Alexander Bird: _Thomas Kuhn_

This is a review of Alexander Bird's book on Thomas Kuhn

Subject and Object in Scientific Realism

In this paper, I explore the relationship between the subject and the object from the perspective of scientific realism. I first characterize the scientific realist position that I adopt. I then address the question of the nature of scientific knowledge from a realist point of view. Next I consider the question of how to locate the knowing subject within the context of scientific realism. After that I consider the place of mind in an objective world. I close with some general remarks on the topic

Incommensurability: An Overview

Opening remarks delivered at "Incommensurability (and related matters)" conference, Hanover, June 199

To believe is to believe true

It is argued that to believe is to believe true. That is, when one believes a proposition one thereby believes the proposition to be true. This is a point about what it is to believe rather than about the aim of belief or the standard of correctness for belief. The point that to believe is to believe true appears to be an analytic truth about the concept of belief. It also appears to be essential to the state of belief that to believe is to believe true. This is not just a contingent fact about our ordinary psychology, since even a non-ordinary believer must believe a proposition that they believe to be true. Nor is the idea that one may accept a theory as empirically adequate rather than as true a counter-example, since such acceptance combines belief in the truth of the observational claims of a theory with suspension of belief with respect to the non-observational claims of a theory. Nor is the fact that to believe is to believe true to be explained in terms of an inference governed by the T-scheme from the belief that P to the belief that P is true, since there is no inference from the former to the latter. To believe that P just is to believe that P is true

Incommensurability and Theory Change

The paper explores the relativistic implications of the thesis of incommensurability. A semantic form of incommensurability due to semantic variation between theories is distinguished from a methodological form due to variation in methodological standards between theories. Two responses to the thesis of semantic incommensurability are dealt with: the first challenges the idea of untranslatability to which semantic incommensurability gives rise; the second holds that relations of referential continuity eliminate semantic incommensurability. It is then argued that methodological incommensurability poses little risk to the rationality or objectivity of science. For rational theory choice need neither be dictated by an algorithm nor governed by a binding set of rules. The upshot of the discussion is deflationary. There is little prospect for a relativistic conception of science based on inflated claims about the incommensurability of scientific theories

Realism and the Epistemic Objectivity of Science

The paper presents a realist account of the epistemic objectivity of science. Epistemic objectivity is distinguished from ontological objectivity and the objectivity of truth. As background, T.S. Kuhn’s idea that scientific theory-choice is based on shared scientific values with a role for both objective and subjective factors is discussed. Kuhn’s values are epistemologically ungrounded, hence provide a minimal sense of objectivity. A robust account of epistemic objectivity on which methodological norms are reliable means of arriving at the truth is presented. The problem remains that deliberative judgement is required to determine the relevance and relative significance of a range of methodological norms. A role is sketched for cognitive virtues which may be exercised in the course of the deliberative judgement

Neither a Truism nor a Triviality: Reply to Grzankowski

This is a reply to Alex Grzankowski’s comment on my paper, ‘To Believe is to Believe True’. I argue that one may believe a proposition to be true without possessing the concept of truth. I note that to believe the proposition P to be true is not the same as to believe the proposition ‘P is true’. This avoids the regress highlighted by Grzankowski in which the concept of truth is employed an infinite number of times in a single belief

Induction and Natural Kinds Revisited

In ‘Induction and Natural Kinds’, I proposed a solution to the problem of induction according to which our use of inductive inference is reliable because it is grounded in the natural kind structure of the world. When we infer that unobserved members of a kind will have the same properties as observed members of the kind, we are right because all members of the kind possess the same essential properties. The claim that the existence of natural kinds is what grounds reliable use of induction is based on an inference to the best explanation of the success of our inductive practices. As such, the argument for the existence of natural kinds employs a form of ampliative inference. But induction is likewise a form of ampliative inference. Given both of these facts, my account of the reliability of induction is subject to the objection that it provides a circular justification of induction, since it employs an ampliative inference to justify an ampliative inference. In this paper, I respond to the objection of circularity by arguing that what justifies induction is not the inference to the best explanation of its reliability. The ground of induction is the natural kinds themselves

Sustaining proactive motivation for non-mandatory professional development building self-determined employees

This dissertation examined the motivations energising employees' participation in non-mandatory professional development (PD) provided within their work organisation using a proactive motivation framework (Parker, Bindl, & Strauss, 2010) and a Self-Determination Theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985) perspective. Two studies were conducted using a mixed-method design. Study 1 was conducted in a specific organisation and involved both quantitative and qualitative data. Both aspects of this study informed the development of the quantitative Study 2 conducted in an organisation non-specific sample. The quantitative aspect of both Study 1 and Study 2 provided support for a structural model of employees‟ motivation to participate in non-mandatory PD within their work organisation as a proactive, self-determined process that includes transfer implementation intentions as a pre-participation commitment toward change and readiness to transfer what is learned. Study 1 demonstrated that employees' Transfer Implementation Intentions were energised by autonomous motivation for participation in non-mandatory PD and the intrinsic benefits envisioned from participation. As an organisational context variable, positive work environment directly influenced each aspect of the model. From the Study 1 qualitative findings it was concluded that organisational commitment to employee development, useful to job, useful to career, and prosocial benefits were important variables to include in the structural model tested in Study 2. Study 2 demonstrated that employees‟ transfer implementation intentions were influenced by both intrinsic benefits and prosocial benefits. Autonomous motivation demonstrated only an indirect influence on transfer implementation intentions. An organisational commitment to development influenced employees‟ perceptions of useful to career and useful to job. Useful to job influenced autonomous motivation and prosocial benefits, while useful to career influenced intrinsic benefits. Together, the results of the two studies highlight the importance of autonomous motivation, intrinsic and prosocial goals, and the provision of organisational support to facilitate employees‟ proactive involvement in non-mandatory PD and their intention to transfer what is learned. These influences are important, as participation and the use of what is learned are paramount to the success of non-mandatory PD activities (Goldstein & Ford, 2002)

Multimodal design and the neomillenial learner

Two courses delivered in 2004 by the Faculty of Business at USQ were part of an initial trial into a new CD based hybrid model of delivery. This represented a change in the way USQ had previously supplied course materials and so it was necessary to ascertain how students responded to this change. This paper reports on findings from this research and demonstrates that higher levels of student engagement are possible, particularly in the context of nationality, age and gender differences. It investigates possible implications for academia when catering for a range of neomillennial learning approaches initially facilitated by the integration of a range of multimodal learning and teaching strategies. It is true 'one size does not fit all', but that does not preclude us from designing learning experiences that cater for a wide range of learners and particularly for those who learn in non-traditional ways whilst utilizing existing technologies