36 research outputs found
The flexibility of early memories: Limited reevaluation of action steps in 2-year-old infants
This study investigated the flexibility of 2-year-old infantsâ retrieval and reenactment processes. In a delayed imitation paradigm, children were exposed to a constraint change (implemented by the distance of a target object) affecting the relevance of using a tool to obtain a goal (reach the object). In Experiment 1, during demonstration in the first session the tool was either relevant or irrelevant for reaching the goal, and 1 week later it either lost or gained its relevance, respectively. We found that when the tool became unnecessary (relevant to irrelevant change), children used it somewhat less than before and used it less compared with when the toolâs relevance remained the same (relevant to relevant, no change). When the tool became necessary after a constraint change (irrelevant to relevant change), children used the tool more than before, but not as much as in the RelevantâRelevant control condition. In Experiment 2, the timing of the constraint change (immediate or delayed) was varied in a modified version of the IrrelevantâRelevant condition, where practice before the constraint change was omitted. Children were not significantly more flexible in the immediate condition than in the delayed condition, and comparisons with Experiment 1 showed that performance did not change if we omitted the practice before the change. These results indicate that although 2-year-olds show considerable mnemonic performance, they face difficulties in adapting to constraint changes. We propose that this inflexibility may stem from infantsâ inability to revise their evaluations formed in previous events due to their immature episodic memory capacities
On potential ocular artifacts in infant electroencephalogram:a reply to comments by Köster
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Three cognitive mechanisms for knowledge tracking: commentary on Phillips et al, 2020, BBS
We welcome Phillips et al.âs proposal to separate the understanding of âknowledgeâ from that of âbeliefsâ. We argue that this distinction is best specified at the level of the cognitive mechanisms. Three distinct mechanisms are discussed: tagging oneâs own representations with those who share the same reality; representing othersâ representations (metarepresenting knowledge); and attributing dispositions to provide useful informatio
3-year-old childrenâs memory flexibility allows adaptation to an altered context
Imitation provides a reliable method to investigate the developing memory functions in childhood. The present study explored whether 3-year-old children are able to revise their previous experiences after a 1 week delay in order to adapt to an altered context. We used a combined immediate (Session 1) and delayed (Session 2) imitation paradigm. The constraints (target object close/far) and relatedly the relevance of using a tool in a goal attainment task (irrelevant/relevant, respectively) changed between the sessions. We found that children in Session 1 used the tool only when it was needed (relevant/object far context). After the 1 week delay when the tool was previously irrelevant and then became relevant, children remembered the irrelevant act and applied it in the altered context. When the tool lost its relevance after 1 week, children used the tool less than before, but did not fully omit it, despite its reduced efficiency. We propose that the flexible restoration of a formerly irrelevant act and the maintenance of a formerly successful solution indicate flexibility of childrenâs memory when guiding imitation. This flexibility, however, interacts with childrenâs tendency to remain faithful to strategies that were previously ostensively demonstrated to them
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What will they choose? Adultsâ and childrenâs intuitive predictions of othersâ numerical decisions
We constantly interpret and predict othersâ decisions and behaviors when interacting with the world. Do our predictions of othersâ decisions differ depending on whose behavior we are trying to predict? In four experiments, we probed how adults and children (N = 144, 6- to 8-years old) predict different agentsâ intuitive numerical decisions. We varied the phylogenetic and ontogenetic history of the agents: an adult, a child, an infant, a chimpanzee, and an ant. We found that both adult and child participants predicted the adult and child agents to reliably choose the larger amount. Both adult and child participants predicted the infant and ant to choose at random. However, while adult participants attribute numerical decisions similar to adults and children to chimpanzees, children seem to think chimpanzees behave similarly to infants and ants. Overall, these results suggest that adults and children share similar intuitions about othersâ numerical decisions based on agent identity