756 research outputs found

    Securing Critical Infrastructures

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    1noL'abstract è presente nell'allegato / the abstract is in the attachmentopen677. INGEGNERIA INFORMATInoopenCarelli, Albert

    Fast Differentially Private Matrix Factorization

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    Differentially private collaborative filtering is a challenging task, both in terms of accuracy and speed. We present a simple algorithm that is provably differentially private, while offering good performance, using a novel connection of differential privacy to Bayesian posterior sampling via Stochastic Gradient Langevin Dynamics. Due to its simplicity the algorithm lends itself to efficient implementation. By careful systems design and by exploiting the power law behavior of the data to maximize CPU cache bandwidth we are able to generate 1024 dimensional models at a rate of 8.5 million recommendations per second on a single PC

    The AXIOM platform for next-generation cyber physical systems

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    Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are widely used in many applications that require interactions between humans and their physical environment. These systems usually integrate a set of hardware-software components for optimal application execution in terms of performance and energy consumption. The AXIOM project (Agile, eXtensible, fast I/O Module), presented in this paper, proposes a hardware-software platform for CPS coupled with an easy parallel programming model and sufficient connectivity so that the performance can scale-up by adding multiple boards. AXIOM supports a task-based programming model based on OmpSs and leverages a high-speed, inexpensive communication interface called AXIOM-Link. The board also tightly couples the CPU with reconfigurable resources to accelerate portions of the applications. As case studies, AXIOM uses smart video surveillance, and smart home living applicationsThis work is partially supported by the European Union H2020 program through the AXIOM project (grant ICT-01-2014 GA 645496) and HiPEAC (GA 687698), by the Spanish Government through Programa Severo Ochoa (SEV-2015-0493), by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology through TIN2015-65316-P project, and by the Generalitat de Catalunya (contracts 2014-SGR-1051 and 2014-SGR-1272). We also thank the Xilinx University Program for its hardware and software donations.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

    Revisiting Vulnerability Analysis in Modern Microprocessors

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    Abstract-The notion of Architectural Vulnerability Factor (AVF) has been extensively used to evaluate various aspects of design robustness. While AVF has been a very popular way of assessing element resiliency, its calculation requires rigorous and extremely time-consuming experiments. Furthermore, recent radiation studies in 90 nm and 65 nm technology nodes demonstrate that up to 55 percent of Single Event Upsets (SEUs) result in Multiple Bit Upsets (MBUs), and thus the Single Bit Flip (SBF) model employed in computing AVF needs to be reassessed. In this paper, we present a method for calculating the vulnerability of modern microprocessors -using Statistical Fault Injection (SFI)-several orders of magnitude faster than traditional SFI techniques, while also using more realistic fault models which reflect the existence of MBUs. Our method partitions the design into various hierarchical levels and systematically performs incremental fault injections to generate vulnerability estimates. The presented method has been applied on an Intel microprocessor and an Alpha 21264 design, accelerating fault injection by 15Â, on average, and reducing computational cost for investigating the effect of MBUs. Extensive experiments, focusing on the effect of MBUs in modern microprocessors, corroborate that the SBF model employed by current vulnerability estimation tools is not sufficient to accurately capture the increasing effect of MBUs in contemporary processes

    Efficient design space exploration of embedded microprocessors

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    Formal Verification of the AAMP-FV Microcode

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    This report describes the experiences of Collins Avionics & Communications and SRI International in formally specifying and verifying the microcode in a Rockwell proprietary microprocessor, the AAMP-FV, using the PVS verification system. This project built extensively on earlier experiences using PVS to verify the microcode in the AAMP5, a complex, pipelined microprocessor designed for use in avionics displays and global positioning systems. While the AAMP5 experiment demonstrated the technical feasibility of formal verification of microcode, the steep learning curve encountered left unanswered the question of whether it could be performed at reasonable cost. The AAMP-FV project was conducted to determine whether the experience gained on the AAMP5 project could be used to make formal verification of microcode cost effective for safety-critical and high volume devices

    Segurança de computadores por meio de autenticação intrínseca de hardware

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    Orientadores: Guido Costa Souza de Araújo, Mario Lúcio Côrtes e Diego de Freitas AranhaTese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de ComputaçãoResumo: Neste trabalho apresentamos Computer Security by Hardware-Intrinsic Authentication (CSHIA), uma arquitetura de computadores segura para sistemas embarcados que tem como objetivo prover autenticidade e integridade para código e dados. Este trabalho está divido em três fases: Projeto da Arquitetura, sua Implementação, e sua Avaliação de Segurança. Durante a fase de projeto, determinamos como integridade e autenticidade seriam garantidas através do uso de Funções Fisicamente Não Clonáveis (PUFs) e propusemos um algoritmo de extração de chaves criptográficas de memórias cache de processadores. Durante a implementação, flexibilizamos o projeto da arquitetura para fornecer diferentes possibilidades de configurações sem comprometimento da segurança. Então, avaliamos seu desempenho levando em consideração o incremento em área de chip, aumento de consumo de energia e memória adicional para diferentes configurações. Por fim, analisamos a segurança de PUFs e desenvolvemos um novo ataque de canal lateral que circunvê a propriedade de unicidade de PUFs por meio de seus elementos de construçãoAbstract: This work presents Computer Security by Hardware-Intrinsic Authentication (CSHIA), a secure computer architecture for embedded systems that aims at providing authenticity and integrity for code and data. The work encompassed three phases: Design, Implementation, and Security Evaluation. In design, we laid out the basic ideas behind CSHIA, namely, how integrity and authenticity are employed through the use of Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs), and we proposed an algorithm to extract cryptographic keys from the intrinsic memories of processors. In implementation, we made CSHIA¿s design more flexible, allowing different configurations without compromising security. Then, we evaluated CSHIA¿s performance and overheads, such as area, energy, and memory, for multiple configurations. Finally, we evaluated security of PUFs, which led us to develop a new side-channel-based attack that enabled us to circumvent PUFs¿ uniqueness property through their architectural elementsDoutoradoCiência da ComputaçãoDoutor em Ciência da Computação2015/06829-2; 2016/25532-3147614/2014-7FAPESPCNP
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