Climato-economic context of regional crime and corruption across the Russian Federation

Cross-national research claims that the crime-and-corruption gap between relatively poor and relatively rich countries is larger in more demanding climates that require more cash and capital to cope with the climate. However, this claim is premature because countries differ in many confounding ways including histories and politics. We, therefore, re-tested the climato-economic context of violent crime and corruption within Russia, a country with considerable regional differences in climate and income. Across the eighty-five administrative units of Russia, the crime-and corruption gap between relatively poor and relatively rich regions is smaller in more demanding climates. Harsher climates are so strongly associated with higher crime levels that the potential influence of differences in wealth becomes negligible. Furthermore, harsher climates are so strongly associated with higher corruption rates in poorer regions but lower corruption rates in richer regions that the potential influence of the climatic demands as such becomes negligible

Social capital and the COVID-19 pandemic threat: The Russian experience

Social capital is an important resource for the wellbeing of both the individual and society. Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, many studies have been conducted to explore the role of social capital in coping with the negative consequences of the pandemic. However, how the pandemic itself can affect the social capital of people has yet to be studied. Try to fill this gap, we aimed at testing the association between the individually perceived coronavirus threat and such indicators of social capital as general social trust, institutional trust, and the quality of various types of people's social relationships (with family, friends, colleagues, neighbors, residents of a locality, residents of a country). Data were collected in different regions of the Russian Federation for a convenience sample of 500 respondents. The study found that the individually perceived coronavirus threat was positively associated with institutional trust, but not with general social trust. Moreover, this covariation was moderated by age: an institutional trust-threat relation emerged only in older respondents with an average age of around 60, but not in younger participants. Furthermore, the study found that perceived coronavirus threat was associated with closer relationships in the family, but simultaneously with an increased distance in relations with neighbors and residents of the respondents' locality. In summary, the study indicated that “strong” ties (i.e., with family, colleagues, and friends) either remained unchanged or were intensified in the face of the pandemic threat, whereas “weak” ties (i.e., with neighbors, residents of the same locality, and fellow citizens) tended to weaken even more

Individual and culture-level components of survey response styles: a multi-level analysis using cultural models of selfhood

Variations in acquiescence and extremity pose substantial threats to the validity of cross-cultural research that relies on survey methods. Individual and cultural correlates of response styles when using two contrasting types of response mode were investigated, drawing on data from 55 cultural groups across 33 nations. Using seven dimensions of self-other relatedness that have often been confounded within the broader distinction between independence and interdependence, our analysis yields more specific understandings of both individual- and culture-level variations in response style. When using a Likert scale response format, acquiescence is strongest among individuals seeing themselves as similar to others, and where cultural models of selfhood favour harmony, similarity with others and receptiveness to influence. However, when using Schwartz’s (2007) portrait-comparison response procedure, acquiescence is strongest among individuals seeing themselves as self-reliant but also connected to others, and where cultural models of selfhood favour self-reliance and self-consistency. Extreme responding varies less between the two types of response modes, and is most prevalent among individuals seeing themselves as self-reliant, and in cultures favouring self-reliance. Since both types of response mode elicit distinctive styles of response, it remains important to estimate and control for style effects to ensure valid comparisons

Being oneself through time: bases of self-continuity across 55 cultures

Self-continuity – the sense that one’s past, present, and future are meaningfully connected – is considered a defining feature of personal identity. However, bases of self-continuity may depend on cultural beliefs about personhood. In multilevel analyses of data from 7287 adults from 55 cultural groups in 33 nations, we tested a new tripartite theoretical model of bases of self-continuity. As expected, perceptions of stability, sense of narrative, and associative links to one’s past each contributed to predicting the extent to which people derived a sense of self-continuity from different aspects of their identities. Ways of constructing self-continuity were moderated by cultural and individual differences in mutable (vs. immutable) personhood beliefs – the belief that human attributes are malleable. Individuals with lower mutability beliefs based self-continuity more on stability; members of cultures where mutability beliefs were higher based self-continuity more on narrative. Bases of self-continuity were also moderated by cultural variation in contextualized (vs. decontextualized) personhood beliefs, indicating a link to cultural individualism-collectivism. Our results illustrate the cultural flexibility of the motive for self-continuity

