Top-down social modulation of interpersonal observation-execution.

Cyclical upper limb movement can involuntarily deviate from its primary movement axis when the performer concurrently observes incongruent biological motion (i.e. interpersonal observation-execution). The current study examined the social modulation of such involuntary motor interference using a protocol that reflected everyday social interactions encountered in a naturalistic social setting. Eighteen participants executed cyclical horizontal arm movements during the observation of horizontal (congruent) or curvilinear (incongruent) biological motion. Both prior to, and during the interpersonal observation-execution task, participants also received a series of social words designed to prime a pro-social or anti-social attitude. The results showed greater orthogonal movement deviation, and thus interference, for the curvilinear compared to horizontal stimuli. Importantly, and opposite to most of the previous findings from work on automatic imitation and mimicry, there was a greater interference effect for the anti-social compared to pro-social prime condition. These findings demonstrate the importance of interpreting the context of social primes, and strongly support predictions of a comparison between the prime construct and the self-concept/-schema and the top-down response modulation of social incentives

Mimicry of Food Intake: The Dynamic Interplay between Eating Companions

Numerous studies have shown that people adjust their intake directly to that of their eating companions; they eat more when others eat more, and less when others inhibit intake. A potential explanation for this modeling effect is that both eating companions' food intake becomes synchronized through processes of behavioral mimicry. No study, however, has tested whether behavioral mimicry can partially account for this modeling effect. To capture behavioral mimicry, real-time observations of dyads of young females having an evening meal were conducted. It was assessed whether mimicry depended on the time of the interaction and on the person who took the bite. A total of 70 young female dyads took part in the study, from which the total number of bites (N = 3,888) was used as unit of analyses. For each dyad, the total number of bites and the exact time at which each person took a bite were coded. Behavioral mimicry was operationalized as a bite taken within a fixed 5-second interval after the other person had taken a bite, whereas non-mimicked bites were defined as bites taken outside the 5-second interval. It was found that both women mimicked each other's eating behavior. They were more likely to take a bite of their meal in congruence with their eating companion rather than eating at their own pace. This behavioral mimicry was found to be more prominent at the beginning than at the end of the interaction. This study suggests that behavioral mimicry may partially account for social modeling of food intake

Alignment to the Actions of a Robot

Alignment is a phenomenon observed in human conversation: Dialog partners’ behavior converges in many respects. Such alignment has been proposed to be automatic and the basis for communicating successfully. Recent research on human–computer dialog promotes a mediated communicative design account of alignment according to which the extent of alignment is influenced by interlocutors’ beliefs about each other. Our work aims at adding to these findings in two ways. (a) Our work investigates alignment of manual actions, instead of lexical choice. (b) Participants interact with the iCub humanoid robot, instead of an artificial computer dialog system. Our results confirm that alignment also takes place in the domain of actions. We were not able to replicate the results of the original study in general in this setting, but in accordance with its findings, participants with a high questionnaire score for emotional stability and participants who are familiar with robots align their actions more to a robot they believe to be basic than to one they believe to be advanced. Regarding alignment over the course of an interaction, the extent of alignment seems to remain constant, when participants believe the robot to be advanced, but it increases over time, when participants believe the robot to be a basic version

Joint-action coordination in transferring objects

Here we report a study of joint-action coordination in transferring objects. Fourteen dyads were asked to repeatedly reposition a cylinder in a shared workspace without using dialogue. Variations in task constraints concerned the size of the two target regions in which the cylinder had to be (re)positioned and the size and weight of the transferred cylinder. Movements of the wrist, index finger and thumb of both actors were recorded by means of a 3D motion-tracking system. Data analyses focused on the interpersonal transfer of lifting-height and movement-speed variations. Whereas the analyses of variance did not reveal any interpersonal transfer effects targeted data comparisons demonstrated that the actor who fetched the cylinder from where the other actor had put it was systematically less surprised by cylinder-weight changes than the actor who was first confronted with such changes. In addition, a moderate, accuracy-constraint independent adaptation to each other’s movement speed was found. The current findings suggest that motor resonance plays only a moderate role in collaborative motor control and confirm the independency between sensorimotor and cognitive processing of action-related information

Embodied Gesture Processing: Motor-Based Integration of Perception and Action in Social Artificial Agents

A close coupling of perception and action processes is assumed to play an important role in basic capabilities of social interaction, such as guiding attention and observation of others’ behavior, coordinating the form and functions of behavior, or grounding the understanding of others’ behavior in one’s own experiences. In the attempt to endow artificial embodied agents with similar abilities, we present a probabilistic model for the integration of perception and generation of hand-arm gestures via a hierarchy of shared motor representations, allowing for combined bottom-up and top-down processing. Results from human-agent interactions are reported demonstrating the model’s performance in learning, observation, imitation, and generation of gestures

Atypical Social Modulation of Imitation in Autism Spectrum Conditions.

