Consciousness and cortical responsiveness: a within-state study during non-rapid eye movement sleep.

When subjects become unconscious, there is a characteristic change in the way the cerebral cortex responds to perturbations, as can be assessed using transcranial magnetic stimulation and electroencephalography (TMS-EEG). For instance, compared to wakefulness, during non-rapid eye movement (NREM) sleep TMS elicits a larger positive-negative wave, fewer phase-locked oscillations, and an overall simpler response. However, many physiological variables also change when subjects go from wake to sleep, anesthesia, or coma. To avoid these confounding factors, we focused on NREM sleep only and measured TMS-evoked EEG responses before awakening the subjects and asking them if they had been conscious (dreaming) or not. As shown here, when subjects reported no conscious experience upon awakening, TMS evoked a larger negative deflection and a shorter phase-locked response compared to when they reported a dream. Moreover, the amplitude of the negative deflection-a hallmark of neuronal bistability according to intracranial studies-was inversely correlated with the length of the dream report (i.e., total word count). These findings suggest that variations in the level of consciousness within the same physiological state are associated with changes in the underlying bistability in cortical circuits

Correction to: Actigraphy assessments of circadian sleep-wake cycles in the Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States.

The original article [1] contains an error affecting the actigraphy time-stamps throughout the article, particularly in Table 1

EEG-based effective connectivity distinguishes between unresponsive states with and without report of conscious experience and correlates with brain complexity

Objective methods for distinguishing conscious from unconscious states in humans are of key importance for clinical evaluation of general anesthesia and patients with disorders or consciousness. Here, we test the generalizability of a DTF-based algorithm - a measure of effective connectivity - as an objective measure of conscious experience during anesthesia and correlate it with a well-tested index of consciousness: the Perturbational Complexity Index (PCI). We reanalyzed EEG data from an experimental study in which 18 healthy volunteers were randomly assigned to one of three types of general anesthesia: propofol, xenon, and ketamine. EEG was recorded before and during anesthesia, and DTF was calculated from every 1-second segment of the EEG data to quantify the effective connectivity between channel pairs. This was used to classify the state of each participant as either conscious or unconscious, and the classifications were compared with the participant’s delayed report of experience, and the PCI. The algorithm was more likely to classify participants as conscious in the awake state than during propofol and xenon anesthesia (p0.05). Furthermore, the DTF-based confidence of being classified as conscious was highly correlated with PCI (r2=0.48, p<0.05). These results provide further support for the notion that effective connectivity measured between EEG electrodes can be used to distinguish between conscious and unconscious states in humans

Disruption in structural–functional network repertoire and time-resolved subcortical fronto-temporoparietal connectivity in disorders of consciousness

Understanding recovery of consciousness and elucidating its underlying mechanism is believed to be crucial in the field of basic neuroscience and medicine. Ideas such as the global neuronal workspace (GNW) and the mesocircuit theory hypothesize that failure of recovery in conscious states coincide with loss of connectivity between subcortical and frontoparietal areas, a loss of the repertoire of functional networks states and metastable brain activation. We adopted a time-resolved functional connectivity framework to explore these ideas and assessed the repertoire of functional network states as a potential marker of consciousness and its potential ability to tell apart patients in the unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS) and minimally conscious state (MCS). In addition, the prediction of these functional network states by underlying hidden spatial patterns in the anatomical network, that is so-called eigenmodes, was supplemented as potential markers. By analysing time-resolved functional connectivity from functional MRI data, we demonstrated a reduction of metastability and functional network repertoire in UWS compared to MCS patients. This was expressed in terms of diminished dwell times and loss of nonstationarity in the default mode network and subcortical fronto-temporoparietal network in UWS compared to MCS patients. We further demonstrated that these findings co-occurred with a loss of dynamic interplay between structural eigenmodes and emerging time-resolved functional connectivity in UWS. These results are, amongst others, in support of the GNW theory and the mesocircuit hypothesis, underpinning the role of time-resolved thalamo-cortical connections and metastability in the recovery of consciousness

A neurophenomenological approach to non-ordinary states of consciousness: hypnosis, meditation, and psychedelics

No contemporary unifying framework has been provided for the study of non-ordinary states of consciousness (NSCs) despite increased interest in hypnosis, meditation, and psychedelics. NSCs induce shifts in experiential contents (what appears to the experiencer) and/or structure (how it appears). This can allow the investigation of the plastic and dynamic nature of experience from a multiscale perspective that includes mind, brain, body, and context. We propose a neurophenomenological (NP) approach to the study of NSCs which highlights their role as catalysts of transformation in clinical practice by refining our understanding of the relationships between experiential (subjective) and neural dynamics. We outline the ethical implications of the NP approach for standard conceptions of health and pathology as well as the crucial role of experience-based know-how in NSC-related research and application

Stratification of unresponsive patients by an independently validated index of brain complexity.

