344,417 research outputs found

    Threshold games and cooperation on multiplayer graphs

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    Objective: The study investigates the effect on cooperation in multiplayer games, when the population from which all individuals are drawn is structured - i.e. when a given individual is only competing with a small subset of the entire population. Method: To optimize the focus on multiplayer effects, a class of games were chosen for which the payoff depends nonlinearly on the number of cooperators - this ensures that the game cannot be represented as a sum of pair-wise interactions, and increases the likelihood of observing behaviour different from that seen in two-player games. The chosen class of games are named "threshold games", and are defined by a threshold, M>0M > 0, which describes the minimal number of cooperators in a given match required for all the participants to receive a benefit. The model was studied primarily through numerical simulations of large populations of individuals, each with interaction neighbourhoods described by various classes of networks. Results: When comparing the level of cooperation in a structured population to the mean-field model, we find that most types of structure lead to a decrease in cooperation. This is both interesting and novel, simply due to the generality and breadth of relevance of the model - it is likely that any model with similar payoff structure exhibits related behaviour. More importantly, we find that the details of the behaviour depends to a large extent on the size of the immediate neighbourhoods of the individuals, as dictated by the network structure. In effect, the players behave as if they are part of a much smaller, fully mixed, population, which we suggest an expression for.Comment: in PLOS ONE, 4th Feb 201

    The Economics of Small Worlds

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    We examine a simple economic model of network formation where agents benefit from indirect relationships. We show that small-world features—short path lengths between nodes together with highly clustered link structures—necessarily emerge for a wide set of parameters

    Maximum Performance at Minimum Cost in Network Synchronization

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    We consider two optimization problems on synchronization of oscillator networks: maximization of synchronizability and minimization of synchronization cost. We first develop an extension of the well-known master stability framework to the case of non-diagonalizable Laplacian matrices. We then show that the solution sets of the two optimization problems coincide and are simultaneously characterized by a simple condition on the Laplacian eigenvalues. Among the optimal networks, we identify a subclass of hierarchical networks, characterized by the absence of feedback loops and the normalization of inputs. We show that most optimal networks are directed and non-diagonalizable, necessitating the extension of the framework. We also show how oriented spanning trees can be used to explicitly and systematically construct optimal networks under network topological constraints. Our results may provide insights into the evolutionary origin of structures in complex networks for which synchronization plays a significant role.Comment: 29 pages, 9 figures, accepted for publication in Physica D, minor correction

    Coalitional Games for Distributed Collaborative Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive Radio Networks

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    Collaborative spectrum sensing among secondary users (SUs) in cognitive networks is shown to yield a significant performance improvement. However, there exists an inherent trade off between the gains in terms of probability of detection of the primary user (PU) and the costs in terms of false alarm probability. In this paper, we study the impact of this trade off on the topology and the dynamics of a network of SUs seeking to reduce the interference on the PU through collaborative sensing. Moreover, while existing literature mainly focused on centralized solutions for collaborative sensing, we propose distributed collaboration strategies through game theory. We model the problem as a non-transferable coalitional game, and propose a distributed algorithm for coalition formation through simple merge and split rules. Through the proposed algorithm, SUs can autonomously collaborate and self-organize into disjoint independent coalitions, while maximizing their detection probability taking into account the cooperation costs (in terms of false alarm). We study the stability of the resulting network structure, and show that a maximum number of SUs per formed coalition exists for the proposed utility model. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm allows a reduction of up to 86.6% of the average missing probability per SU (probability of missing the detection of the PU) relative to the non-cooperative case, while maintaining a certain false alarm level. In addition, through simulations, we compare the performance of the proposed distributed solution with respect to an optimal centralized solution that minimizes the average missing probability per SU. Finally, the results also show how the proposed algorithm autonomously adapts the network topology to environmental changes such as mobility.Comment: in proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM 200
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