The relative nature of perception:a response to Canal-Bruland and van der Kamp (2015)

Cañal-Bruland and van der Kamp (2015) present an argument about the incommensurate relationship between affordance perception and spatial perception in a criticism of Proffitt and Linkenauger (2013)’s phenotypic approach to perception. Many of their criticisms are based on a difference in the interpretation of the core ideas underlying the phenotypic approach. The most important of these differences in interpretations concern fundamental assumptions about the nature of the perceptions of size and distance themselves. Extent perception must be relative to the organism; therefore, there can be no veridical perception of space. Also, we argue in the phenotypic approach that space perception is an emergent property of affordance perception; they are not different types of perceptions as Cañal-Bruland and van der Kamp presume. Thirdly, affordance perception need not be perfectly accurate, just good enough. Additionally, affordance perception need not be dichotomous; this presumption likely originates in the methodology typically employed to study affordance perception. Finally, I agree with Cañal-Bruland and van der Kamp that joint research efforts will clarify and improve our understanding of these issues

Arithmetic Notation…now in 3D!

When people reason formally, they often make use of special notations—algebra and arithmetic are familiar examples. These notations are often treated as mere shorthand—a concise way of referring to meaningful mathematical concepts. Other authors have argued that people treat notations as pictures—literal diagrams of an imagined set of objects (Dörfler, 2003; Landy Goldstone, 2009). If notations depict objects that exist in space, then it makes sense to wonder how they are arranged not just in the two visible dimensions, but in depth. In four experiments, we find a consistent pattern: properties that increase mathematical precedence also tend to make objects appear closer in space. This alignment of formal pressures and informal pressures suggests that perceived depth may play a role in supporting computational reasoning processes. Although our primary focus is documenting the existence of depth illusions in notations, we also evaluate several sources of information that might guide depth judgments: availability of an object for computational actions, formal syntactic structure, relative symbol salience and voluntary attention shifts. We consider relationships between these nonexclusive possible sources of information in guiding how people judge depth in mathematics

The Influence of Perceptual-Motor Variability on the Perception of Action Boundaries for Reaching

Successful interactions within the environment are contingent upon the perceiver’s ability to perceive the maximum extent over which they can perform actions, commonly referred to as action boundaries. Individuals are extremely calibrated to their action boundaries, and the perceptual system can quickly and flexibly recalibrate to changes in the size of action boundaries in the event of physiological and/or environmental changes. However, because even the most basic motor activities are subject to variability over time, the information upon which action boundaries are based must also be subject to variability. In this set of studies, we examined the effect of random and systematic variability in reaching experience on the perception of action boundaries for reaching using virtual reality. Participants were asked to estimate their reachability following experience reaching with either a long virtual arm, short virtual arm, or a virtual arm that varied in size. Overall, we found that individuals tended toward liberal estimates of their reachability; however, individuals can be influenced to be slightly more conservative after a higher percentage of short reaches. Consequently, when anticipating our reaching capability in the event of perceptual motor variability, individuals employ a liberal approach as it would result in the highest number of successful attempts. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved

Action-specific effects in perception and their potential applications

Spatial perception is biased by action. Hills appear steeper and distances appear farther to individuals who would have to exert more effort to transverse the space. Objects appear closer, smaller, and faster when they are easier to obtain. Athletes who are playing better than others see their targets as bigger. These phenomena are collectively known as action-specific effects on perception. In this target article, we review evidence for action-specific effects, including evidence that they reflect genuine changes in perception, and speculate on possible applications of action’s influence on vision

Perceiving action boundaries for overhead reaching in a height-related situation

To successfully interact within our environment, individuals need to learn the maximum extent (or minimum) over which they can perform actions, popularly referred to as action boundaries. Because people learn such boundaries over time from perceptual motor feedback across different contexts, both environmental and physiological, the information upon which action boundaries are based must inherently be characterised by variability. With respect to reaching, recent work suggests that regardless of the type of variability present in their perceptual-motor experience, individuals favoured a liberal action boundary for horizontal reaching. However, the ways in which action boundaries are determined following perceptual-motor variability could also vary depending on the environmental context as well as the type of reach employed. The present research aimed to established whether the perceptual system utilises the same strategy for all types of reaches over different contexts. Participants estimated their overhead reachability following experience reaching with either a long or a short virtual arm, or a virtual arm that varied in length – while standing on the edge of a rooftop or standing on the ground. Results indicated that while similar strategies were used to determine action boundaries in both height- and non-height-related context, participants were significantly more conservative with their reachability estimates in the height-related context. Participants were sensitive to the probabilistic information associated with different arm’s reach they have experienced during the calibration phase, and used a weighted average of reaching experience to determine their action boundary under conditions of uncertaint

