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Methodological Anxiety

Heidegger on Moods and Emotions

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In the context of a history of the emotions, Martin Heidegger presents an important and challenging case. Emotions, broadly construed, play a central role in his thinking; particularly boredom, fear, and anxiety.¹ This role is, however, highly distinctive: Heidegger is critical of much of the standard ontology of emotions and he is uninterested in many of the philosophical debates within which emotions usually figure. My purpose in this article is to sketch these aspects of Heidegger's work, highlighting both the innovative nature of his views and the distinctive problems he faces as a consequence.

Before getting underway, two preliminary remarks. The first concerns the scope of this chapter. Heidegger was a prolific writer: the *Gesamtausgabe* edition runs to over one hundred volumes. Furthermore, during the course of his lifetime, his work undergoes a series of complex stylistic and philosophical shifts—for example, during the early 1930s, and then again in the aftermath of the war. There is no scholarly consensus on the exact nature of these developments or on the degree of continuity or change that they imply. Given these facts, it would be impossible to address Heidegger's views on 'emotions' or indeed any other topic in a single chapter without radically restricting the chronological range of the discussion. I will therefore focus on Heidegger's best-known work, *Sein und Zeit* (1927), and on the account developed there and then refined in subsequent texts such as Ga29/30, the 1929 lecture series *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*. In this sense what follows is a study of 'early Heidegger'; for stylistic reasons, I will speak simply of 'Heidegger', taking the restriction as understood. The second preliminary remark concerns my aim: I want to present Heidegger's views in a way that allows one to make sense of where he agrees with, and where he departs from, the other thinkers in this volume. In order to do this within the space available, I will have to sidestep certain exegetical issues pertaining to the internal structure of Heidegger's own system. For example, I will look very closely at his treatment of anxiety, but I will say comparatively little about the larger story in which it is embedded: for example, his theory of 'affectivity' [*Befindlichkeit*],

or his idea of ‘care’ [*Sorge*].² I will also focus on the links between Heidegger and other philosophers, rather than, say, psychoanalysts or psychiatrists.³

12.1 Heidegger and the Structure of Moods

I want to begin by outlining the concept which dominates Heidegger’s discussion of emotions: that of *Stimmung*, which I will translate as ‘mood’.⁴

Heidegger is highly suspicious of the apparatus in terms of which previous thinkers have understood what we could loosely call the ‘human subject’. This suspicion often manifests in a dismissive rejection of traditional ontologies, and the complaint that these ossify philosophical thought. So, for example, discussing affects, he laments that:

What has escaped notice is that the basic ontological interpretation of the affective life in general has been able to make scarcely one forward step worthy of mention since Aristotle. On the contrary, affects and feelings come under the theme of psychological phenomena, functioning as a third class of these, usually along with representation [*Vorstellen*] and volition. They sink to the level of accompanying phenomena.⁵

Elsewhere, he states bluntly that ‘we must dismiss the psychology of feelings, experiences and consciousness’.⁶ Underpinning remarks such as these are broader worries about many of the oppositions used to frame the discussion of emotions: for example, he is insistent that we avoid characterizing matters in terms of rational or irrational states.⁷ One immediate consequence is that Heidegger himself does not speak of ‘emotions’ or ‘affects’ or ‘passions’; instead, for reasons I will unpack below, he frames the discussion in terms of ‘moods’. However, at an extensional level, one can see immediate overlap between the phenomena in which he is interested and those found in standard treatments of emotion: the three cases on which he focuses are anxiety [*Angst*], fear, and boredom.⁸ Given this extensional overlap, Heidegger can be legitimately seen, at least to begin with, as providing a new account of what we call ‘emotions’, rather than simply changing the topic. The task now is to introduce the distinctive way in which he frames these cases; what follows is only preliminary and I will come back to many of these points below.

Heidegger sees moods as defined by a number of general features which I will take in turn. First, moods are ever-present: we are always in some mood or other: ‘we are never free of moods’.⁹ In a characteristic tactic, he suggests that the putative counter-example of ‘an evenly balanced lack of mood’ is in fact itself a quite specific mood; he speaks of a mood of ‘satiation’, but one might also call it a mood of indifference.¹⁰ Second, moods shape and inform our experience: the lover in a jealous mood is struck by aspects of the scene he would never normally notice (why is her phone there?). Moods also restrict or distort what we notice: the person in an aggressive mood blindly construes the casual gesture as a provocation. In this sense a mood can ‘close the world off more stubbornly than any non-perceiving’.¹¹ In Heideggerian terms, moods thus play a disclosive role—they make manifest the world in a certain way.¹² One of Heidegger’s most striking claims, and one I will analyse in Section 12.4 is

that this epistemic function is not a secondary one, not a mere ‘gut instinct’ substitute for more considered rational cognition. Instead ‘from an ontological point of view’, it plays an explanatorily fundamental and irreducible role.¹³ Third, in moods the world is manifest as mattering in various ways. Underlying this is Heidegger’s idea of affectivity. Prior to any kind of rational calculation as to what I should do, there must be an initial assignment of values to the various options: affectivity refers to the fact that we ‘always already’ find ourselves operating against the backdrop of some such assignment.¹⁴ For Heidegger, moods make this fact manifest: parts of the world can only appear as threatening, for example, insofar as they pose a risk to projects I care about.¹⁵ In contrast, he emphasizes that ‘pure beholding’ cannot play the same role: his point is that no set of natural facts are sufficient to establish that something is a threat without some additional premises about what matters to me, premises made available by moods, by what I fear or what bores me, for example.¹⁶ Fourth, in illuminating the world, moods simultaneously illuminate our own situation: so, for example, the body of the stressed or the bored is manifest to them as taut or leaden. Thus, a mood makes manifest ‘how one is, and how one is faring’.¹⁷ Fifth, moods illustrate the ‘thrown’ aspect of our experience. There is a limit to how much control we have over them: as Heidegger puts it, ‘a mood assails us’.¹⁸

