208 research outputs found
What is it Like to Have a Crappy Imagination?
I argue that when it comes to understanding other people, humans have a problem that involves a combination of poor imagination and excessive trust in this imagination. Often, the problem has to do with what I call "runaway simulation" - clinging to the assumption that another person resembles you despite glaring counter-evidence. I then argue that the same type of problem appears intra-personally, as we fail miserably to imagine potential and future selves. Finally, I argue that this fact goes a long way to explain the phenomenology of many transformative experiences, an explanation that does not require a special kind of knowledge to exist along the lines of "knowing what it's like"
Responsibility, applied ethics, and complex autonomy theories
I argue that despite it being said often that the concept of personal autonomy is important for grounding moral responsibility and in applied ethics, a certain type of theories of autonomy and identification, descended from the work of Harry Frankfurt starting 1971, are not relevant in an obvious way to either moral responsibility or applied ethics
It Ain't Necessarily So
While Neo-Aristotelians argue quite plausibly that it is hard to get to eudaemonia if one is wicked, I argue that they fail to show that the seeker of flourishing has a reason to become virtuous (as opposed to morally mediocre)
Quality of Will and (Some) Unusual Behavior
This chapter explores how far one can go accounting for the moral responsibility implications of several unusual mental conditions using a parsimonious quality-of-will account that relies on the way we talk about moral responsibility in more mundane situations. By contrasting situations involving epistemic irrationality versus cognitive impairment, it becomes clear that the presence of those often (but not always) excuses actions performed by unusual agents. The discussion turns to cases of clinical depression and sketches a way for quality-of-will accounts to approach them. It is also argued that of some of these mental conditions, there is no particular reason to think that they excuse. There is also an argument against regarding the concept "mental disorder" and current DSM categories as critical to agency theory
Affective Experience, Desire, and Reasons for Action
What is the role of affective experience in explaining how our desires provide us with reasons for action? When we desire that p, we are thereby disposed to feel attracted to the prospect that p, or to feel averse to the prospect that not-p. In this paper, we argue that affective experiences – including feelings of attraction and aversion – provide us with reasons for action in virtue of their phenomenal character. Moreover, we argue that desires provide us with reasons for action only insofar as they are dispositions to have affective experiences. On this account, affective experience has a central role to play in explaining how desires provide reasons for action
The Right Wrong‐Makers
Right- and wrong-making features ("moral grounds") are widely believed to play important normative roles, e.g. in morally apt or virtuous motivation. This paper argues that moral grounds have been systematically misidentified. Canonical statements of our moral theories tend to summarize, rather than directly state, the full range of moral grounds posited by the theory. Further work is required to "unpack" a theory's criterion of rightness and identify the features that are of ground-level moral significance. As a result, it is not actually true that maximizing value is the relevant right-making feature even for maximizing consequentialists. Focusing on the simple example of utilitarianism, I show how careful attention to the ground level can drastically influence how we think about our moral theories
Saints, heroes, sages, and villains
This essay explores the question of how to be good. My starting point is
a thesis about moral worth that I’ve defended in the past: roughly, that an action is
morally worthy if and only it is performed for the reasons why it is right. While I
think that account gets at one important sense of moral goodness, I argue here that it
fails to capture several ways of being worthy of admiration on moral grounds. Moral
goodness is more multi-faceted. My title is intended to capture that multi-facetedness:
the essay examines saintliness, heroism, and sagacity. The variety of our
common-sense moral ideals underscores the inadequacy of any one account of
moral admirableness, and I hope to illuminate the distinct roles these ideals play in
our everyday understanding of goodness. Along the way, I give an account of what
makes actions heroic, of whether such actions are supererogatory, and of what, if
anything, is wrong with moral deference. At the close of the essay, I begin to
explore the flipside of these ideals: villainy
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