Non-approximability and Polylogarithmic Approximations of the Single-Sink Unsplittable and Confluent Dynamic Flow Problems

Dynamic Flows were introduced by Ford and Fulkerson in 1958 to model flows over time. They define edge capacities to be the total amount of flow that can enter an edge in one time unit. Each edge also has a length, representing the time needed to traverse it. Dynamic Flows have been used to model many problems including traffic congestion, hop-routing of packets and evacuation protocols in buildings. While the basic problem of moving the maximal amount of supplies from sources to sinks is polynomial time solvable, natural minor modifications can make it NP-hard. One such modification is that flows be confluent, i.e., all flows leaving a vertex must leave along the same edge. This corresponds to natural conditions in, e.g., evacuation planning and hop routing. We investigate the single-sink Confluent Quickest Flow problem. The input is a graph with edge capacities and lengths, sources with supplies and a sink. The problem is to find a confluent flow minimizing the time required to send supplies to the sink. Our main results include: a) Logarithmic Non-Approximability: Directed Confluent Quickest Flows cannot be approximated in polynomial time with an O(log n) approximation factor, unless P=NP. b) Polylogarithmic Bicriteria Approximations: Polynomial time (O(log^8 n), O(log^2 kappa)) bicritera approximation algorithms for the Confluent Quickest Flow problem where kappa is the number of sinks, in both directed and undirected graphs. Corresponding results are also developed for the Confluent Maximum Flow over time problem. The techniques developed also improve recent approximation algorithms for static confluent flows

Graph Orientation and Flows Over Time

Flows over time are used to model many real-world logistic and routing problems. The networks underlying such problems -- streets, tracks, etc. -- are inherently undirected and directions are only imposed on them to reduce the danger of colliding vehicles and similar problems. Thus the question arises, what influence the orientation of the network has on the network flow over time problem that is being solved on the oriented network. In the literature, this is also referred to as the contraflow or lane reversal problem. We introduce and analyze the price of orientation: How much flow is lost in any orientation of the network if the time horizon remains fixed? We prove that there is always an orientation where we can still send $\frac{1}{3}$ of the flow and this bound is tight. For the special case of networks with a single source or sink, this fraction is $\frac12$ which is again tight. We present more results of similar flavor and also show non-approximability results for finding the best orientation for single and multicommodity maximum flows over time

Computational aspects of combinatorial pricing problems

Combinatorial pricing encompasses a wide range of natural optimization problems that arise in the computation of revenue maximizing pricing schemes for a given set of goods, as well as the design of profit maximizing auctions in strategic settings. We consider the computational side of several different multi-product and network pricing problems and, as most of the problems in this area are NP-hard, we focus on the design of approximation algorithms and corresponding inapproximability results. In the unit-demand multi-product pricing problem it is assumed that each consumer has different budgets for the products she is interested in and purchases a single product out of her set of alternatives. Depending on how consumers choose their products once prices are fixed we distinguish the min-buying, max-buying and rank-buying models, in which consumers select the affordable product with smallest price, highest price or highest rank according to some predefined preference list, respectively. We prove that the max-buying model allows for constant approximation guarantees and this is true even in the case of limited product supply. For the min-buying model we prove inapproximability beyond the known logarithmic guarantees under standard complexity theoretic assumptions. Surprisingly, this result even extends to the case of pricing with a price ladder constraint, i.e., a predefined relative order on the product prices. Furthermore, similar results can be shown for the uniform-budget version of the problem, which corresponds to a special case of the unit-demand envy-free pricing problem, under an assumption about the average case hardness of refuting random 3SAT-instances. Introducing the notion of stochastic selection rules we show that among a large class of selection rules based on the order of product prices the maxbuying model is in fact the only one allowing for sub-logarithmic approximation guarantees. In the single-minded pricing problem each consumer is interested in a single set of products, which she purchases if the sum of prices does not exceed her budget. It turns out that our results on envyfree unit-demand pricing can be extended to this scenario and yield inapproximability results for ratios expressed in terms of the number of distinct products, thereby complementing existing hardness results. On the algorithmic side, we present an algorithm with approximation guarantee that depends only on the maximum size of the sets and the number of requests per product. Our algorithm’s ratio matches previously known results in the worst case but has significantly better provable performance guarantees on sparse problem instances. Viewing single-minded as a network pricing problem in which we assign prices to edges and consumers want to purchase paths in the network, it is proven that the problem remains APX-hard even on extremely sparse instances. For the special case of pricing on a line with paths that are nested, we design an FPTAS and prove NP-hardness. In a Stackelberg network pricing game a so-called leader sets the prices on a subset of the edges of a network, the remaining edges have associated fixed costs. Once prices are fixed, one or more followers purchase min-cost subnetworks according to their requirements and pay the leader for all pricable edges contained in their networks. We extend the analysis of the known single-price algorithm, which assigns the same price to all pricable edges, from cases in which the feasible subnetworks of a follower form the basis of a matroid to the general case, thus, obtaining logarithmic approximation guarantees for general Stackelberg games. We then consider a special 2-player game in which the follower buys a min-cost vertex cover in a bipartite graph and the leader sets prices on a subset of the vertices. We prove that this problem is polynomial time solvable in some cases and allows for constant approximation guarantees in general. Finally, we point out that results on unit-demand and single-minded pricing yield several strong inapproximability results for Stackelberg pricing games with multiple followers