This initial sketch sets up a number of lines of possible development. At the macro-level, Heidegger takes moods to support his rejection of the traditional opposition between ‘inner’ states and an ‘external’ world. As he puts it, a mood ‘comes neither from “outside” nor from “inside”, but arises out of Being-in-the-world, as a way of such Being’.¹⁹ He is particularly fond of examples which problematize inner/outer distinctions; consider Ga29/30’s appeal to phrases such as a ‘cheerful room’ or a ‘melancholy landscape’.²⁰ Many commentators see this as part of a larger project within which Heidegger seeks to move beyond familiar categories such as that of ‘mental states’.²¹ At the micro-level, there is much exegetical work to be done in making clear the details of Heidegger’s story: for example, with respect to fear and his claim that ‘that about which we fear’ is always ourselves.²²

I am not, however, going to pursue either of these lines here. The macro issue in particular is far too broad. This is because Heidegger’s stance on the ‘inner’ and the ‘outer’ is not directly a function of his views on the emotions, but rather of his stance on ‘content’ and on topics like scepticism more broadly.²³ Instead, I want to focus on the question of how Heidegger’s theory of moods relates to the broader discussion of emotions in the canon. To see that, I need to say a little more about some of the various roles which such states might play.

12.2 The Role of Emotions within Modern Philosophy

I want to begin by highlighting a few of the varied roles which emotions have played in modern Western philosophy.²⁴ I will take four examples—these are, of course, not intended to be either exhaustive or exclusive; my aim is rather to provide a backdrop against which the distinctive contours of Heidegger’s view can be seen.

First, one might locate emotions in the context of debates surrounding motivation. A classic case here is Hume's treatment of the passions in book two of the *Treatise*, but this approach is also very visible in readings of Kant which emphasize his relationship to Hume.²⁵ So, for example, Guyer argues that Kant follows Hume in assuming that only 'suitable feelings' can move us to action; the difference between the two is that Kant holds the necessary feelings are in some sense a function of the moral law.²⁶ The conclusion, Guyer summarizes, is that 'even when pure practical reason is efficacious, it works by modifying our feelings and desires and by determining our actions through them'.²⁷ Second, one might allot a normative role to emotions: by this, I mean that undergoing a particular emotion is taken to be a necessary condition on being the type of agent whom the author valorizes. A good example here is Hegel, unsurprisingly due to his Aristotelian heritage. On the Hegelian picture: 'It is required not only that we know God, right and the like...but that these things should be in our feelings, in our hearts'.²⁸ Family members, for example, should thus relate to each other with 'love', members of corporations via 'fellow-feeling'.²⁹ Possession of the relevant affects is thus a necessary condition on being the type of agent found in Hegel's ideal society. Third, emotions might play a subversive role. Perhaps the best example of this is Nietzschean genealogy. By exposing the emotions, such as *ressentiment*, underlying certain philosophical or political positions, Nietzsche intends to weaken or subvert those views.³⁰ Fourth, emotions might play a methodological role: the idea here is that only through the experience of certain emotions can the philosopher proceed correctly. Whilst this idea obviously has its roots in the ancient world, post-Nietzschean thinkers often hold specifically that extreme emotions are needed to shatter or shake us out of comforting assumptions in order to see things aright. This idea is particularly visible in twentieth-century French thought, where it is often associated with talk of 'limit experiences', and where it is present even in writers otherwise suspicious of first personal reports on emotional states. Thus, for example Foucault.

[E]xperience according to Nietzsche, Blanchot, and Bataille has rather the task of 'tearing' the subject from itself in such a way that it is no longer the subject as such, or that it is completely 'other' than itself so that it may arrive at its annihilation, its dissociation. It is this de-subjectifying undertaking, the idea of a 'limit-experience' that tears the subject from itself, which is the fundamental lesson that I've learned from these authors.³¹

The experience to which he refers here are largely emotions, such as Bataille's 'states of ecstasy, of rapture'.³²

If we now turn back to Heidegger, a few preliminary points can be made. There is no real treatment of the first of these issues in his work, the question of motivation. Whilst, as we will see, Heidegger is extremely interested in the effects of certain emotional experiences, his model of the subject prevents him from framing the issue along the standard belief–desire lines. In particular, the primitive Heideggerian 'action state' is understanding—which simultaneously includes taking a particular stance on myself and on the world by and through realizing certain possibilities.³³ As a consequence, the

classic post-Humean question of the relationship between judgement and the ‘passions’ cannot arise in the same way: to understand in Heidegger’s sense is already to act.³⁴ By extension, he shows no interest in the familiar cast of characters used to frame the motivational debate, such as the psychopath who purports to make moral judgements but finds them unmoving.³⁵ Likewise, I think that the third strand discussed—the use of emotions for debunking or subversive purposes—is also largely absent from Heidegger’s work. Heidegger does hold, for reasons which will become apparent, that inauthentic agents exhibit problematic relationships to their moods (for example, suppressing anxiety).³⁶ But his strategy is overwhelmingly focused on the further claim that such problems reflect an attempt to hide from deep facts about ourselves: his complaint, unlike the Nietzsche of the *Genealogy*, is not primarily that his opponents are driven by certain emotions, but rather that their emotions serve as an index of their underlying failure to face up to ontological truths. This is of a piece with Heidegger’s broader hostility to psychological explanation. In the first volume of the infamous ‘*Schwarze Hefte*’, for example, he suggests that the pre-Socratics are so philosophically significant partly because there is no possibility of ‘rooting about’ in their characters or letters.³⁷