Dissociation of feeling and belief in the rubber hand illusion

The Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) has been widely used to investigate the perception of the bodily self. Commonly used measures of the illusion are self-report questionnaires and proprioceptive drift of the participants’ hands towards the rubber hand. Recent studies have shown that these measures can be dissociated, suggesting they may arise from distinct mechanisms. In previous studies using questionnaires, participants were asked to base responses on their subjective feelings of body ownership, rather than their beliefs. This makes sense given the obvious fact that whereas participants may feel like the rubber hand is part of their body, they do not believe that it is. It is not clear, however, whether a similar dissociation between feelings and beliefs also exists for proprioceptive drift. Here, we investigated the presence of a dissociation between feeling and belief in the context of the RHI. When participants reported their feelings there was an increase both in the sense of body ownership over the fake hand as well as in the proprioceptive drift, compared to when they reported their beliefs. Strikingly, unlike the sense of ownership, proprioceptive drift was unaffected by the synchrony of stimulation. This may be an important way in which the two measures of the RHI differ

Asymmetrical Body Perception: A Possible Role for Neural Body Representations

Perception of one\u27s body is related not only to the physical appearance of the body, but also to the neural representation of the body. The brain contains many body maps that systematically differ between right- and left-handed people. In general, the cortical representations of the right arm and right hand tend to be of greater area in the left hemisphere than in the right hemisphere for right-handed people, whereas these cortical representations tend to be symmetrical across hemispheres for left-handers. We took advantage of these naturally occurring differences and examined perceived arm length in right- and left-handed people. When looking at each arm and hand individually, right-handed participants perceived their right arms and right hands to be longer than their left arms and left hands, whereas left-handed participants perceived both arms accurately. These experiments reveal a possible relationship between implicit body maps in the brain and conscious perception of the body

Intention and motor representation in purposive action

Are there distinct roles for intention and motor representation in explaining the purposiveness of action? Standard accounts of action assign a role to intention but are silent on motor representation. The temptation is to suppose that nothing need be said here because motor representation is either only an enabling condition for purposive action or else merely a variety of intention. This paper provides reasons for resisting that temptation. Some motor representations, like intentions, coordinate actions in virtue of representing outcomes; but, unlike intentions, motor representations cannot feature as premises or conclusions in practical reasoning. This implies that motor representation has a distinctive role in explaining the purposiveness of action. It also gives rise to a problem: were the roles of intention and motor representation entirely independent, this would impair effective action. It is therefore necessary to explain how intentions interlock with motor representations. The solution, we argue, is to recognise that the contents of intentions can be partially determined by the contents of motor representations. Understanding this content-determining relation enables better understanding how intentions relate to actions

The influence of perceptual motor variability on the perception of action boundaries for reaching in a real-world setting

The ability to accurately perceive the extent over which one can act is requisite for the successful execution of visually-guided actions. Yet, like other outcomes of perceptual-motor experience, our perceived action boundaries are not stagnant, but in constant flux. Hence, the perceptual systems must account for variability in one’s action capabilities in order for the perceiver to determine when they are capable of successfully performing an action. Recent work has found that, after reaching with a virtual arm that varied between short and long each time they reach, individuals determine their perceived action boundaries using the most liberal reaching experience. However, these studies were conducted in virtual reality, and the perceptual systems may handle variability differently in a real-world setting. To test this hypothesis, we created a modified orthopaedic elbow brace that mimic injury in the upper limb by restricting elbow extension via remote control. Participants were asked to make reachability judgements after training in which the maximum extent of their reaching ability was either unconstricted, constricted or variable over several calibration trials. Findings from the current study didn’t conform to those in virtual reality; participants were more conservative with their reachability estimates after experiencing variability in a real-world setting

Putting Like a Pro: The Role of Positive Contagion in Golf Performance and Perception

Many amateur athletes believe that using a professional athlete's equipment can improve their performance. Such equipment can be said to be affected with positive contagion, which refers to the belief of transference of beneficial properties between animate persons/objects to previously neutral objects. In this experiment, positive contagion was induced by telling participants in one group that a putter previously belonged to a professional golfer. The effect of positive contagion was examined for perception and performance in a golf putting task. Individuals who believed they were using the professional golfer's putter perceived the size of the golf hole to be larger than golfers without such a belief and also had better performance, sinking more putts. These results provide empirical support for anecdotes, which allege that using objects with positive contagion can improve performance, and further suggest perception can be modulated by positive contagion