Appropriate modulation of imitation according to social context is important for successful social interaction. In the present study we subliminally primed high-functioning adults with ASC and age- and IQ-matched controls with either a pro- or non- social attitude. Following priming, an automatic imitation paradigm was used to acquire an index of imitation. Whereas imitation levels were higher for pro-socially primed relative to non-socially primed control participants, there was no difference between pro- and non- socially primed individuals with ASC. We conclude that high-functioning adults with ASC demonstrate atypical social modulation of imitation. Given the importance of imitation in social interaction we speculate that difficulties with the modulation of imitation may contribute to the social problems characteristic of ASC

How does it really feel to act together? : Shared emotions and the phenomenology of we-agency

Research on the phenomenology of agency for joint action has so far focused on the sense of agency and control in joint action, leaving aside questions on how it feels to act together. This paper tries to fill this gap in a way consistent with the existing theories of joint action and shared emotion. We first reconstruct Pacherie’s (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 13, 25–46, 2014) account on the phenomenology of agency for joint action, pointing out its two problems, namely (1) the necessary trade-off between the sense of self- and we-agency; and (2) the lack of affective phenomenology of joint action in general. After elaborating on these criticisms based on our theory of shared emotion, we substantiate the second criticism by discussing different mechanisms of shared affect—feelings and emotions—that are present in typical joint actions. We show that our account improves on Pacherie’s, first by introducing our agentive model of we-agency to overcome her unnecessary dichotomy between a sense of self- and we-agency, and then by suggesting that the mechanisms of shared affect enhance not only the predictability of other agents’ actions as Pacherie highlights, but also an agentive sense of we-agency that emerges from shared emotions experienced in the course and consequence of joint action.Peer reviewe

Copying you copying me:Interpersonal motor co-ordination influences automatic imitation

Moving in a co-ordinated fashion with another individual changes our behaviour towards them; we tend to like them more, find them more attractive, and are more willing to co-operate with them. It is generally assumed that this effect on behaviour results from alterations in representations of self and others. Specifically, through neurophysiological perception-action matching mechanisms, interpersonal motor co-ordination (IMC) is believed to forge a neural coupling between actor and observer, which serves to blur boundaries in conceptual self-other representations and causes positive views of the self to be projected onto others. An investigation into this potential neural mechanism is lacking, however. Moreover, the specific components of IMC that might influence this mechanism have not yet been specified. In the present study we exploited a robust behavioural phenomenon - automatic imitation - to assess the degree to which IMC influences neural action observation-execution matching mechanisms. This revealed that automatic imitation is reduced when the actions of another individual are perceived to be synchronised in time, but are spatially incongruent, with our own. We interpret our findings as evidence that IMC does indeed exert an effect on neural perception-action matching mechanisms, but this serves to promote better self-other distinction. Our findings demonstrate that further investigation is required to understand the complex relationship between neural perception-action coupling, conceptual self-other representations, and social behaviour

The bodily social self: a link between phenomenal and narrative selfhood

The Phenomenal Self (PS) is widely considered to be dependent on body representations, whereas the Narrative Self (NS) is generally thought to rely on abstract cognitive representations. The concept of the Bodily Social Self (BSS) might play an important role in explaining how the high level cognitive self-representations enabling the NS might emerge from the bodily basis of the PS. First, the phenomenal self (PS) and narrative self (NS), are briefly examined. Next, the BSS is defined and its potential for explaining aspects of social cognition is explored. The minimal requirements for a BSS are considered, before reviewing empirical evidence regarding the development of the BSS over the first year of life. Finally, evidence on the involvement of the body in social distinctions between self and other is reviewed to illustrate how the BSS is affected by both the bottom up effects of multisensory stimulation and the top down effects of social identification

Low Fidelity Imitation of Atypical Biological Kinematics in Autism Spectrum Disorders Is Modulated by Self-Generated Selective Attention.

We examined whether adults with autism had difficulty imitating atypical biological kinematics. To reduce the impact that higher-order processes have on imitation we used a non-human agent model to control social attention, and removed end-state target goals in half of the trials to minimise goal-directed attention. Findings showed that only neurotypical adults imitated atypical biological kinematics. Adults with autism did, however, become significantly more accurate at imitating movement time. This confirmed they engaged in the task, and that sensorimotor adaptation was self-regulated. The attentional bias to movement time suggests the attenuation in imitating kinematics might be a compensatory strategy due to deficits in lower-level visuomotor processes associated with self-other mapping, or selective attention modulated the processes that represent biological kinematics