With respect to the other two strands of the traditional debate which I discussed, however, matters are very different. Consider what I called the ‘normative’ view of emotions: there is clearly a very close tie between anxiety and the form of agency valorized in texts such as *Sein und Zeit*, namely authenticity.³⁸ Likewise, Heidegger also exemplifies the fourth approach I considered, one on which that certain emotions are methodologically necessary in order to wrench us out of the ‘tranquilised’ and misguided views in which we typically operate. Thus ‘anxiety brings [*Dasein*] back from its absorption in the “world”. Everyday familiarity collapses.’³⁹ By extension, philosophy requires the author to enter into the specific moods that characterize and enable it: thus Ga29/30 states simply that: ‘our fundamental task now consists in awakening a fundamental mood which is to sustain our philosophizing’.⁴⁰

I have identified two points of contact between Heidegger and the canonical debate on the emotions: the experience of certain moods is a necessary condition both on the type of agency he privileges and on a rigorous philosophy. However, to understand exactly how he develops these ideas, we need to look simultaneously at the other central role which he allots to mood: that of ‘disclosing’ or making manifest aspects of the world and of ourselves. The task of Section 12.3 will be to bring together and flesh out these points via a specific case study: his treatment of anxiety.

12.3 A Case Study: *Sein und Zeit* on Anxiety

Sein und Zeit’s discussion of anxiety is undoubtedly Heidegger’s best-known analysis of an emotional state broadly construed. The other obvious candidate for use as a case study would be Ga29/30’s treatment of boredom; that, however, hangs directly on Heidegger’s complex views about the metaphysics of time and would require a separate

essay on those.⁴¹ I will therefore focus on anxiety, noting parallels to the later discussion of boredom as appropriate.⁴²

Anxiety for Heidegger is a mood, where ‘mood’ is defined by the specific vectors of that term which I discussed in Section 12.1. More specifically, we can think of Heideggerian anxiety along several ontological dimensions. For Heidegger, anxiety is an inescapable dispositional state. As will become clear, he thinks that the features about which we are anxious are necessary and omnipresent aspects of human existence.⁴³ It is also an incipient state, by which I mean that Heidegger takes all agents to have a peripheral phenomenological awareness of it and yet to have suppressed or distracted themselves from that awareness.⁴⁴ In at least some cases, it will further become manifest as a full-blown episodic state with attendant implications, to be discussed below, for the phenomenology and content of any co-occurring experiences; this episodic version of anxiety is what Heidegger is referring to when he talks of it as ‘arising in even the most innocuous situations’.⁴⁵ Finally it is possible for agents who have experienced episodic anxiety to adopt a particular stance on it and on the incipient awareness of its possible return: such agents, labelled ‘authentic’ by *Sein und Zeit*, have a ‘readiness for anxiety’.⁴⁶ I cannot discuss Heidegger’s treatment of self-deception and what he calls ‘inauthenticity’ here; instead, I am going to focus on the relation between dispositional and episodic anxiety, and on the resultant view of things which authentic agents supposedly have. I am going to pick out four central features of Heidegger’s discussion.

First, anxiety lacks a specific intentional object. Whereas my fear is directed at a particular target—the snarling dog, the oncoming train—anxiety is ‘indefinite’.⁴⁷ Phenomenologically put, Heidegger sees episodic anxiety as a state in which one feels a pervasive unease: this unease colours and affects the tempo and dynamics of each interaction, without itself having a clear locus. In the language of *Sein und Zeit* ‘that in the face of which one has anxiety is Being-in-the-world as such’.⁴⁸

Second, in this state, the agent feels a particular kind of detachment from the goals and standards by which he or she has previously lived their life. As Heidegger puts it ‘the world has the character of completely lacking significance’.⁴⁹ Underlying this claim is a distinctive vision of the structure of human agency. Heidegger operates with a picture of experiential space, the ‘world’, as teleologically structured around the self-identities of agents. The notions of self-identity and world here are often illustrated with quasi-institutional examples (being a doctor), but I think Heidegger must intend it more broadly too (consider, for example, the way one might talk of the world of fashion or of machismo). The basic idea is that in virtue of understanding oneself in a certain way various means and goals show up as salient, as appropriate or as inappropriate.⁵⁰ So, to adapt an example of Heidegger’s own, the monumental sculpture appears very differently to the critic and to the team whose job is to work out how to crate the thing up: the long protruding arms, that the former sees as a bold departure from modernism, are manifest to the latter as an obstacle, a reason why a standard number 5 crate won’t work. These self-understandings, what Heidegger calls our ‘for-the-sake-of-which’, thus structure the normative landscape; they determine,

at least in large part, what we have reason to care about.⁵¹ Now, in a moment of anxiety, Heidegger argues that our identification with and investment in these various identities is suspended: they no longer exercise a pull over us. The world, the network of teleological links, remains intact, but the familiar teleological and social chains that define it seem unmotivating and insignificant. To get into Med School Tom still needs to pass these tests with this score, but that goal, around which his life had previously turned, now appears un compelling.⁵² Yet this is not because Tom suddenly wants to be a racing driver or whatever else. Instead, anxiety globally discolours his experience, it is an extreme state in which Dasein finds itself alienated not just from one particular identity, but from all of them.⁵³ The result is a global suspension of normativity, resulting from a disengagement with the identities which grounded it: Philippe talks of the ‘universal meaninglessness we experience in [anxiety]’.⁵⁴ As Heidegger puts it:

The world in which I exist has sunk into insignificance; and the world which is thus disclosed is one in which entities can be freed only in the character of having no involvement.⁵⁵

