32 research outputs found

    Veiligheid is beheersing van bedrijfsprocessen

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    Beheersing van bedrijfsprocessen

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    Veiligheid is beheersing van bedrijfsprocessen

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    Accidents in chemical industry: are they foreseeable?

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    ‘Accidents recur,’ which is what Kletz [Kletz T. (1993). Lessons from disasters, how organisations have no memory and accidents recur. UK: Institution of Chemical Engineers] wrote in 1993. Indeed, despite all measures taken accidents may re-occur, but ‘disruptions’ in a process reoccur much more frequently. If a disruption occurs it may lead to an accident. If the same disruption reoccurs it is certainly suspect and should be considered as a potential precursor. In this paper, we concentrate on these disruptions and we will define them as precursors if they recur. Organizations somehow lack the ability to control such recurring disruptions that may escalate into serious accidents under certain circumstances. The presence of such precursors long before the occurrence of an accident raises doubts about how well organizations control safety. In this paper, the control mechanism inside organizations is examined, by means of several accident investigations. It will be shown that not only accidents recur, but also that disruptions recur in a period preceding the actual accident. The recurrence of these disruptions implies that the corresponding organizational control mechanism must be failing. Often, alternative circumstances prompt the escalation of such precursors and lead to actual accidents. It is demonstrated that the use of detailed accident information is of great importance for companies that are actually willing to prevent accidents through the elimination of disruptions preceding accidents. Keywords: Process safety; Accident; Precursor; Prevention; Knowledge bas

    Accidents in chemical industry: are they foreseeable?

    No full text
    ‘Accidents recur,’ which is what Kletz [Kletz T. (1993). Lessons from disasters, how organisations have no memory and accidents recur. UK: Institution of Chemical Engineers] wrote in 1993. Indeed, despite all measures taken accidents may re-occur, but ‘disruptions’ in a process reoccur much more frequently. If a disruption occurs it may lead to an accident. If the same disruption reoccurs it is certainly suspect and should be considered as a potential precursor. In this paper, we concentrate on these disruptions and we will define them as precursors if they recur. Organizations somehow lack the ability to control such recurring disruptions that may escalate into serious accidents under certain circumstances. The presence of such precursors long before the occurrence of an accident raises doubts about how well organizations control safety. In this paper, the control mechanism inside organizations is examined, by means of several accident investigations. It will be shown that not only accidents recur, but also that disruptions recur in a period preceding the actual accident. The recurrence of these disruptions implies that the corresponding organizational control mechanism must be failing. Often, alternative circumstances prompt the escalation of such precursors and lead to actual accidents. It is demonstrated that the use of detailed accident information is of great importance for companies that are actually willing to prevent accidents through the elimination of disruptions preceding accidents. Keywords: Process safety; Accident; Precursor; Prevention; Knowledge bas

    Accidents : a discrepancy between indicators and facts!

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    Despite, the overwhelming amount of currently available safety management systems (and accompanying tools) accidents with hazardous substances still occur every now and then in the process industries. In this paper a large number of recently occurred accidents in the process industries are analysed showing that reoccurring disruptions during daily operation were present in the causal path of these accidents. The reoccurring disruptions can be seen as pre-warning signals. Their existence forms a gap with the common proactive safety indicators. This gap exists of information, already present and available in daily operation, of which it is UNKNOWN (to the local assessor) that it may lead to unsafe situations/accidents, e.g. maintenance backlogs, quality reports, etc. It is argued that these reoccurring events should be considered to be included in the safety indicators after assessment by an extended body of knowledge, because these events seem to become increasingly important regarding the prevention of accidents that still occur nowadays
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