A Close Eye on the Eagle-Eyed Visual Acuity Hypothesis of Autism

Autism spectrum disorders (ASD) have been associated with sensory hypersensitivity. A recent study reported visual acuity (VA) in ASD in the region reported for birds of prey. The validity of the results was subsequently doubted. This study examined VA in 34 individuals with ASD, 16 with schizophrenia (SCH), and 26 typically developing (TYP). Participants with ASD did not show higher VA than those with SCH and TYP. There were no substantial correlations of VA with clinical severity in ASD or SCH. This study could not confirm the eagle-eyed acuity hypothesis of ASD, or find evidence for a connection of VA and clinical phenotypes. Research needs to further address the origins and circumstances associated with altered sensory or perceptual processing in ASD

Simple mindreading abilities predict complex theory of mind: developmental delay in autism spectrum disorders

Theory of Mind (ToM) is impaired in individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD). The aims of this study were to: i) examine the developmental trajectories of ToM abilities in two different mentalizing tasks in children with ASD compared to TD children; and ii) to assess if a ToM simple test known as Eyes-test could predict performance on the more advanced ToM task, i.e. Comic Strip test. Based on a sample of 37 children with ASD and 55 TD children, our results revealed slower development at varying rates in all ToM measures in children with ASD, with delayed onset compared to TD children. These results could stimulate new treatments for social abilities, which would lessen the social deficit in ASD

Does Cognitive Impairment Explain Behavioral and Social Problems of Children with Neurofibromatosis Type 1?

Thirty NF1-patients (mean age 11.7 years, SD = 3.3) and 30 healthy controls (mean age 12.5 years, SD = 3.1) were assessed on social skills, autistic traits, hyperactivity-inattention, emotional problems, conduct problems, and peer problems. Cognitive control, information processing speed, and social information processing were measured using 5 computer tasks. GLM analyses of variance showed significant group differences, to the disadvantage of NF1-patients, on all measures of behavior, social functioning and cognition. General cognitive ability (a composite score of processing speed, social information processing, and cognitive control) accounted for group differences in emotional problems, whereas social information processing accounted for group differences in conduct problems. Although reductions were observed for group differences in other aspects of behavior and social functioning after control for (specific) cognitive abilities, group differences remained evident. Training of cognitive abilities may help reducing certain social and behavioral problems of children with NF1, but further refinement regarding associations between specific aspects of cognition and specific social and behavioral outcomes is required

Susceptibility to Ebbinghaus and Muller-Lyer illusions in autistic children: a comparison of three different methods

Background Studies reporting altered susceptibility to visual illusions in autistic individuals compared to that typically developing individuals have been taken to reflect differences in perception (e.g. reduced global processing), but could instead reflect differences in higher-level decision-making strategies. Methods We measured susceptibility to two contextual illusions (Ebbinghaus, Müller-Lyer) in autistic children aged 6–14 years and typically developing children matched in age and non-verbal ability using three methods. In experiment 1, we used a new two-alternative-forced-choice method with a roving pedestal designed to minimise cognitive biases. Here, children judged which of two comparison stimuli was most similar in size to a reference stimulus. In experiments 2 and 3, we used methods previously used with autistic populations. In experiment 2, children judged whether stimuli were the ‘same’ or ‘different’, and in experiment 3, we used a method-of-adjustment task. Results Across all tasks, autistic children were equally susceptible to the Ebbinghaus illusion as typically developing children. Autistic children showed a heightened susceptibility to the Müller-Lyer illusion, but only in the method-of-adjustment task. This result may reflect differences in decisional criteria. Conclusions Our results are inconsistent with theories proposing reduced contextual integration in autism and suggest that previous reports of altered susceptibility to illusions may arise from differences in decision-making, rather than differences in perception per se. Our findings help to elucidate the underlying reasons for atypical responses to perceptual illusions in autism and call for the use of methods that reduce cognitive bias when measuring illusion susceptibility

"I know that you know that I know": neural substrates associated with social cognition deficits in DM1 patients