Third, Heidegger takes this experience to have profound implications: agents who are authentic recognize these, and in that recognition, their ‘readiness for anxiety’ characterizes their future conduct. But it is less clear what exactly those implications are. Blattner describes anxiety as the ‘the condition in which nothing matters’.⁵⁶ Yet, as McManus notes, if anxiety so described is taken straightforwardly as a veridical experience, Heidegger seems to be left with the conclusion that there is no good reason to adopt any particular course of action rather than another: after all, if the world has been exposed as ‘insignificant’, why do this rather than that? As Tugendhat, perhaps the best-known of critic of this aspect of Heidegger, observes, this seems to undercut the very idea of choice and of personhood: ‘A choice... that is not made in the light of reasons... is a choice in which I leave how I choose to accident; and in this respect we have to say that it was not I who chose.’⁵⁷ There are various possible responses to this concern.⁵⁸ I think that the most plausible is this: anxiety does not show that none of our goals matter. Instead it shows two things. On the one hand, it serves as a shock, a way of viscerally calling in to question the familiar norms into which we have been educated and within which we have lived unquestioningly. For Tom previously going to Med School may have been just ‘what one did’—what his siblings did, what his parents did, what he had always assumed he would do; anxiety questions this goal from a new, radically detached perspective. On the other hand, anxiety reveals some quite *specific* kind of disconnection between the subject and the norms and goals which structure its world: it shows that none of these are *necessarily* or *essentially* binding on us. As Thomson puts it:

[T]he fundamental existential homelessness that follows from the fact that there is no life project any of us can ever finally be at home in, because there is ultimately nothing about the ontological structure of the self that could tell us what specifically we should do with our lives.⁵⁹

A more formal way to put the point is this: anxiety is a state in which we come to recognize not that there are no norms, but that norms are merely hypothetical imperatives.

Contra Kant, there is no norm binding simply on me *qua* agent, a fact made graphic in anxiety as I survey the world in its stark irrelevance. Instead, what we have reason to do is a function of our self-identities and of a gradual piecemeal transition from one such identity to another; stripped of these, as we are in the anxious state, we can find no firm normative ground. One consequence of this move, incidentally, is that one can see how delicate the interplay is between the episodic state and the subsequent attitude to that state held by authentic agents. It is implausible that the phenomenology of the anxiety attack itself contains anything like this type of fine-grained distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. The idea is rather that, following the initial shock, the authentic agent comes to see things in these terms—comes to learn from, and reflect on, and internalize the experience.⁶⁰ At a textual level, the details are closely tied to Heidegger's claim that 'anxiety individualises' by 'throwing Dasein back' on its 'ownmost potentiality for being'.⁶¹ In anxiety Dasein experiences itself as cut off from all worldly source of normativity, left in what Ga29/30 calls 'limbo'; this inability to act, this 'impossibility of projecting' in SZ's terms, supposedly makes manifest the absence of norms inhering simply in agency *per se*, the absence of a non-worldly authority to fall back on.⁶²

Fourth, Heidegger argues that agents who face up to such anxiety will ultimately possess a number of distinctive features, features which he valorizes. For example, in line with the point just made, they possess and manifest in their lives a fuller understanding of the normative landscape in which they live.⁶³ As I have argued elsewhere, Dasein is Heidegger's name for the normative standpoint, and so one can equally express this view by stating that they are more aware of and so more fully manifest the nature of Dasein: as he puts it, they 'liberate' the Dasein within themselves.⁶⁴ More broadly, Heidegger takes such agents to possess a refined capacity for decision-making in the future: they are, for example, presented as specifically attentive to the nuances of each individual situation.⁶⁵ The most natural way to read this is in terms of an increased recognition that the received norms and practices which they had unthinkingly followed are in fact open to challenge and criticism. Thus Blattner, for example, characterizes the aftermath of anxiety as follows:

Once I encounter anxiety, I am temporarily alienated from the public norms in the light of which I live, and I thereby come to see them as negotiable in a way I had not before. I can respond to this disclosure in one of two ways: I can flee from it by rushing back to the public world of my everyday existence and aggressively rejecting challenges to public norms, thereby burying myself in an aggravated form of conformism. Or I can return to the everyday world of public norms loosened up and flexible, able to entertain challenges to these norms and imagine alternative ways of living.⁶⁶

12.4 Critical Assessment

We can now see how Heidegger's treatment of anxiety connects to the lines of thought identified in Section 12.2. For Heidegger, anxiety plays a central methodological role: it forces Dasein out of the 'complacency and tranquilized obviousness' in which it

characteristically lives.⁶⁷ By extension, he valorizes agents who are open to anxiety and who face up to its implications.⁶⁸ Heidegger then embeds these claims within his larger system: through anxiety Dasein is disclosed to itself as it truly is: it ‘becomes “essentially” Dasein in that authentic existence’, fulfilling the ancient injunction to ‘become what you are’, and making possible a philosophy based on recognition of that nature.⁶⁹ As Heidegger puts it:

If the existential analytic of Dasein is to retain clarity in principle as to its function in fundamental ontology, then in order to master its provisional task of exhibiting Dasein’s Being, it must seek for one of the most far reaching and most primordial possibilities of disclosure—one that lies in Dasein itself....As a [mood] which will satisfy these methodological requirements, the phenomenon of anxiety will be made basic for our analysis.⁷⁰

The task now is to offer some assessment of Heidegger’s account; we can identify, I suggest, four key questions.

