Individual Preferences, Monetary Gambles and the Equity Premium

We argue that narrow framing, whereby an agent who is offered a new gamble evaluates that gamble in isolation, separately from other risks she already faces, may be a more important feature of decision-making under risk than previously realized. To demonstrate this, we present evidence on typical attitudes to independent monetary gambles with both large and small stakes and show that across a wide range of utility functions, including all expected utility and many non-expected utility specifications, the only ones that can easily capture these attitudes are precisely those exhibiting narrow framing. Our analysis also makes predictions about the kinds of preferences that might be able to address the stock market participation and equity premium puzzles. We illustrate these predictions in simple portfolio choice and equilibrium settings.

Closing a mental account: the realization effect for gains and losses

How do risk attitudes change after experiencing gains or losses? For the case of losses, Imas (Am Econ Rev 106:2086–2109, 2016) shows that subsequent risk-taking behavior depends on whether these losses have been realized or not. After a realized loss, individuals’ risk-taking decreases, whereas it increases after an unrealized (paper) loss. He refers to this asymmetry as the realization effect. In this study, we derive theoretical predictions for risk-taking after paper and realized gains, and for investment opportunities with different skewness. We experimentally test these predictions and, at the same time, replicate Imas’ original study. Independent of a prior gain or loss, we show that subsequent risk-taking is higher when outcomes remain unrealized. However, we find no evidence of a realization effect for non-positively skewed lotteries. While the first result suggests that the effect is more general, the second result reveals its boundary conditions

The risk perceptions of individual investors

Risk perceptions of individual investors are studied by asking experimental questions to 2,226 members of a consumer panel. Their responses are analyzed in order to find which risk measures they implicitly use. We find that most investors implicitly use more than one risk measure. For those investors who systematically perceive risk according to the same risk measure, semi-variance of returns is most popular. Semi-variance is similar to variance, but only negative deviations fro the mean or another benchmark are taken into account. Stock investors implicitly choose for semi-variance as a risk measure, while bond investors favor probability of loss. Investors state that they consider the original investment to be the most important benchmark, followed by the risk-free rate of return, and the market return. However, their choices in the experimental questionnaire study reveal that the market return is the most important benchmark

Behavioral Finance

Behavioral finance studies the application of psychology to finance, with a focus on individual-level cognitive biases. I describe here the sources of judgment and decision biases, how they affect trading and market prices, the role of arbitrage and flows of wealth between more rational and less rational investors, how firms exploit inefficient prices and incite misvaluation, and the effects of managerial judgment biases. There is need for more theory and testing of the effects of feelings on financial decisions and aggregate outcomes. Especially, the time has come to move beyond behavioral finance to social finance, which studies the structure of social interactions, how financial ideas spread and evolve, and how social processes affect financial outcomes

Momentum and the Disposition Effect: The Role of Individual Investors

We hypothesize that disposition effect-induced momentum documented in Grinblatt and Han (2005) should be stronger in stocks with greater individual investors’ presence since individual investors are more prone to the disposition effect. We find strong evidence for our hypothesis for a large sample of NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks from the end of 1980 to 2005. Our results hold across different momentum strategies using alternative ways of defining individual investors’ presence in a stock and maintain even after controlling for variables known to drive momentum. Furthermore, we find that our results are stronger for hard-to-value stocks consistent with the findings of Kumar (2009).Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/79368/1/j.1755-053X.2010.01107.x.pd