Deductive arguments

This essay presents deductive arguments to an introductory-level audience via a discussion of Aristotle's three types of rhetoric, the goals of and differences between deductive and non-deductive arguments, and the major features of deductive arguments (e.g., validity and soundness)

Deductive Cogency, understanding, and acceptance

Deductive Cogency holds that the set of propositions towards which one has, or is prepared to have, a given type of propositional attitude should be consistent and closed under logical consequence. While there are many propositional attitudes that are not subject to this requirement, e.g. hoping and imagining, it is at least prima facie plausible that Deductive Cogency applies to the doxastic attitude involved in propositional knowledge, viz. belief. However, this thought is undermined by the well-known preface paradox, leading a number of philosophers to conclude that Deductive Cogency has at best a very limited role to play in our epistemic lives. I argue here that Deductive Cogency is still an important epistemic requirement, albeit not as a requirement on belief. Instead, building on a distinction between belief and acceptance introduced by Jonathan Cohen and recent developments in the epistemology of understanding, I propose that Deductive Cogency applies to the attitude of treating propositions as given in the context of attempting to understand a given phenomenon. I then argue that this simultaneously accounts for the plausibility of the considerations in favor of Deductive Cogency and avoids the problematic consequences of the preface paradox

Query Evaluation in Deductive Databases

It is desirable to answer queries posed to deductive databases by computing fixpoints because such computations are directly amenable to set-oriented fact processing. However, the classical fixpoint procedures based on bottom-up processing — the naive and semi-naive methods — are rather primitive and often inefficient. In this article, we rely on bottom-up meta-interpretation for formalizing a new fixpoint procedure that performs a different kind of reasoning: We specify a top-down query answering method, which we call the Backward Fixpoint Procedure. Then, we reconsider query evaluation methods for recursive databases. First, we show that the methods based on rewriting on the one hand, and the methods based on resolution on the other hand, implement the Backward Fixpoint Procedure. Second, we interpret the rewritings of the Alexander and Magic Set methods as specializations of the Backward Fixpoint Procedure. Finally, we argue that such a rewriting is also needed in a database context for implementing efficiently the resolution-based methods. Thus, the methods based on rewriting and the methods based on resolution implement the same top-down evaluation of the original database rules by means of auxiliary rules processed bottom-up

Proving Finite Satisfiability of Deductive Databases

It is shown how certain refutation methods can be extended into semi-decision procedures that are complete for both unsatisfiability and finite satisfiability. The proposed extension is justified by a new characterization of finite satisfiability. This research was motivated by a database design problem: Deduction rules and integrity constraints in definite databases have to be finitely satisfiabl

Sciduction: Combining Induction, Deduction, and Structure for Verification and Synthesis

Even with impressive advances in automated formal methods, certain problems in system verification and synthesis remain challenging. Examples include the verification of quantitative properties of software involving constraints on timing and energy consumption, and the automatic synthesis of systems from specifications. The major challenges include environment modeling, incompleteness in specifications, and the complexity of underlying decision problems. This position paper proposes sciduction, an approach to tackle these challenges by integrating inductive inference, deductive reasoning, and structure hypotheses. Deductive reasoning, which leads from general rules or concepts to conclusions about specific problem instances, includes techniques such as logical inference and constraint solving. Inductive inference, which generalizes from specific instances to yield a concept, includes algorithmic learning from examples. Structure hypotheses are used to define the class of artifacts, such as invariants or program fragments, generated during verification or synthesis. Sciduction constrains inductive and deductive reasoning using structure hypotheses, and actively combines inductive and deductive reasoning: for instance, deductive techniques generate examples for learning, and inductive reasoning is used to guide the deductive engines. We illustrate this approach with three applications: (i) timing analysis of software; (ii) synthesis of loop-free programs, and (iii) controller synthesis for hybrid systems. Some future applications are also discussed

Show Me the Argument: Empirically Testing the Armchair Philosophy Picture

Many philosophers subscribe to the view that philosophy is a priori and in the business of discovering necessary truths from the armchair. This paper sets out to empirically test this picture. If this were the case, we would expect to see this reflected in philosophical practice. In particular, we would expect philosophers to advance mostly deductive, rather than inductive, arguments. The paper shows that the percentage of philosophy articles advancing deductive arguments is higher than those advancing inductive arguments, which is what we would expect from the vantage point of the armchair philosophy picture. The results also show, however, that the percentages of articles advancing deductive arguments and those advancing inductive arguments are converging over time and that the difference between inductive and deductive ratios is declining over time. This trend suggests that deductive arguments are gradually losing their status as the dominant form of argumentation in philosophy