First, why does Heidegger appeal to a mood, to what most authors would class as an emotion, to play this role? Part of the answer will be highly specific. Heidegger uses anxiety to illustrate the structural aspect of our existence which he dubs ‘affectivity’—and this, defined in terms of notions like ‘thrownness’ and ‘mattering’, has obvious links to the basic topology of moods set out in Section 12.1.⁷¹ But I think a broader point can also be made if one asks why Heidegger identifies a mood as that which ‘brings Dasein face to face with... the authenticity of its being’.⁷² After all, there are clearly many other mechanisms which might shake people out of an assumed belief system and bring them to a new self-understanding: Socratic questioning is an obvious example. I suspect the answer hangs in part on a fundamental suspicion Heidegger has about the nature of dialogue and debate, which he tends to see as progressively obscuring a topic, rather than illuminating it. Thematized in *Sein und Zeit* under the label of ‘idle talk’ [*Gerede*], this assumption is present throughout Heidegger’s work.⁷³ Thus pre-*Sein und Zeit* texts such as the 1925 lecture course ‘*Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*’ present academic conferences as devices for ‘covering up’ ideas through parroting them out.⁷⁴ By the time of the *Schwarze Hefte*, Heidegger has applied the lesson to the reception of his own work: scholarly exegesis of *Sein und Zeit* is treated as a derailment device by which academics serve to distract themselves and the public from the book’s real import.⁷⁵ Of course, Heidegger thinks that anxiety can easily be suppressed and ‘explained away’ by inauthentic agents.⁷⁶ But here even the urgency of this flight still betrays an incipient grasp of Dasein’s true nature.⁷⁷ So my suggestion is that Heidegger sees the immediacy of moods as providing a superior access to point to Dasein’s nature in part because he takes the obvious alternative, discourse and debate, to systematically obscure whatever it treats.

Second, one might ask why Heidegger appeals to this particular mood to play the relevant role. Depending on the comparison one has in mind, this question can take several forms. One issue is why Heidegger offers *this* account of anxiety and not some other. After all, his treatment of it is clearly at odds with many alternate such

accounts. To take a simple example, the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual* used in much contemporary psychiatric practice lists a host of ‘anxiety disorders’, many of which lack the distinctive features Heidegger stresses. So, for example:

The individual with separation anxiety disorder is fearful or anxious about separation from attachment figures to a degree that is developmentally inappropriate. There is persistent fear or anxiety about harm coming to attachment figures and events that could lead to loss of or separation from attachment figures and reluctance to go away from attachment figures, as well as nightmares and physical symptoms of distress.⁷⁸

This state clearly has an intentional object—it is about a particular individual or individuals—in a way that Heideggerian anxiety is not; but it still seems reasonably described as a type of anxiety. So the question might be ‘why focus on this mode of anxiety and not others?’ Alternately, one might mean something more like ‘why focus on anxiety as *opposed to* say, joy or depression or contempt or amusement?’ As I noted in Section 12.2, the idea that emotions play a central methodological role is a common one, particularly in twentieth-century French philosophy, and its defenders typically each have their own preferred candidate for the key emotion: Bataille, to use the same example as above, emphasizes a form of ecstatic laughter.⁷⁹ This raises the question: might not Heidegger’s existential analytic have looked very different if he had begun from another emotion? Given this, one might well ask on what basis he chose anxiety rather than, say, joy?

Third, supposing we grant Heidegger’s focus on this particular brand of anxiety, why should we take such an experience so seriously? Blattner describes Heidegger’s position, as one where ‘[n]o self-understanding is immune to being undercut by anxiety; anything we take for granted about ourselves can be dissolved by the corrosive effects of anxiety’.⁸⁰ But why, to take an Aristotelian worry, is the person for whom this is true not simply incontinent or badly brought up? Above I discussed McManus’s concern about whether anxiety was veridical. There I suggested that the problem could be at least postponed by reading anxiety such that it didn’t imply complete meaninglessness, but only that no norms were binding on Dasein merely *qua* Dasein. Yet the worry will reoccur—even if this is what the state shows, why should we take it as veridical? The fear is no longer that doing so will deliver us straight into Tugendhat’s challenge. Rather, it is broader—why should we regard such states as good evidence? After all, one might think that this kind of foundational normative question needs to be settled by argument—by ruling out, perhaps, the various Kantian programmes which would reach a very different conclusion.

Fourth, suppose we grant that there exists a mood of roughly the type Heidegger describes and which has roughly the methodological and evidential status he claims—is his account of it internally plausible? There seem to me several points on which to press. Consider the supposedly global scope of anxiety—a state in which, as Blattner put it, ‘nothing matters to you’.⁸¹ One might object, following Okrent, that whilst we can be alienated from each individual identity, it does not follow that we can be alienated

from all of them at once: ‘pace Heidegger, the contingency of every one of our identities does not imply the contingency of the fact that each of us has some identity’.⁸² One way to put the worry is that we have good Heideggerian reasons to think that even an anxious person sees themselves in terms of some, culturally complex, identity with its own patterns of salience and norms—that of the sufferer of anxiety, in some ways a distinctively modern trope.⁸³

I have sketched here four possible lines of attack.⁸⁴ Yet these questions are not easy to answer in any direct fashion due to the systematic and holistic character of Heidegger’s method. His basic claim is that anxiety allows ‘the structural totality of the Being we seek [to] come to light in an elemental way’.⁸⁵ But whether it does this or not, and whether it does it better than various other means, will clearly be a function of one’s view as to what that totality is and what an ‘elemental’ approach is—that is even before one gets into familiar Heideggerian controversies such as that over ‘Being’.⁸⁶ More broadly, to challenge him one would need to show not simply that there are other forms of anxiety (something he explicitly concedes), nor that there are other moods which might equally play a key philosophical role (a point he accepts and utilizes when discussing boredom), but that the results he derives from anxiety are biased or misleading—and it is hard to see how one might do that outside a global valuation of his work.

