Consciousness And Self-Identity: A Phenomenological View on a Cognitive Issue

The paper aims at analyzing the inner development of self-identity from its pre-reflective level to the full awareness one. The recent findings of neurosciences and cognitive studies suggest focusing attention on the complex relation between self as consciousness and self as subjectivity, both with regard to their interdependency and to their reference to a shared context. Phenomenology, thanks to the careful consideration of the issues regarding the constitution of mental life articulated by its classic researches and current inquires, offers a valuable opportunity to set the scientific outcomes in an authentically philosophical perspective

Consciousness, ego, alterity: crossing of neuroscience and phenomenology?

The paper aims at comparing the recent findings of neurosciences with the phenomenological approach as regards the multifaceted relationship between self as consciousness and self as subjectivity. Phenomenology, thanks to the careful consideration of the issues concerning the constitution of mental life, offers a precious chance to set the scientific results in an authentically philosophical outlook

Consciousness, ego, alterity: Crossing of neuroscience and phenomenology?

The paper aims at comparing the recent findings of neurosciences with the phenomenological approach as regards the multifaceted relationship between self as consciousness and self as subjectivity. Phenomenology, thanks to the careful consideration of the issues concerning the constitution of mental life, offers a precious chance to set the scientific results in an authentically philosophical outlook

Thinking of Identity as Self and Body. Recent Contributions from Phenomenology, Cognitive Studies, and Neuroscience

In recent years, phenomenology has increasingly engaged in dialogue with the cognitive sciences, the neurosciences, and psychopathology. In particular, the foci of this debate are: the structure of consciousness and conscious acts, the different forms of self-awareness, the inquiry concerning the self and its disturbances, and intersubjectivity. Two recent volumes bear witness to this flourishing debate. The first one, Body Memory, Metaphor, and Movement deals with the issue of embodied subjectivity and is particularly concerned with the phenomenon of implicit body memory and collects contributions from phenomenology, the cognitive sciences, and embodied therapies. The second one, The Oxford Handbook of the Self brings together contributions from phenomenological, cognitive, and psychopathological research and addresses the topic of the Self from the diverse standpoints expressed by these areas of studies. The issue of the Self is analyzed with regard to various perspectives such as bodily existence, the formation of personal identity, metaphysical inquiry, the moral dimension and the pathologies of the self. The essay aims to provide a critical assessment of these volumes and to discuss their theoretical impact on current phenomenological and cognitive research

Die phänomenologische Reduktion und ihre Bedingungen

Within the phenomenological perspective the reductive method, as proceeding through the path (µετα-οδός), allows the subject to refer to its own living structure. It is crucial to bring outthe aware character of this relationship, because such consciousness is achieved by an unawaresubjectivity. Since the subject arises ab initio in a hyletic-temporal field, it has to carry out itsmethodological procedure according to definite modes, that is the time-consciousness’ modes. The method of reduction, which aims to uncover what is not thematic, constitutes the radicalaction, which permits the subject to represent the way of being of its inner structure. In thissense, the reduction is the highest act of representation ( Vergegenwärtigung ), because its proce-dure takes place by a thematizing return of the subject to itself. To carry out the reductivemethod, i.e. to perform a self-unveiling, the subject has to follow the patterns of a pre-existentlife, which are already temporal and to which it always is related. Though the reduction is afree choice of a subject, it has to conform to a prescribed procedure

Dreaming Consciousness: A Contribution from Phenomenology

The central aim of this paper is to offer a historical reconstruction of phenomenological studies on dreaming and to put forward a draft for a phenomenological theory of the dream state. Prominent phenomenologists have offered an extremely valuable interpretation of the dream as an intentional process, stressing its relevance in understanding the complexity of the mental life of subject, the continuous interplay between reality and unreality, and the possibility of building parallel spheres of experience influencing the development of personal identity. Taking into consideration the main characteristics of dream experience emphasized by these scholars, in the final part of the paper I propose to elaborate a new phenomenology of dreaming, which should be able to offer a theoretical description of dream states. My sketched proposal is based on Eugen Fink’s notion of the dream as “presentification”. By combining the past and the present of phenomenological investigation, I aim at suggesting a philosophical framework to explain the intentional features of dreaming as Erlebnis

Eros

Le regain d’intérêt pour la thématique de l’eros en phénoménologie aujourd’hui, à travers, notamment, les ouvrages de Christos Yannaras, Variations sur le Cantique des Cantiques, Essai sur l’Eros (1995), de Michel Henry, Incarnation. Une philosophie de la chair (2000), de Jean-Luc Marion, Le phénomène érotique (2003) et de Jean-Louis Chrétien, La symbolique du corps. La tradition chrétienne du Cantique des Cantiques (2005), a alerté notre attention sur l’importance d’un examen à nouveaux frais de cette question. Aussi avons-nous souhaité réinterroger le sens de certaines articulations expérientielles et conceptuelles qui déterminent le champ d’extension de l’eros. Car il ne revient pas au même de décrire l’expérience de l’eros en la distinguant (ou pas) de celle de l’agapè, ce qui invite à repenser le sens de l’amour comme désir ou comme charité, ou de penser l’eros en relation d’opposition (ou de complémentarité) avec thanatos voire antéros, comme c’est le cas en psychanalyse voire en sexologie, ou encore de s’interroger sur les liens entre eros et eris

Ras-guanine nucleotide-releasing factor 1 (Ras-GRF1) controls activation of extracellular signal-regulated kinase (ERK) signaling in the striatum and long-term behavioral responses to cocaine

Background: Ras-extracellular signal-regulated kinase (Ras-ERK) signaling is central to the molecular machinery underlying cognitive functions. In the striatum, ERK1/2 kinases are co-activated by glutamate and dopamine D1/5 receptors, but the mechanisms providing such signaling integration are still unknown. The Ras-guanine nucleotide-releasing factor 1 (Ras-GRF1), a neuronal specific activator of Ras-ERK signaling, is a likely candidate for coupling these neurotransmitter signals to ERK kinases in the striatonigral medium spiny neurons (MSN) and for modulating behavioral responses to drug abuse such as cocaine. Methods: We used genetically modified mouse mutants for Ras-GRF1 as a source of primary MSN cultures and organotypic slices, to perform both immunoblot and immunofluorescence studies in response to glutamate and dopamine receptor agonists. Mice were also subjected to behavioral and immunohistochemical investigations upon treatment with cocaine. Results: Phosphorylation of ERK1/2 in response to glutamate, dopamine D1 agonist, or both stimuli simultaneously is impaired in Ras-GRF1–deficient striatal cells and organotypic slices of the striatonigral MSN compartment. Consistently, behavioral responses to cocaine are also affected in mice deficient for Ras-GRF1 or overexpressing it. Both locomotor sensitization and conditioned place preference are significantly attenuated in Ras-GRF1–deficient mice, whereas a robust facilitation is observed in overexpressing transgenic animals. Finally, we found corresponding changes in ERK1/2 activation and in accumulation of FosB/ΔFosB, a well-characterized marker for long-term responses to cocaine, in MSN from these animals. Conclusions: These results strongly implicate Ras-GRF1 in the integration of the two main neurotransmitter inputs to the striatum and in the maladaptive modulation of striatal networks in response to cocaine