Beyond the ‘East-West’ dichotomy: global variation in cultural models of selfhood

Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) theory of independent and interdependent self-construals had a major influence on social, personality, and developmental psychology by highlighting the role of culture in psychological processes. However, research has relied excessively on contrasts between North American and East Asian samples, and commonly used self-report measures of independence and interdependence frequently fail to show predicted cultural differences. We revisited the conceptualization and measurement of independent and interdependent self-construals in 2 large-scale multinational surveys, using improved methods for cross-cultural research. We developed (Study 1: N = 2924 students in 16 nations) and validated across cultures (Study 2: N = 7279 adults from 55 cultural groups in 33 nations) a new 7-dimensional model of self-reported ways of being independent or interdependent. Patterns of global variation support some of Markus and Kitayama’s predictions, but a simple contrast between independence and interdependence does not adequately capture the diverse models of selfhood that prevail in different world regions. Cultural groups emphasize different ways of being both independent and interdependent, depending on individualism-collectivism, national socioeconomic development, and religious heritage. Our 7-dimensional model will allow future researchers to test more accurately the implications of cultural models of selfhood for psychological processes in diverse ecocultural contexts

Institutional trust and economic coping strategies in response to sanctions: The case of Russia and Iran

Sanctions are now an established feature of the economic landscape in Russia and Iran and may lead to economic insecurity and distrust of political bodies among citizens of these countries. However, few studies have investigated the way individuals cope with sanctions and if their coping strategy relates to their trust in institutions. To address this gap, we aimed to compare Russians and Iranians regarding their economic coping strategies (ECS) in response to sanctions and the relationship of these strategies with their institutional trust. Using a cross-sectional design, we administered surveys in Russia and Iran. The results indicated that Russians have higher institutional trust and lower degrees of utilizing ECS compared to Iranians. Furthermore, we found that lower institutional trust is related to more use of overall ECS among Russians, but not Iranians. When we examined each coping strategy separately, we found that Russians with lower institutional trust relied more on seeking extra work, cutting expenses, and resorting to social and material resources for dealing with sanctions, while in Iran, this relationship was observed for cutting expenses and modern investments. We concluded that in Russia, financial insecurity induced by sanctions may have impacted institutional trust for low-income individuals that have been pressed to use certain strategies, while in Iran, the link between cutting expenses, modern investments, and institutional trust may be better explained by reduced life satisfaction and strict regulation of some investing activities

intercultural relations in Kabardino-Balkaria: does integration always lead to subjective well-being?

This article examines intercultural relations in Kabardino-Balkaria. Among a great number of ethnic groups living in Kabardino-Balkaria, Kabardians and Balkars are one of the largest (they are so-called titular ethnic groups). Russians are the second largest of the ethnic groups after Kabardians. We report here the results of an empirical study of the intercultural relations, mutual acculturation, and adaptation of Kabardians and Balkars (N = 285) and Russians (N = 249). Specifically, we examine the relevance of three hypotheses formulated to understand intercultural relations: the multiculturalism hypothesis, the integration hypothesis, and the contact hypothesis. We conducted path analysis in AMOS with two samples: a sample of Russians and a sample of the two main ethnic groups (Kabardians and Balkars), and we further compared the path models with each other. The results revealed significant effects of security, intercultural contacts, multicultural ideology, acculturation strategies, and acculturation expectations on attitudes, life satisfaction, and self-esteem in both samples. These findings partially confirm the three hypotheses in both groups. However, we also identified a regionally specific pattern. We found that, in the Russian sample, the integration strategy was negatively related to wellbeing, while contact with the dominant ethnic group was positively related to well-being. At the same time, in the sample of Kabardians and Balkars, acculturation expectations of integration and assimilation were positively related to well-being. In the article, we discuss these regional specifics. Keywords: acculturation strategies/expectations, intercultural contact, intercultural relations, multicultural ideology, life satisfaction, perceived security, perceived discrimination/threat, ethnic tolerance In our study, we sought to verify three hypotheses of intercultural relations (the multiculturalism hypothesis, the integration hypothesis, and the contact hypothesis)

Random polytopes obtained by matrices with heavy-tailed entries

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