Perhaps the most that can be said in the current context then is this: I have raised a number of serious questions for Heidegger’s analysis, and suggested where he may face problems. I want to conclude by highlighting a final issue. Suppose everything that Heidegger says is right—anxiety thus becomes a state with a profound philosophical importance. Yet Heidegger is clear, particularly in Ga29/30, that we cannot control the onset of moods in any straightforward sense. He writes:

Moods—are they not something we can least of all invent, something that comes over us, something that we cannot simply call up? Do they not form of their own accord, as something that we cannot forcibly bring about but into which we slip unawares? If so, then we cannot and may not forcibly bring about such a mood artificially or arbitrarily...It must already be there. All we can do is ascertain it.⁸⁷

Moods thus ‘assail’ us, and their sudden descent is intended to exhibit what he calls our ‘thrownness’, our finding ourselves in a situation not of our choosing. The result is that Heidegger’s work on the emotions mandates that we take up a very particular stance. Whilst we cannot induce them, we must be highly attentive to their onset and remove any factors which would block or overcome them. As he puts it when discussing boredom, the upshot is that we must ‘not let boredom fall asleep... a strange and almost insane demand’.⁸⁸ Han-Pile, analysing the closely related case of the ‘call of conscience’ puts it like this:

[T]he choice is neither fully active nor fully passive: it involves a particular kind of agency, which, following Greek grammarians, I shall call ‘medio-passive’... Ultimately, hearing the call is not up to me: yet I can take some responsibility for doing so in the sense that, unless I try to attune myself in the right way, it may never be heard at all.⁸⁹

This new problematic links very naturally with Heidegger's theological interests: Dasein's need to be attentive is, for example, the secular analogue of the Pauline injunction to watchfulness.⁹⁰ The result is that in identifying the distinctive methodological role for emotions which I have discussed, Heidegger also comes to need a distinctive methodology by which we might cultivate and foster them. This methodology in turn feeds back into the rest of his philosophy. By the time of texts like Ga65, the *Beiträge*, Heidegger's ideal relationship to 'Seyn'—ceaselessly elusive, resisting any deliberate attempt to grasp it, requiring constant attentive expectation—*mirrors* in many ways this delicate balance of activity and passivity through which we must awaken to moods. In line with the quasi-poetic tenor of Ga65, Heidegger exploits the full gamut of meanings for terms like 'Stimmung'. But what I want to stress is that we must keep in mind the paradigm provided by the attentive awaiting of moods when we encounter remarks such as this:

This preparation [for a new kind of philosophy] does not consist in acquiring preliminary cognitions as the basis for the later disclosure of actual cognitions. Rather, here preparation is: opening the way, yielding to the way—essentially, *attuning* [*Stimmung*].⁹¹

I have argued that Heidegger possesses a sophisticated and innovative philosophy of the emotions. But one might also speak, in the years after *Sein und Zeit*, of an 'emotionalised philosophy'.⁹²

12.5 Conclusion

My aim in this chapter has been to trace the profile of Heidegger's innovative treatment of the emotions, and to indicate some of the consequent problems he faces. I have argued that he is uninterested in, and even unable to formulate, a number of the canonical debates in this area: the classic early modern and enlightenment dispute over motivation and the 'passions' is one such case. Simultaneously, however, he makes moods central to both his normative vision and to his methodological programme. Ultimately, I have suggested, there is at least a strand of his thought within which emotions are not simply a necessary condition on philosophizing, but a paradigm for it.

Notes

1. I discuss the relation between Heidegger's preferred characterization of these states and the usual idea of an emotion in Section 12.1. In citing Heidegger, I refer to the standard *Gesamtausgabe* edition (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1975–; abbreviated as Ga), with the exception of SZ, where I use the standard text (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1957). I employ the following abbreviations and I list any translations consulted below: all translations show the German pagination in the margins.

SZ *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1957); *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962)

- Ga3 *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (1998); *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press)
- Ga9 *Wegmarken* (1976); *Pathmarks*, trans. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)
- Ga20 *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* (1979); *History of the Concept of Time*, trans. Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992)
- Ga26 *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz* (1978)
- Ga29/30 *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik* (1983); *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995)
- Ga60 *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens* (1995)
- Ga65 *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1989)
- Ga94 *Überlegungen II–VI (Schwarze Hefte 1931–1938)* (2014)
2. Macquarrie and Robinson render *Befindlichkeit* as ‘state of mind’; I follow most contemporary authors in avoiding this since it risks prejudging Heidegger’s stance on mental states.
 3. For an excellent treatment of Heidegger’s relationship to Freud, for example, see Havi Carel, *Life and Death in Freud and Heidegger* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2014).
 4. As with all Heideggerian terminology, translation is a contentious issue. Many commentators now use ‘attunement’ for *Stimmung* to capture both the play on *stimmen*, meaning ‘to tune’ (a *Klavierstimmer* is a piano tuner), and some of the themes I discuss below, in particular Heidegger’s attempt to subvert models on which moods are inner states projected onto a blankly valueless world. In the current context, however, where the focus is as much on emotions themselves as on Heidegger exegesis, I have decided to employ the simpler ‘mood’. In this I follow the standard translation of *Sein und Zeit* by Macquarrie and Robinson.
 5. SZ, p. 139. See similarly Ga29/30, pp. 98–9. One of the targets Heidegger has in mind here is Kant, who defends a tripartite analysis of the mind along these lines (*V-MP/Mron*, pp. 877–8). All references to Kant are to the standard edition, *Kants gesammelte Schriften*

GMS *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* (Ak., vol. 4)

MS *Die Metaphysik der Sitten* (Ak., vol. 6)

V-MP/Mron *Metaphysik Mrongovius* (Ak., vol. 29)

(Berlin: de Gruyter, 1900–; abbreviated as Ak.). I employ the following abbreviations:

6. Ga29/30, p. 100.
7. SZ, p. 136.
8. I will say something about the question of whether these examples are all well characterized as moods in Section 12.2.
9. SZ, p. 134; 136.
10. SZ, p. 134. On the general tactic compare SZ, p. 34.
11. SZ, p. 136.
12. SZ, p. 137.
13. SZ, p. 138.

