Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods

We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rules that are efficient and immune to manipulations via endowments (either with respect to hiding or destroying part of the endowment or transferring part of the endowment to another trader). We consider three manipulability axioms: hiding-proofness, destruction-proofness, and transfer-proofness. We prove that no rule satisfying efficiency and hiding-proofness (which implies individual rationality) exists. For two-agent exchange markets with separable and responsive preferences, we show that efficient, individually rational, and destruction-proof rules exist. However, for separable preferences, no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and destruction-proofness. In the case of transfer-proofness the compatibility with efficiency and individual rationality for the two-agent case extends to the unrestricted domain. For exchange markets with separable preferences and more than two agents no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and transfer-proofness.Hiding-proofness, destruction-proofness, transfer-proofness, exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible objects.

The genitive case with postpositions in Turkish

There is a diverse set of postpositions in Turkish that take genitive marked complements. The genitive case found on these postpositional complements is idiosyncratic, suggesting that it is a lexical case rather than a structural one (Ozt ¨ urk ¨ & Taylan 2016; Satik 2021; Kornfilt 1985; Baker 2015). The lexical genitive case exhibits distinctive behavioral patterns that we do not observe in the structural genitive case. That is, it is only overt on bare pronominals; otherwise, it is zero marked. The overt form of the lexical genitive case is syncretic with the structural genitive case. Through an analysis of these behaviors, we explore the relationship between the lexical and the structural genitive case

Cyclic Agreement and Empty Slots in Pazar Laz

This paper discusses the compatibility of templatic morphology and cyclic agreement on verbal agreement prefixes in Pazar Laz. It is based on templatic morphology and introduces the following questions: Can agreement slots on verbal agreement remain empty through the steps of derivation? Is there insertion of a dummy element in cases when arguments are deficient in terms of agreement The organization of the paper is as the following: It first introduces the relevant background information about templatic morphology and then, it presents data from Pazar Laz to show that it has a templatic morphology on verbs. In section 3 we propose a cyclic agreement model based on Bejar & Rezac (2009) and discuss with relevant data. Section 4 summarizes and concludes the paper

On the existence of equilibrium in games and economies

Cataloged from PDF version of article.There are three main contributions of this thesis in equilibrium theory. The first is about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous games. We find sufficient conditions for the existence of ε-Nash equilibrium in games with discontinuous payoff functions. In the second one, under time-varying discount factors we restate the Folk Theorems on the existence of equilibria of infinitely repeated games. The third one is about the existence of equilibrium in economies with indivisible goods. We re-formulate the model and the existence result of Danilov et al(2001) with more realistic cost functions, which depend on prices as well as the output level.Atlamaz, MuratM.S

Orta Anadolu Bölgesinde Organik Kiraz Üretiminde Hastalık, Zararlı ve Yabancı Otların Mücadelesinin Yönetimi

Proje 2003-2005 yılları arasında Isparta (Eğirdir) ve Konya (Akşehir) illerinde yürütülmüştür. Organik ve entegre mücadele uygulamaları yapılan kiraz bahçelerinde mevcut hastalık, zararlı ve yabancı otların tespiti ve mücadelesi, doğal düşmanların tür ve yoğunlukları, toprak ve yaprak analizleri, meyve analizleri ve ekonomik analizler yapılmıştır. Kiraz Zararlılarının Mücadelesinin Yönetiminde bahçelerdeki zararlı ve yararlı türleri ve yoğunluklarını belirlemek amacıyla dal sayım yöntemi, gözle inceleme yöntemi, darbe yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Kiraz Hastalıklarının Mücadelesinin Yönetiminde hastalık etmenlerini saptamak amacıyla hastalık belirtisi gösteren meyve, dal, yaprak ve sürgünlerden örnek alınarak izolasyonu yapılmıştır. Yabancı ot Mücadelesinin Yönetiminde bahçelerdeki yabancı otların türleri saptanmıştır. Hastalık, zararlı ve yabancı otların mücadelesi, organik tarım bahçelerinde organik tarım yöntemlerine, entegre mücadele bahçelerinde entegre mücadele yöntemlerine uygun olarak gerçekleştirilmiştir. Çalışmaların yapıldığı bahçelerden toprak ve yaprak örnekleri alınarak, analizleri yapılmış ve besin eksikliği belirlenmiştir. Pomolojik analizler ve ekonomik analizler yapılmıştır. ETKO Organik Tarım Kontrol ve Sertifikasyon kuruluşu uzmanları tarafından organik tarım uygulaması yapılan bahçeler denetlenmiş olup, her iki bahçeye de 2004-2005 yıllarında Organik Tarım Sertifikası verilmiştir

Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity

We consider the problem of allocating finitely many units of an indivisible good among a group of agents when each agent receives at most one unit of the good and pays a non-negative price. For example, imagine that a government allocates a fixed number of licenses to private firms, or that it distributes equally divided lands to households. Anonymity in welfare is a condition of impartiality in the sense that it requires allocation rules to treat agents equally in welfare terms from the viewpoint of agents who are ignorant of their own valuations or identities. We show that the Vickrey allocation rule is the unique allocation rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare, and individual rationality

Pest insect immigration warning system by an atmospheric dispersion model, weather radars and traps

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