Independent Set, Induced Matching, and Pricing: Connections and Tight (Subexponential Time) Approximation Hardnesses

We present a series of almost settled inapproximability results for three fundamental problems. The first in our series is the subexponential-time inapproximability of the maximum independent set problem, a question studied in the area of parameterized complexity. The second is the hardness of approximating the maximum induced matching problem on bounded-degree bipartite graphs. The last in our series is the tight hardness of approximating the k-hypergraph pricing problem, a fundamental problem arising from the area of algorithmic game theory. In particular, assuming the Exponential Time Hypothesis, our two main results are: - For any r larger than some constant, any r-approximation algorithm for the maximum independent set problem must run in at least 2^{n^{1-\epsilon}/r^{1+\epsilon}} time. This nearly matches the upper bound of 2^{n/r} (Cygan et al., 2008). It also improves some hardness results in the domain of parameterized complexity (e.g., Escoffier et al., 2012 and Chitnis et al., 2013) - For any k larger than some constant, there is no polynomial time min (k^{1-\epsilon}, n^{1/2-\epsilon})-approximation algorithm for the k-hypergraph pricing problem, where n is the number of vertices in an input graph. This almost matches the upper bound of min (O(k), \tilde O(\sqrt{n})) (by Balcan and Blum, 2007 and an algorithm in this paper). We note an interesting fact that, in contrast to n^{1/2-\epsilon} hardness for polynomial-time algorithms, the k-hypergraph pricing problem admits n^{\delta} approximation for any \delta >0 in quasi-polynomial time. This puts this problem in a rare approximability class in which approximability thresholds can be improved significantly by allowing algorithms to run in quasi-polynomial time.Comment: The full version of FOCS 201

Capacitated Vehicle Routing with Non-Uniform Speeds

The capacitated vehicle routing problem (CVRP) involves distributing (identical) items from a depot to a set of demand locations, using a single capacitated vehicle. We study a generalization of this problem to the setting of multiple vehicles having non-uniform speeds (that we call Heterogenous CVRP), and present a constant-factor approximation algorithm. The technical heart of our result lies in achieving a constant approximation to the following TSP variant (called Heterogenous TSP). Given a metric denoting distances between vertices, a depot r containing k vehicles with possibly different speeds, the goal is to find a tour for each vehicle (starting and ending at r), so that every vertex is covered in some tour and the maximum completion time is minimized. This problem is precisely Heterogenous CVRP when vehicles are uncapacitated. The presence of non-uniform speeds introduces difficulties for employing standard tour-splitting techniques. In order to get a better understanding of this technique in our context, we appeal to ideas from the 2-approximation for scheduling in parallel machine of Lenstra et al.. This motivates the introduction of a new approximate MST construction called Level-Prim, which is related to Light Approximate Shortest-path Trees. The last component of our algorithm involves partitioning the Level-Prim tree and matching the resulting parts to vehicles. This decomposition is more subtle than usual since now we need to enforce correlation between the size of the parts and their distances to the depot