14. Thus Dreyfus's classic formulation: affectivity 'is the condition of the possibility of specific things showing up as mattering'. Hubert Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-world* (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1991), p. 175.
15. SZ, p. 137.
16. SZ, p. 138.
17. SZ, pp. 134–5.
18. SZ, p. 136. On the link to thrownness see especially SZ, p. 135. I'll return to the question of to what degree we might be able to control moods in Section 12.4.
19. SZ, p. 136.
20. Ga29/30, pp. 127–8.
21. For an extremely influential modern formulation of how exactly this might work see Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-world*. Dreyfus thus places particular stress on Heidegger's remarks on the public nature of moods—for example, SZ, p. 138 (Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-world*, p. 171).
22. SZ, pp. 141–2. To see why this is problematic consider the following. I am standing at a viewing platform on top of a mountain. Through the telescope, I see the restaurant across the valley—and a small child cycling right on the edge. It seems natural to express this by saying that I fear that the child will fall. Yet it is not immediately obvious in what sense this fear is about me—the child may be a complete stranger. There are of course responses that might be made—my point is just that some kind of development of the idea is necessary.
23. In Heideggerian terms, the issue of the 'inner' and 'outer' arises at the level of being-in-the-world, of which affectivity is only one aspect. I discuss this issue in detail elsewhere: see Sacha Golob, *Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom and Normativity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 70–103.
24. Each philosopher of course has their own preferred taxonomy of emotions/feelings/passions/drives and so on; my goal in this section is simply to sketch some very broad, but I hope useful, patterns of coalescence.
25. For Hume's own famous formulation, see David Hume *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 2.3.3.4.
26. Paul Guyer, *Knowledge, Reason, and Taste: Kant's Response to Hume* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 181. The key primary passage is this:

Every determination of choice proceeds from the representation of a possible action to the deed through the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, taking an interest in the action or its effect. The state of feeling here (the way in which inner sense is affected) is either pathological or moral. (MM 6:399)
27. Guyer, *Knowledge, Reason, and Taste*, p. 183.
28. G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, trans. Peter Hodgson, 3 vols (London: University of California Press, 1984–5), vol. I, p. 391.
29. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. H. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), sections 163; 207; 253.
30. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, trans. Carol Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1.10.
31. Michel Foucault, *Remarks on Marx*, trans. J. Goldstein and J. Cascaito (New York: Semiotext, 1991), pp. 31–2.
32. Georges Bataille, *Inner Experience*, trans. Leslie Boldt (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988), p. 3.
33. SZ, pp. 146–7.

34. SZ, p. 145. For an extremely helpful analysis of this aspect of Heidegger's system, see William Blattner, *Heidegger's Temporal Idealism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 40–2.
35. One might try to align such cases with inauthentic Dasein, and there are some very general communalities: both are in an important sense 'defective' judges. But the defects are different. The usual worry in the ethics literature is about agents who are capable of tracking the extension of moral predicates and even offering some account of why they apply, but don't act on the verdicts reached. Inauthentic Dasein, in contrast, systematically misapplies many of the concepts, death, the future, the past, in which Heidegger is interested (SZ, pp. 167–71).
36. SZ, p. 186.
37. Ga94, p. 198.
38. SZ, p. 266 or SZ, pp. 295–6.
39. SZ, p. 189.
40. Ga29/30, p. 89.
41. See, for example, Ga29/30, p. 190. I think SZ's treatment of fear is also interesting, but it is clearly intended by Heidegger as a foil for the methodologically much more significant case of anxiety (SZ, p. 140). I also share widely voiced concerns about how well the episodic fear he discusses actually fits into his taxonomy of moods (see, for example, Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-world*, p. 169).
42. Heidegger embeds anxiety within a complex web of existential and quasi-theological concepts such as death, guilt, authenticity, and the 'call of conscience' (see, for example, SZ, pp. 269–71). The exact role of these concepts within his system is disputed, as is the connection between his use of terms like death and their ordinary meaning. Any treatment of such larger aspects of Heidegger's system would take us well beyond the current chapter, and I will not attempt one here. For a good overview of many of the issues see Iain Thomson, 'Death and Demise in Being and Time', in *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger's Being and Time*, ed. Mark Wrathall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). For a detailed presentation of my own take on these issues, please see Golob, *Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom and Normativity*, ch. 6.
43. SZ, pp. 186, 187. Thus death, which is closely bound with Heideggerian anxiety, is likewise 'a way to be, which Dasein takes over as soon as it is' (SZ, p. 245; on the close links between death and anxiety see SZ, p. 266).
44. SZ, pp. 185–6; 189.
45. SZ, p. 189.
46. SZ, p. 260, 296. As Blattner observes, Heidegger is ambiguous as to precisely what relation authentic agents need to anxiety (Blattner, 'Essential Guilt and Transcendental Conscience', in *Heidegger, Authenticity and the Self*, ed. Denis McManus (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 116–35, p. 127. The exact details of the relationship, whilst important to the description of 'resoluteness', do not matter here.
47. SZ, p. 187.
48. SZ, p. 186.
49. SZ, p. 186.
50. SZ, p. 86 (see also Ga29/30, p. 333).
51. In Heidegger's own terms:

Why is there anything such as a why and a because? Because Dasein exists... The for-the-sake-of-which, as the primary character of world, i.e. of transcendence, is the primal phenomenon of ground as such... (Ga26: 276)

There is a broader question here as to whether all normativity is a function of these ‘for-the-sake-of-whichs’. This will depend on how exactly one specifies ‘function’, and how one cashes the details of the story about self-understanding. One can, for example, easily imagine identities that give me a reason not to recognize biological needs as reasons. But it is less clear why agents who just unreflectively take biological impulses to be reasons are doing so because of any self-understanding. For a very helpful discussion of these issues, drawing on a comparison with Korsgaard’s work on practical identity, see M. Okrent, ‘Heidegger and Korsgaard on Human Reflection’, *Philosophical Topics* 27 (1999): 47–76.

