The global economic burden of alcohol: A review and some suggestions

Economic arguments for acting for health are increasingly important for policymakers, yet to date there has been no consideration of the likely economic burden of alcohol on the global level. A review of existing cost estimates was conducted, with each study disaggregated into different cost areas and the methodology of each element evaluated. The range of figures produced from more robust studies was then applied tentatively on the global level. The reviewed studies suggested a range of estimates of 1.3 - 3.3% of total health costs, 6.4 - 14.4% of total public order and safety costs, 0.3 - 1.4% of GDP for criminal damage costs, 1.0 - 1.7% of GDP for drink-driving costs, and 2.7 - 10.9% of GDP for work-place costs (absenteeism, unemployment and premature mortality). On a global level, this suggests costs in the range of $210 - 665 billion in 2002. These figures cannot be understood without considering simultaneously six key problems: (i) the methods used by each study; (ii) who pays these costs; (iii) the 'economic benefits' of premature deaths; (iv) establishing causality; (v) omitted costs; and (vi) the applicability of developed country estimates to developing countries. Alcohol exerts a considerable economic burden worldwide, although the exact level of this burden is a matter of debate and further research. Policymakers should consider economic issues alongside evidence of the cost-effectiveness of particular policy options in improving health, such as in the WHO's CHOICE project

The impact of the treaty basis on health policy legislation in the European Union: A case study on the tobacco advertising directive

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>The Europe Against Cancer programme was initiated in the late 1980s, recognising, among other risk factors, the problematic relationship between tobacco use and cancer. In an attempt to reduce the number of smokers in the European Community, the European Commission proposed a ban on tobacco advertising. The question of why it took over ten years of negotiating before the EU adopted a policy measure that could in fact improve the health situation in the Community, can only be answered by focusing on politics.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>We used an actor-centred institutionalist approach, focusing on the strategic behaviour of the major actors involved. We concentrated our analysis on the legal basis as an important institution and evaluated how the absence of a proper legal basis for public health measures in the Treaties influenced policy-making, framing the discussion in market-making versus market-correcting policy interventions. For our analysis, we used primary and secondary sources, including policy documents, communications and press releases. We also conducted 9 semi-structured interviews.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>The ban on tobacco advertising was, in essence, a public health measure. The Commission used its agenda-setting power and framed the market-correcting proposal in market-making terms. The European Parliament and the Council of Ministers then used the discussion on the legal basis as a vehicle for real political controversies. After adoption of the ban on tobacco advertising, Germany appealed to the European Court of Justice, which annulled the ban but also offered suggestions for a possible solution with article 100a as the legal basis.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>The whole market-making versus market-correcting discussion is related to a broader question, namely how far European health regulation can go in respect to the member states. In fact, the policy-making process of a tobacco advertising ban, as described in this paper, is related to the 'constitutional' foundation of health policy legislation in the Community. The absence of a clear-cut legal basis for health policies does not imply that the EU's impact on health is negligible. In the case of tobacco-control measures, the creative use of other Treaty bases has resulted in significant European action in the field of public health.</p