24 research outputs found

    ABC as a multi-lens sustainability reporting system in smart cities

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    There is a very short list of theoretical and empirical studies on the role of management accounting tools in the sustainability of smart cities. While the majority of these studies have addressed this role from the perspective of openness, participation, and hybridisation, others have addressed it in terms of economic, social, and environmental sustainability. Despite their early efforts often focusing on institutionalisation and governmentality processes, their analyses did not address how management accounting tools can be used to achieve sustainable goals, particularly in developing countries with a political and cultural character. This study aims to explore how an activity-based costing/ABC system is configured within urban development organisations to internalise cultural and political sustainability values at the smart city level. It applies a politico-cultural model and uses a case study approach from an Egyptian state-owned smart city enterprise. The findings reveal smart city culture and political/government compliance in the implementation of the ABC system, enabled by enterprise resource planning/ERP technology, within state-owned enterprises/SOEs. This system, seen as an emerging field, was created as a multi-lens reporting system on their political and cultural sustainability in smart cities. While political sustainability refers to SOEs’ compliance with the ABC system, cultural sustainability refers to the embodiment of national smart city values in their system implementation. This sustainability costing system of a political and cultural nature has also created recursive dynamics, exemplified by the powerful role of ERP-ABC reports in making participatory sustainability decisions at various organisational and governmental levels for smart cities

    Investigating the process of sustainable publicness in the solar energy market: A case study of Nigeria

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    This study investigates the process of designing and setting-up a new market for solar energy in Nigeria and its expected sustainable values, such as low costs for end-users and positive climate change impact. Empirics come from a case-study conducted in Nigeria. Taking inspiration from the work of Deleuze and Guattari, we analyse the ways in which each key component of the new market form an assemblage; and how each assemblage has potentials to influence performance metrics of the new market. Further, we examine how using solar energy in households improves sustainability for climate change at macro organisational level. Findings show factors that enable or hinder public authorities and market actors from institutionalising the solar energy market throughout the whole country and what can be done to reach there

    Delegation in hard times:the financial management of arm's length bodies in the UK

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    This paper explores the effectiveness of financial management tools in regulating the use of resources by arm’s length bodies (ALBs) in a period of fiscal stress. The paper presents research undertaken into the implementation of a new financial management tool for ALBs in the UK since the 2008 financial crisis. Drawing on conflict ambiguity theory, the paper shows how the effectiveness of such tools is affected by deep-rooted tensions implicit within arm’s length governance. This gives rise to micro-level conflict over the means of achieving fiscal regulation, underpinned by macro-level ambiguity over the logic of governance pursued by the government

    New public management, cost savings and regressive effects: A case from a less developed country

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    © 2015 This paper presents a detailed account of the regressive effects of cost management reforms in a Pakistani state-owned enterprise. In a bid to improve the economic efficiency of the public sector, Pakistani Government embarked on a reform programme soon after the appointment of a former multinational executive as the Prime Minister of the country. A ‘successful’ private sector manager (CEO of a multinational company) was appointed as the director general of the case firm to bring about the changes typically associated with new public management reforms. Cost savings through rationalization of senior management positions became a top concern of this particular reform. However, the reform led to regressive results i.e., an increase in senior management positions rather than a decrease. The paper attempts to explain the circumstances and reasons leading to these regressive effects based on Sieber's (1981) work and the theoretical model developed in the spirit of the critical realist tradition (Bhaskar, 1979). The paper concludes with policy recommendations for public sector reform programs

    Accounting for competition, governance and accountability during institutional change in not-for-profit and public sector organisations

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    Purpose The aim of this thesis1 is to analyse theoretically how institutionalisation of competitive tendering2, governance and budgetary policies cannot be taken for granted to lead to accountability among institutional actors3. The nature of an institutionalised management accounting policy, its relevance as a source of power in organisational decision making, and in negotiating inter-organisational relationships, are also analysed. Practical motivation The practical motivation of the thesis is to show how practitioners and policy makers can institutionalise changes which improve the power of management accounting and control systems4 as a mechanism of accountability among institutional actors and in negotiating relationships with other organisations. Theoretical motivation and conceptual approach The theoretical motivation of the thesis is to extend the institutional framework of management accounting change proposed by Burns and Scapens (2000) by using the theories of critical realism, communicative action, negotiated order and the framework of circuits of power. The Burns and Scapens framework needs further theorisation to analyse the relationship between the institutionalisation of management accounting and accountability; and the relevance of management accounting information in negotiating in inter-organisational relationships. Methodology and field studies Field research took place in public and not-for-profit health care organisations and a municipality in Finland from 2008 to 2013. Data were gathered by document analysis, interviews, participation in meetings and observations. Findings The findings are explained in four different essays that show that institutionalisation of competitive tendering, governance and budgetary policies cannot be taken for granted to lead to accountability among institutional actors. The ways by which institutional actors think and act can be influenced by other institutional mechanisms, such as inter-organisational circuits of power and intraorganisational governance policies, independent of the institutional change process. The relevance of institutionalised management accounting policies in negotiating relationships between two or more organisations depends on processes and contexts through which institutional actors use management accounting information as a tool of communication, mutual understanding and power. Research limitations / implications The theoretical framework used can be applied validly in other studies. The empirical findings cannot be generalised directly to other organisations than the organisations analysed. Practical implications Competitive tendering and budgetary policies can be institutionalised to shape actions of institutional actors within an organisation. To lead to accountability, practitioners and policy makers should implement governance policies that increase the use of management accounting information in institutional actors’ thinking, actions and responsibility for their actions. To reach a negotiated order between organisations, institutionalised management accounting policies should be used as one of the tools of communication aiming to reach mutual agreement among institutional actors
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