52. SZ, p. 186.
53. Heidegger makes similar claims about ‘profound boredom’. It is an experience in which ‘beings as a whole do not disappear, however, but show themselves precisely as such in their indifference’ (Ga29/30, p. 208).
54. Herman Philipse, *Heidegger’s Philosophy of Being* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 395.
55. SZ, p. 343. Crowell seems to me to have the idea right when he summarizes that: ‘anxiety in Heidegger’s sense reveals something like a global incapacity vis-à-vis the normativity of all laws and oughts: existing norms present themselves as mere facts’. Steven Crowell, ‘Conscience and Reason’, in *Transcendental Heidegger*, ed. Jeff Malpas and Steven Crowell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 43–62, (p. 55).
56. Blattner, *Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism*, p. 80.
57. Ernst Tugendhat, *Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination*, trans. P. Stern (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1986), p. 216.
58. For an alternative response which places great stress on the nature of ‘making’ decisions, see Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-world*, p. 319.
59. Thomson, *Death and Demise*, p. 270.
60. This would be my response to McManus’s powerful challenge as to whether anxiety is veridical or not: a positive answer lands one facing Tugendhat’s problem, whilst a negative answer makes the importance which Heidegger attaches to it puzzling. My view is that Heidegger does regard it as conveying something accurate about the normative landscape, but it requires subsequent reflection to understand precisely what: the answer, the absence of categorical norms, avoids Tugendhat’s threat, whilst still being of obvious import. For an extremely helpful discussion of the underlying issues, and his own solution to the challenge, see D. McManus, ‘Anxiety, Choice, Responsibility’, in *Heidegger, Authenticity and the Self*, ed. D. McManus (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 163–86.
61. SZ, p. 191; pp. 186–7.
62. Ga29/30, p. 123; SZ, p. 343. For a full discussion see Golob, *Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom and Normativity*, pp. 229–33.
63. Again, this mirrors the upshot of Heidegger’s treatment of profound boredom; see Ga29–30, pp. 254–5.
64. Ga29/30, pp. 246–8.
65. SZ, pp. 298–300.
66. Blattner, ‘Essential Guilt and Transcendental Conscience’, p. 132.
67. SZ, p. 311.
68. SZ, pp. 296–7.

69. SZ, p. 323; SZ, p. 145.
70. SZ, p. 182.
71. SZ, p. 184.
72. SZ, p. 308.
73. SZ, pp. 167–70.
74. Ga20, p. 376.
75. GA94, p. 74; see similarly p. 39.
76. SZ, p. 185, 187.
77. SZ, p. 185, 187.
78. The American Psychiatric Association, *The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition* (Arlington VA.: American Psychiatric Association, 2013), p. 189.
79. Bataille, *Inner Experience*, p. 34.
80. D. McManus, 'Anxiety, Choice, Responsibility', in *Heidegger, Authenticity and the Self*, ed. D. McManus (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 163–85 (p. 155).
81. Blattner, *Heidegger's Temporal Idealism*, p. 80.
82. Mark Okrent, 'Heidegger and Korsgaard on Human Reflection', p. 73.
83. The worry here would be that even in anxiety individuals retain much more of a culturally specific, worldly identity than Heidegger allows—so, for example, something thicker than the bare awareness of one's own being which Blattner calls 'purely thin facticity and existentiality' (Blattner, *Heidegger's Temporal Idealism*, p. 77).
84. When considered in the larger context of Heidegger's work, further worries emerge which I cannot adequately discuss here. For example, as Tobias Keiling perceptively noted in comments on an earlier draft of this material, the central methodological role which Heidegger allots to successive moods (anxiety, boredom, or later what one might call 'restraint' [*Verhaltenheit*]) leads a structural neglect of their phenomenological differences: very crudely put, they all 'do' the same basic thing. I am indebted to Tobias for helping me see this more clearly.
85. SZ, p. 182.
86. Heidegger himself sometimes tries to offer more specific defences of the choice of anxiety, but these are largely couched in terms which require an antecedent acceptance of his system. So, for example, Ga3, pp. 283–4 makes much play of the fact that we are anxious about 'nothing'. Heidegger's intent is to link the supposed absence of a target object in anxiety to his broader doctrine of the 'Nothing' [*Das Nichts*]*—*the plausibility of this move is entirely a function of the plausibility of that other commitment.
87. Ga29/30, pp. 89–90.
88. Ga29/30, p. 119.
89. Beatrice Han-Pile, 'Freedom and the Choice to Choose Oneself in Being and Time', in *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger's Being and Time*, ed. M. Wrathall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 291–319 (pp. 308–9).
90. Ga60, pp. 104–5.
91. Ga65, p. 86 (original emphasis).
92. I would like to thank Denis McManus, Sasha Mudd, and audiences in Southampton and Oxford for extremely helpful discussion of these issues. I would also like to thank the editors of the volume and Tobias Keiling for their insightful comments on an earlier draft.

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