God's Nature and Attributes

In Western theism, different attributes have classically been ascribed to God, such as omnipotence, omniscience, wisdom, goodness, freedom and so on. But these ascriptions have also raised many conceptual difficulties: are these attributes internally coherent? Are they really compossible? Are they compatible with what we know about the world (e.g. the existence of evil, human freedom, the laws of nature etc.). These traditional questions are part of the inquiry on God’s nature as it is carried out in contemporary philosophy of religion. Another part of this inquiry is constituted by theological and philosophical questions raised by more precise or particular religious conceptions of God – e.g. the doctrine of Trinity in Christianity, or other specific credentials about the right way to understand God’s perfection and absolute transcendence in Judaism, Christianity or Islam. In this issue, we propose to follow these two directions of the inquiry about God’s nature and attributes through historical and systematic studies, in the perspective of contemporary philosophy of religion and analytical theology. While the three papers specifically dedicated to the problem of the Trinity pertain mainly to the second part of the examination (the conceptual analysis of specific credentials and theological doctrines), the three others offer new perspectives and arguments on traditional questions about God, like the problem of evil, perfect goodness, or the problem of divine perfection and God’s freedom

Editorial: God's Nature and Attributes

In Western theism, different attributes have classically been ascribed to God, such as omnipotence, omniscience, wisdom, goodness, freedom and so on. But these ascriptions have also raised many conceptual difficulties: are these attributes internally coherent? Are they really compossible? Are they compatible with what we know about the world (e.g. the existence of evil, human freedom, the laws of nature etc.). These traditional questions are part of the inquiry on God’s nature as it is carried out in contemporary philosophy of religion. Another part of this inquiry is constituted by theological and philosophical questions raised by more precise or particular religious conceptions of God – e.g. the doctrine of Trinity in Christianity, or other specific credentials about the right way to understand God’s perfection and absolute transcendence in Judaism, Christianity or Islam. In this issue, we propose to follow these two directions of the inquiry about God’s nature and attributes through historical and systematic studies, in the perspective of contemporary philosophy of religion and analytical theology. While the three papers specifically dedicated to the problem of the Trinity pertain mainly to the second part of the examination (the conceptual analysis of specific credentials and theological doctrines), the three others offer new perspectives and arguments on traditional questions about God, like the problem of evil, perfect goodness, or the problem of divine perfection and God’s freedom

Dieu veut-il nécessairement le meilleur ?

According to the principle of the best, if there is an option which is objectively the best one, necessarily a perfectly rational agent, who is also perfectly good and perfectly well informed, chooses it. In theology, adopting this principle seems compatible with the claim that God is free, provided that it is possible to conceive situations in which there exists no unique optimum that would give God an objective reason to prefer it to any other option. But is this sort of freedom sufficiently perfect to be attributed to God? Cannot we consider that God’s freedom includes the possibility not to choose the best? Brian Leftow has recently defended a voluntarist account of divine choice. According to it, God does not necessarily want the best, but can—under certain conditions—freely choose an option which is sufficiently good even if it is not the best one, provided that He is moved by love and acts according to His personal preferences (Leftow 2017). In this article, I discuss Leftow’s proposal, and consider several ways to refuse the principle of the best. I criticize the version of this refusal which appears to be the most convincing one, and propose another theory, called ‘voluntarist optimalism’. This last option constitutes an attempt to preserve—as Leftow’s theory does—the gratuitous character of God’s love and choices, without refusing the principle of the best itself. Résumé: Selon le principe du meilleur, s’il existe un meilleur parti objectif, nécessairement un agent parfaitement rationnel, parfaitement bon et parfaitement informé le veut. En théologie, l’adoption de ce principe semble compatible avec la liberté divine, à condition que l’on puisse concevoir des situations dans lesquelles aucun optimum unique ne fournit à Dieu de raison décisive et objective de le préférer à toute autre option. Mais la liberté ainsi conçue est-elle suffisamment parfaite pour être attribuée à Dieu, et peut-on envisager que la liberté divine inclue aussi la possibilité de ne pas élire le meilleur ? Brian Leftow a récemment défendu un modèle « volontariste » du choix divin, selon lequel Dieu ne veut pas nécessairement le meilleur mais peut librement choisir, à certaines conditions, une option suffisamment bonne mais de valeur un peu moindre, lorsqu’il agit par amour et au nom de ses préférences personnelles (Leftow 2017). Dans cet article je discute la proposition de Leftow, et considère différentes versions possibles du refus du principe du meilleur. Je propose une critique de la version qui me paraît la plus solide. Je propose ensuite une voie alternative (l’optimalisme volontariste) qui tente de préserver, comme le veut Leftow, la gratuité du choix d’un Dieu qui agit par amour, sans pour autant renoncer au principe du meilleur lui-même