OBJECTIVE: Validating objective, brain-based indices of consciousness in behaviorally unresponsive patients represents a challenge due to the impossibility of obtaining independent evidence through subjective reports. Here we address this problem by first validating a promising metric of consciousness-the Perturbational Complexity Index (PCI)-in a benchmark population who could confirm the presence or absence of consciousness through subjective reports, and then applying the same index to patients with disorders of consciousness (DOCs). METHODS: The benchmark population encompassed 150 healthy controls and communicative brain-injured subjects in various states of conscious wakefulness, disconnected consciousness, and unconsciousness. Receiver operating characteristic curve analysis was performed to define an optimal cutoff for discriminating between the conscious and unconscious conditions. This cutoff was then applied to a cohort of noncommunicative DOC patients (38 in a minimally conscious state [MCS] and 43 in a vegetative state [VS]). RESULTS: We found an empirical cutoff that discriminated with 100% sensitivity and specificity between the conscious and the unconscious conditions in the benchmark population. This cutoff resulted in a sensitivity of 94.7% in detecting MCS and allowed the identification of a number of unresponsive VS patients (9 of 43) with high values of PCI, overlapping with the distribution of the benchmark conscious condition. INTERPRETATION: Given its high sensitivity and specificity in the benchmark and MCS population, PCI offers a reliable, independently validated stratification of unresponsive patients that has important physiopathological and therapeutic implications. In particular, the high-PCI subgroup of VS patients may retain a capacity for consciousness that is not expressed in behavior

Response to comment on "preserved feedforward but impaired top-down processes in the vegetative state".

King et al. raise some technical issues about our recent study showing impaired top-down processes in the vegetative state. We welcome the opportunity to provide more details about our methods and results and to resolve their concerns. We substantiate our interpretation of the results and provide a point-by-point response to the issues raised.Peer reviewe

A neurophenomenological approach to non-ordinary states of consciousness: hypnosis, meditation, and psychedelics

Copyright © 2023 The Authors. No contemporary unifying framework has been provided for the study of non-ordinary states of consciousness (NSCs) despite increased interest in hypnosis, meditation, and psychedelics. NSCs induce shifts in experiential contents (what appears to the experiencer) and/or structure (how it appears). This can allow the investigation of the plastic and dynamic nature of experience from a multiscale perspective that includes mind, brain, body, and context. We propose a neurophenomenological (NP) approach to the study of NSCs which highlights their role as catalysts of transformation in clinical practice by refining our understanding of the relationships between experiential (subjective) and neural dynamics. We outline the ethical implications of the NP approach for standard conceptions of health and pathology as well as the crucial role of experience-based know-how in NSC-related research and application.This research was supported by Mind and Life Europe, the LABEX CORTEX of Université de Lyon (ANR-11-LABX-0042) within the 'Investissements d'Avenir' program (ANR-11-IDEX-0007) (to A.L.), by a European Research Council grant (ERC-Consolidator 617739-BRAINandMINDFULNESS) (A.L.), BIAL Foundation (260/16; P.R.B. and A.L.; Grant Nos 261/18 and 344/20 to O.G.), the EU Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program under Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement 749582 (Neural Correlates of Self/NeuCoSe; P.R.B) and under the Specific Grant Agreement No. 945539 (Human Brain Project SGA3), University and University Hospital of Liège, Benoit Foundation (Bruxelles), and King's College London (King's Together Fund research grant 'Towards Experiential Neuroscience Paradigm'; E.A.), the Belgian Foundation Against Cancer (Grant Nos 2017064 and C/2020/1357), the Télévie, Wallonia as part of a program of the BioWin Health Cluster framework and the Swiss Neuromatrix Foundation (Grant No 2020-0201 to F.X.V.). C.T. is funded by donors of the Centre for Psychedelic Research; O.G. and S.L. are supported by the Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique (FRS)/Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique (FNRS). The authors would like to thank Adeline Deward (RISE Illustration) for professional rendering of the figures

Measures of metabolism and complexity in the brain of patients with disorders of consciousness

Background Making an accurate diagnosis in patients with disorders of consciousness remains challenging. F-18-fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG)-PET has been validated as a diagnostic tool in this population, and allows identifying unresponsive patients with a capacity for consciousness. In parallel, the perturbational complexity index (PCI), a new measure based on the analysis of the electroencephalographic response to transcranial magnetic stimulation, has also been suggested as a tool to distinguish between unconscious and conscious states. The aim of the study was to cross-validate FDG-PET and PCI, and to identify signs of consciousness in otherwise unresponsive patients. Methods We jointly applied the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised, FDG-PET and PCI to assess 24 patients with non-acute disorders of consciousness or locked-in syndrome(13 male; 19-54 years old; 12 traumatic; 9 unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, 11 minimally conscious state; 2 emergence from the minimally conscious state, and 2 locked-in syndrome). Results FDG-PET and PCI provided congruent results in 22 patients, regardless of their behavioural diagnosis. Notably, FDG-PET and PCI revealed preserved metabolic rates and high complexity levels in four patients who were behaviourally unresponsive. Conclusion We propose that jointly measuring the metabolic activity and the electrophysiological complexity of cortical circuits is a useful complement to the diagnosis and stratification of patients with disorders of consciousness