Myotonic dystrophy type-1 (DM1) is a genetic multi-systemic disorder involving several organs including the brain. Despite the heterogeneity of this condition, some patients with non-congenital DM1 can present with minimal cognitive impairment on formal testing but with severe difficulties in daily-living activities including social interactions. One explanation for this paradoxical mismatch can be found in patients' dysfunctional social cognition, which can be assessed in the framework of the Theory of Mind (ToM). We hypothesize here that specific disease driven abnormalities in DM1 brains may result in ToM impairments. We recruited 20 DM1 patients who underwent the "Reading the Mind in the Eyes" and the ToM-story tests. These patients, together with 18 healthy controls, also underwent resting-state functional MRI. A composite Theory of Mind score was computed for all recruited patients and correlated with their brain functional connectivity. This analysis provided the patients' "Theory of Mind-network", which was compared, for its topological properties, with that of healthy controls. We found that DM1 patients showed deficits in both tests assessing ToM. These deficits were associated with specific patterns of abnormal connectivity between the left inferior temporal and fronto-cerebellar nodes in DM1 brains. The results confirm the previous suggestions of ToM dysfunctions in patients with DM1 and support the hypothesis that difficulties in social interactions and personal relationships are a direct consequence of brain abnormalities, and not a reaction symptom. This is relevant not only for a better pathophysiological comprehension of DM1, but also for non-pharmacological interventions to improve clinical aspects and impact on patients' success in life

Adults with autism overestimate the volatility of the sensory environment.

Insistence on sameness and intolerance of change are among the diagnostic criteria for autism spectrum disorder (ASD), but little research has addressed how people with ASD represent and respond to environmental change. Here, behavioral and pupillometric measurements indicated that adults with ASD are less surprised than neurotypical adults when their expectations are violated, and decreased surprise is predictive of greater symptom severity. A hierarchical Bayesian model of learning suggested that in ASD, a tendency to overlearn about volatility in the face of environmental change drives a corresponding reduction in learning about probabilistically aberrant events, thus putatively rendering these events less surprising. Participant-specific modeled estimates of surprise about environmental conditions were linked to pupil size in the ASD group, thus suggesting heightened noradrenergic responsivity in line with compromised neural gain. This study offers insights into the behavioral, algorithmic and physiological mechanisms underlying responses to environmental volatility in ASD

Abilities to explicitly and implicitly infer intentions from actions in adults with autism spectrum disorder

Previous research suggests that Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) might be associated with impairments on implicit but not explicit mentalizing tasks. However, such comparisons are made difficult by the heterogeneity of stimuli and the techniques used to measure mentalizing capabilities. We tested the abilities of 34 individuals (17 with ASD) to derive intentions from others’ actions during both explicit and implicit tasks and tracked their eye-movements. Adults with ASD displayed explicit but not implicit mentalizing deficits. Adults with ASD displayed typical fixation patterns during both implicit and explicit tasks. These results illustrate an explicit mentalizing deficit in adults with ASD, which cannot be attributed to differences in fixation patterns

The Edinburgh Social Cognition Test (ESCoT):Examining the effects of age on a new measure of theory of mind and social norm understanding

<div><p>Current measures of social cognition have shown inconsistent findings regarding the effects of healthy aging. Moreover, no tests are currently available that allow clinicians and researchers to examine cognitive and affective theory of mind (ToM) and understanding of social norms within the same test. To address these limitations, we present the Edinburgh Social Cognition Test (ESCoT) which assesses cognitive and affective ToM and inter- and intrapersonal understanding of social norms. We examined the effects of age, measures of intelligence and the Broader Autism Phenotype (BAP) on the ESCoT and established tests of social cognition. Additionally, we investigated the convergent validity of the ESCoT based on traditional social cognition measures. The ESCoT was administered alongside Reading the Mind in Films (RMF), Reading the Mind in Eyes (RME), Judgement of Preference and Social Norm Questionnaire to 91 participants (30 aged 18–35 years, 30 aged 45–60 years and 31 aged 65–85 years). Poorer performance on the cognitive and affective ToM ESCoT subtests were predicted by increasing age. The affective ToM ESCoT subtest and RMF were predicted by gender, where being female predicted better performance. Unlike the ESCoT, better performance on the RMF was predicted by higher verbal comprehension and perceptual reasoning abilities, while better performance on the RME was predicted by higher verbal comprehension scores. Lower scores on inter-and intrapersonal understanding of social norms were both predicted by the presence of more autism-like traits while poorer interpersonal understanding of social norms performance was predicted by increasing age. These findings show that the ESCoT is a useful measure of social cognition and, unlike established tests of social cognition, performance is not predicted by measures of verbal comprehension and perceptual reasoning. This is particularly valuable to obtain an accurate assessment of the influence of age on our social cognitive abilities.</p></div