Levels of discontinuity, limit-computability, and jump operators

We develop a general theory of jump operators, which is intended to provide an abstraction of the notion of "limit-computability" on represented spaces. Jump operators also provide a framework with a strong categorical flavor for investigating degrees of discontinuity of functions and hierarchies of sets on represented spaces. We will provide a thorough investigation within this framework of a hierarchy of $\Delta^0_2$-measurable functions between arbitrary countably based $T_0$-spaces, which captures the notion of computing with ordinal mind-change bounds. Our abstract approach not only raises new questions but also sheds new light on previous results. For example, we introduce a notion of "higher order" descriptive set theoretical objects, we generalize a recent characterization of the computability theoretic notion of "lowness" in terms of adjoint functors, and we show that our framework encompasses ordinal quantifications of the non-constructiveness of Hilbert's finite basis theorem

A generalization of a theorem of Hurewicz for quasi-Polish spaces

We identify four countable topological spaces $S_2$, $S_1$, $S_D$, and $S_0$ which serve as canonical examples of topological spaces which fail to be quasi-Polish. These four spaces respectively correspond to the $T_2$, $T_1$, $T_D$, and $T_0$-separation axioms. $S_2$ is the space of rationals, $S_1$ is the natural numbers with the cofinite topology, $S_D$ is an infinite chain without a top element, and $S_0$ is the set of finite sequences of natural numbers with the lower topology induced by the prefix ordering. Our main result is a generalization of Hurewicz's theorem showing that a co-analytic subset of a quasi-Polish space is either quasi-Polish or else contains a countable $\Pi^0_2$-subset homeomorphic to one of these four spaces

Quasi-Polish Spaces

We investigate some basic descriptive set theory for countably based completely quasi-metrizable topological spaces, which we refer to as quasi-Polish spaces. These spaces naturally generalize much of the classical descriptive set theory of Polish spaces to the non-Hausdorff setting. We show that a subspace of a quasi-Polish space is quasi-Polish if and only if it is level \Pi_2 in the Borel hierarchy. Quasi-Polish spaces can be characterized within the framework of Type-2 Theory of Effectivity as precisely the countably based spaces that have an admissible representation with a Polish domain. They can also be characterized domain theoretically as precisely the spaces that are homeomorphic to the subspace of all non-compact elements of an \omega-continuous domain. Every countably based locally compact sober space is quasi-Polish, hence every \omega-continuous domain is quasi-Polish. A metrizable space is quasi-Polish if and only if it is Polish. We show that the Borel hierarchy on an uncountable quasi-Polish space does not collapse, and that the Hausdorff-Kuratowski theorem generalizes to all quasi-Polish spaces

Bion Theory: an answer to the question Why is there Something rather than Nothing?

Why is there something rather than nothing? This paper explores one particular argument in favor of the answer that 'the existence of nothing' would amount to a logical contradiction. This argument consists of positing the existence of a novel entity, called a bion, of which all contingent things can be composed yet itself is non-contingent. First an overview of historical attempts to compile a systematic and exhaustive list of answers to the question is presented as context. Then follows an analysis of how the antropic principle would manifest itself in a world that consists of information and at the same time conforms to modal realism. Next, a thought experiment introduces bions as the foundation of such a world, showing how under these circumstances the ultimate origin of all existing things would be explained. The non-contingent nature of bions themselves is subsequently argued via a discussion of the principle of non-contradiction. Finally, this theory centered on the existence of bions is integrated into the worldview of Popperian metaphysics. According to the latter's criteria, I conclude that bion theory provides an integral answer to why there is something rather than nothing