Weak sequential convergence in Lp (<mu>, X)

Includes bibliographical references (p. 17-18).Non-Latin script recor

On the upper and lower semicontinuity of the Aumann Integral

Includes bibliographical references (p. 21-22)

What is perfect competition?

Includes bibliographical references (p. 38-39)

Non-implementation of Rational Expectations as a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium

We show that a rational expectations equilibrium need not be incentive compatible, need not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and may not be fully Pareto optimal, unless the utility functions are state independent. A comparison of rational expectations equilibria with core concepts is also provided.Differential information economy, Rational expectations equilibrium, Implementation, Game trees, Private core

A new perspective to rational expectations: maximin rational expectations equilibrium

We introduce a new notion of rational expectations equilibrium (REE) called maximin rational expectations equilibrium (MREE), which is based on the maximin expected utility (MEU) formulation. In particular, agents maximize maximin expected utility conditioned on their own private information and the information that the equilibrium prices generate. Maximin equilibrium allocations need not to be measurable with respect to the private information of each individual and with respect to the information that the equilibrium prices generate, as it is in the case of the Bayesian REE. We prove that a maximin REE exists universally (and not generically as in Radner (1979) and Allen (1981)), it is effcient and incentive compatible. These results are false for the Bayesian REE

Non-emptiness of the alpha-core

We prove non-emptiness of the alpha-core for balanced games with non-ordered preferences, extending and generalizing in several aspects the results of Scarf (1971), Border (1984), Florenzano (1989), Yannelis (1991) and Kajii (1992). In particular we answer an open question in Kajii (1992) regarding the applicability of the non-emptiness results to models with infinite dimensional strategy spaces. We provide two models with Knightian and voting preferences for which the results of Scarf (1971) and Kajii (1992) cannot be applied while our non-emptiness result applies.

On the Limit Points of an Infinitely Repeated Rational Expectations Equilibrium

We show that a symmetric information Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) exists universally (and not generically), it is Pareto efficient and obviously incentive compatible. Agents, in a repeated economy framework, can reach a symmetric information REE (i.e., an efficient and incentive compatible equilibrium outcome) by observing the past asymmetric REE and also by updating their private information. We also prove the converse result, i.e., given a symmetric information REE, we can construct a sequence of approximate asymmetric REE allocations that converges to the symmetric information REE. The approximate REE can be interpreted as the mistakes that agents make due to bounded rationality, nonetheless, in the limit an exact symmetric information REE is reached. In view of the above results, the symmetric information REE provides a rationalization for the asymmetric one

Stable Sets for Exchange Economies with Interdependent Preferences

We introduce the notion of stable sets with externalities and address the existence problem. The importance of this solution concept is related to the fact that the existence of core allocations for exchange economies is not in general assured in a framework with more than two traders

Perfect Competition in Differential Information Economies *

Abstract The idea of perfect competition for an economy with differential information is formalized via an idiosyncratic signal process in which the private signals of almost every individual agent can influence only a negligible group of agents, and the individual agents&apos; relevant signals are essentially pairwise independent conditioned on the true states of nature. Thus, there is no incentive for an individual agent to manipulate her private information. The existence of incentive compatible, ex post Walrasian allocations is shown for such a perfectly competitive differential information economy with or without &quot;common values&quot;. Consequently, the conflict between incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency is resolved exactly, and its asymptotic version is derived for a sequence of large, but finite private information economies

Commodity pair desirability and the core equivalence theorem / 1991:139:2

Includes bibliographical references (p. 26-29)