104,393 research outputs found
Psychopathy, Agency, and Practical Reason
Philosophers have urged that considerations about the psychopath’s capacity for practical rationality can help to advance metaethical debates. These debates include the role of rational faculties in moral judgment and action, the relationship between moral judgment and moral motivation, and the capacities required for morally responsible agency. I discuss how the psychopath’s capacity for practical reason features in these debates, and I identify several takeaway lessons from the relevant literature. Specifically, I show how the insights contained therein can illuminate the complex structure of practical rationality, inform our standards for an adequate theory of practical reason, and frame our thinking about the significance of rational capacities in moral theory and social practice
Taking Turing by Surprise? Designing Digital Computers for morally-loaded contexts
There is much to learn from what Turing hastily dismissed as Lady Lovelace s
objection. Digital computers can indeed surprise us. Just like a piece of art,
algorithms can be designed in such a way as to lead us to question our
understanding of the world, or our place within it. Some humans do lose the
capacity to be surprised in that way. It might be fear, or it might be the
comfort of ideological certainties. As lazy normative animals, we do need to be
able to rely on authorities to simplify our reasoning: that is ok. Yet the
growing sophistication of systems designed to free us from the constraints of
normative engagement may take us past a point of no-return. What if, through
lack of normative exercise, our moral muscles became so atrophied as to leave
us unable to question our social practices? This paper makes two distinct
normative claims:
1. Decision-support systems should be designed with a view to regularly
jolting us out of our moral torpor.
2. Without the depth of habit to somatically anchor model certainty, a
computer s experience of something new is very different from that which in
humans gives rise to non-trivial surprises. This asymmetry has key
repercussions when it comes to the shape of ethical agency in artificial moral
agents. The worry is not just that they would be likely to leap morally ahead
of us, unencumbered by habits. The main reason to doubt that the moral
trajectories of humans v. autonomous systems might remain compatible stems from
the asymmetry in the mechanisms underlying moral change. Whereas in humans
surprises will continue to play an important role in waking us to the need for
moral change, cognitive processes will rule when it comes to machines. This
asymmetry will translate into increasingly different moral outlooks, to the
point of likely unintelligibility. The latter prospect is enough to doubt the
desirability of autonomous moral agents
Decision-Making: A Neuroeconomic Perspective
This article introduces and discusses from a philosophical point of view the nascent field of neuroeconomics, which is the study of neural mechanisms involved in decision-making and their economic significance. Following a survey of the ways in which decision-making is usually construed in philosophy, economics and psychology, I review many important findings in neuroeconomics to show that they suggest a revised picture of decision-making and ourselves as choosing agents. Finally, I outline a neuroeconomic account of irrationality
The Challenges of Forgiveness in Context: Introduction to The Moral Psychology of Forgiveness
I offer a brief survey of thematic elements in contemporary literature on forgiveness and then an overview of the responses to that literature comprising the contents of this volume. I concentrate on the extent to which work in moral psychology provides a needed corrective to some excesses in philosophical aversion to empirically informed theorizing. I aim to complicate what has been referred to at times as the standard or classic view, by which philosophers often mean the predominant view of forgiveness in the first half of the thirty-year boom in contemporary philosophy of forgiveness. I conclude by enjoining philosophers to further consider psychological contexts in which forgiveness may be seen primarily as a commitment rather than primarily as an emotional state
Introduction: Justice and Disadvantages during Childhood: What Does the Capability Approach Have to Offer?
Justice for children and during childhood and the particular political,
social and moral status of children has long been a neglected issue in
ethics, and in social and political philosophy. The application of general,
adult-oriented theories of justice to children can be regarded as particularly
problematic. Philosophers have only recently begun to explore what
it means to consider children as equals, what goods are especially valuable
to them, and what are the obligations of justice different agents have
toward children. In addition, while philosophers have extensively written
about global poverty and inequality, the issue of disadvantages during
childhood, especially child poverty, has only been superficially addressed.
This also applies to the Capability Approach (CA) as a normative theory.
