage such that, if no decision has been taken by then, the worst outcome results. I show that (i) if there is enough time for all the voters to change their vote, a decision will be taken, and (ii) if there is an alternative preferred by a majority of the voters, this alternative will be finally chosen. I add an experimental study indicating that even with less time necessary for every voter to change his vote, the voters will agree with a decision anyway

Semantic discovery and reuse of business process patterns

Patterns currently play an important role in modern information systems (IS) development and their use has mainly been restricted to the design and implementation phases of the development lifecycle. Given the increasing significance of business modelling in IS development, patterns have the potential of providing a viable solution for promoting reusability of recurrent generalized models in the very early stages of development. As a statement of research-in-progress this paper focuses on business process patterns and proposes an initial methodological framework for the discovery and reuse of business process patterns within the IS development lifecycle. The framework borrows ideas from the domain engineering literature and proposes the use of semantics to drive both the discovery of patterns as well as their reuse