193 research outputs found

    Assessing systemic risk due to fire sales spillover through maximum entropy network reconstruction

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    Assessing systemic risk in financial markets is of great importance but it often requires data that are unavailable or available at a very low frequency. For this reason, systemic risk assessment with partial information is potentially very useful for regulators and other stakeholders. In this paper we consider systemic risk due to fire sales spillover and portfolio rebalancing by using the risk metrics defined by Greenwood et al. (2015). By using the Maximum Entropy principle we propose a method to assess aggregated and single bank's systemicness and vulnerability and to statistically test for a change in these variables when only the information on the size of each bank and the capitalization of the investment assets are available. We prove the effectiveness of our method on 2001-2013 quarterly data of US banks for which portfolio composition is available.Comment: 36 pages, 6 figures, Accepted on Journal of Economic Dynamics and Contro

    Optimal Trade Execution Under Endogenous Pressure to Liquidate: Theory and Numerical Solutions

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    We study optimal liquidation of a trading position (so-called block order or meta-order) in a market with a linear temporary price impact (Kyle, 1985). We endogenize the pressure to liquidate by introducing a downward drift in the unaffected asset price while simultaneously ruling out short sales. In this setting the liquidation time horizon becomes a stopping time determined endogenously, as part of the optimal strategy. We find that the optimal liquidation strategy is consistent with the square-root law which states that the average price impact per share is proportional to the square root of the size of the meta-order (Bershova and Rakhlin, 2013; Farmer et al., 2013; Donier et al., 2015; T´oth et al., 2016). Mathematically, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of our optimization leads to a severely singular and numerically unstable ordinary differential equation initial value problem. We provide careful analysis of related singular mixed boundary value problems and devise a numerically stable computation strategy by re-introducing time dimension into an otherwise time-homogeneous task

    Compressing over-the counter markets. ECMI Working Paper No 11 12 Nov 2020.

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    Over-the-counter markets are at the centre of the global reform of the financial system. The authors of this paper show how the size and structure of these markets can undergo rapid and extensive changes when participants engage in portfolio compression, which is an optimisation technology that exploits multilateral netting opportunities. They find that tightly knit and concentrated trading structures, as featured by many large over-the-counter markets, are especially susceptible to reductions of notional amounts and network reconfiguration resulting from compression activities. Using a unique transaction-level dataset on credit-default-swaps markets, they estimate reduction levels suggesting that the adoption of this technology can account for a large share of the historical development observed in these markets since the Global Financial Crisis. Finally, the authors test the effect of a mandate to centrally clear over the counter markets in terms of size and structure. When participants engage in both central clearing and portfolio compression with the clearinghouse, results show large netting failures if clearinghouses proliferate. Allowing for compression across clearinghouses by-and-large offsets this adverse effect

    Essays on credit contagion and shocks in banking

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    Essays on Financial Regulation in Macroeconomics

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    This dissertation investigates two aspects of how to regulate the financial sector optimally in order to increase macroeconomic stability and mitigate the risk of future financial crises. Chapter 1 analyzes the desirability of international coordination in financial regulation. It develops a two-country model of systemic liquidity risk-taking in which financial market imperfections provide a rationale for macro-prudential regulation. In the model, curbing liquidity risk-taking via regulation lowers the price of liquidity during financial crises and thereby reduces the costs associated with market incompleteness. But regulation also entails costs in the form of distortions to productive investment decisions. The discrepancy between the domestic dimension of the costs and the global dimension of the benefits of regulation generates free-riding incentives among regulators operating in different countries. The theory predicts that absent international coordination, national authorities are tempted to regulate their financial systems in a way that results in excessive illiquidity. It therefore speaks in favor of a stronger global coordination of banking regulation. Chapter 2 analyzes the social optimality of private debt maturity choices. It studies debt maturity decisions in a dynamic macroeconomic model in which financial frictions give rise to systemic risk in the form of amplification effects. Long-term liabilities provide insurance against shocks to the asset side of the balance sheet, but they come at an extra cost. The debt maturity structure therefore maps into an allocation of macroeconomic risk between lenders and leveraged borrowers, and fundamental shocks propagate more powerfully in the economy when the maturity is shorter. The market equilibrium is not constrained efficient as borrowers fail to internalize their contribution to systemic risk and take on too much short-term debt in a decentralized economy. The theory indicates that a tax on short-term debt -- a form of macroprudential policy -- leads to Pareto improvements and results in less volatile allocations and asset prices

    Too-connected-to-fail Institutions and Payments System’s Stability: Assessing Challenges for Financial Authorities

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    The most recent episode of market turmoil exposed the limitations resulting from the traditional focus on too-big-to-fail institutions within an increasingly systemic-crisis-prone financial system, and encouraged the appearance of the too-connected-to-fail (TCTF) concept. The TCTF concept conveniently broadens the base of potential destabilizing institutions beyond the traditional banking-focused approach to systemic risk, but requires methodologies capable of coping with complex, cross-dependent, context-dependent and non-linear systems. After comprehensively introducing the rise of the TCTF concept, this paper presents a robust, parsimonious and powerful approach to identifying and assessing systemic risk within payments systems, and proposes some analytical routes for assessing financial authorities’ challenges. Banco de la Republica’s approach is based on a convenient mixture of network topology basics for identifying central institutions, and payments systems simulation techniques for quantifying the potential consequences of central institutions failing within Colombian large-value payments systems. Unlike econometrics or network topology alone, results consist of a rich set of quantitative outcomes that capture the complexity, cross-dependency, context-dependency and non-linearity of payments systems, but conveniently disaggregated and dollar-denominated. These outcomes and the proposed analysis provide practical information for enhanced policy and decision-making, where the ability to measure each institution’s contribution to systemic risk may assist financial authorities in their task to achieve payments system’s stability.Payments systems, too-connected-to-fail, too-big-to-fail, systemic risk, network topology, simulation, central bank liquidity. Classification JEL:E58, E44, C63, G21, D85.
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