Although the socio-scientific and economic literature on how to conceptualize
capabilities and functionings of children and how to measure them
in the context of poverty and wellbeing is steadily growing, the normative
aspects of these issues are still under-theorized. The CA offers a unique
framework to engage with both the topic of justice for children and
questions
concerning what justice implies and demands with regard to
children living and growing up in disadvantaged circumstances. Furthermore,
justice and disadvantage during childhood is a compellingly interdisciplinary
topic that invites the combination of ethical and philosophical
reasoning together with socio-scientific theories and empirical knowledge.
In this special issue of Ethical Perspectives we bring together theoretical
and empirically informed discussions that explore the CA in relation to
children and the many disadvantages they can face in their lives
Emotion, deliberation, and the skill model of virtuous agency
A recent skeptical challenge denies deliberation is essential to virtuous agency: what looks like genuine deliberation is just a post hoc rationalization of a decision already made by automatic mechanisms (Haidt 2001; Doris 2015). Annas’s account of virtue seems well-equipped to respond: by modeling virtue on skills, she can agree that virtuous actions are deliberation-free while insisting that their development requires significant thought. But Annas’s proposal is flawed: it over-intellectualizes deliberation’s developmental role and under-intellectualizes its significance once virtue is acquired. Doing better requires paying attention to a distinctive form of anxiety—one that functions to engage deliberation in the face of decisions that automatic mechanisms alone cannot resolve
Humane Dignity
The ethics of care has developed as a movement of allied thinkers, in different continents, who have a shared concern and who reflect on similar topics. This shared concern is that care can only be revalued and take its societal place if existing asymmetrical power relations are unveiled, and if the dignity of care givers and care receivers is better guaranteed, socially, politically and personally.
In this first volume of a new series leading care ethicists from Europe and the United States focus on the moral significance of two concepts in the debate that ask for further reflection. In discussion with the work of Axel Honneth on recognition and the work of Emmanuel Housset on compassion a contribution is made to a reconsideration of recognition and compassion from an ethics of care perspective
Equal Rights for Zombies?: Phenomenal Consciousness and Responsible Agency
Intuitively, moral responsibility requires conscious awareness of what one is doing, and why one is doing it, but what kind of awareness is at issue? Neil Levy argues that phenomenal consciousness—the qualitative feel of conscious sensations—is entirely unnecessary for moral responsibility. He claims that only access consciousness—the state in which information (e.g., from perception or memory) is available to an array of mental systems (e.g., such that an agent can deliberate and act upon that information)—is relevant to moral responsibility. I argue that numerous ethical, epistemic, and neuroscientific considerations entail that the capacity for phenomenal consciousness is necessary for moral responsibility. I focus in particular on considerations inspired by P. F. Strawson, who puts a range of qualitative moral emotions—the reactive attitudes—front and center in the analysis of moral responsibility
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Emotional Biosensing: Exploring Critical Alternatives
Emotional biosensing is rising in daily life: Data and categories claim to know how people feel and suggest what they should do about it, while CSCW explores new biosensing possibilities. Prevalent approaches to emotional biosensing are too limited, focusing on the individual, optimization, and normative categorization. Conceptual shifts can help explore alternatives: toward materiality, from representation toward performativity, inter-action to intra-action, shifting biopolitics, and shifting affect/desire. We contribute (1) synthesizing wide-ranging conceptual lenses, providing analysis connecting them to emotional biosensing design, (2) analyzing selected design exemplars to apply these lenses to design research, and (3) offering our own recommendations for designers and design researchers. In particular we suggest humility in knowledge claims with emotional biosensing, prioritizing care and affirmation over self- improvement, and exploring alternative desires. We call for critically questioning and generatively re- imagining the role of data in configuring sensing, feeling, ‘the good life,’ and everyday experience
Methodological Anxiety: Heidegger on Moods and Emotions
In the context of a history of the emotions, Martin Heidegger presents an important and yet challenging case. He is important because he places emotional states, broadly construed, at the very heart of his philosophical methodology—in particular, anxiety and boredom. He is challenging because he is openly dismissive of the standard ontologies of emotions, and because he is largely uninterested in many of the canonical debates in which emotions figure. My aim in this chapter is to identify and critique the distinctive role which Heidegger allots to the emotions, focusing on Sein und Zeit's famous treatment of anxiety. Having outlined his position, I close by considering a number of challenges, both methodological and substantive, to Heidegger's approach
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