Quantum Games Entropy

We propose the study of quantum games from the point of view of quantum information theory and statistical mechanics. Every game can be described by a density operator, the von Neumann entropy and the quantum replicator dynamics. There exists a strong relationship between game theories, information theories and statistical physics. The density operator and entropy are the bonds between these theories. The analysis we propose is based on the properties of entropy, the amount of information that a player can obtain about his opponent and a maximum or minimum entropy criterion. The natural trend of a physical system is to its maximum entropy state. The minimum entropy state is a characteristic of a manipulated system i.e. externally controlled or imposed. There exist tacit rules inside a system that do not need to be specified or clarified and search the system equilibrium under the collective welfare principle. The other rules are imposed over the system when one or many of its members violate this principle and maximize its individual welfare at the expense of the group.Comment: 6 page

Quantum Replicator Dynamics

We propose quantization relationships which would let us describe and solution problems originated by conflicting or cooperative behaviors among the members of a system from the point of view of quantum mechanical interactions. The quantum analogue of the replicator dynamics is the equation of evolution of mixed states from quantum statistical mechanics. A system and all its members will cooperate and rearrange its states to improve their present condition. They strive to reach the best possible state for each of them which is also the best possible state for the whole system. This led us to propose a quantum equilibrium in which a system is stable only if it maximizes the welfare of the collective above the welfare of the individual. If it is maximized the welfare of the individual above the welfare of the collective the system gets unstable and eventually it collapses.Comment: 10 page

Kinship, Incentives and Evolution – revised version: Kinship, Incentives, and Evolution

We analyze how family ties affect incentives, with focus on the strategic interaction between two mutually altruistic siblings. The siblings exert effort to produce output under uncertainty, and they may transfer output to each other. With equally altruistic siblings, their equilibrium effort is nonmonotonic in the common degree of altruism, and it depends on the harshness of the environment. We define a notion of local evolutionary stability of degrees of sibling altruism and show that this degree is lower than the kinship-relatedness factor. Numerical simulations show how family ties vary with the environment, and how this affects economic outcomes.