VANET Connectivity Analysis

Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) are a peculiar subclass of mobile ad hoc networks that raise a number of technical challenges, notably from the point of view of their mobility models. In this paper, we provide a thorough analysis of the connectivity of such networks by leveraging on well-known results of percolation theory. By means of simulations, we study the influence of a number of parameters, including vehicle density, proportion of equipped vehicles, and radio communication range. We also study the influence of traffic lights and roadside units. Our results provide insights on the behavior of connectivity. We believe this paper to be a valuable framework to assess the feasibility and performance of future applications relying on vehicular connectivity in urban scenarios

Strategic Network Formation with Attack and Immunization

Strategic network formation arises where agents receive benefit from connections to other agents, but also incur costs for forming links. We consider a new network formation game that incorporates an adversarial attack, as well as immunization against attack. An agent's benefit is the expected size of her connected component post-attack, and agents may also choose to immunize themselves from attack at some additional cost. Our framework is a stylized model of settings where reachability rather than centrality is the primary concern and vertices vulnerable to attacks may reduce risk via costly measures. In the reachability benefit model without attack or immunization, the set of equilibria is the empty graph and any tree. The introduction of attack and immunization changes the game dramatically; new equilibrium topologies emerge, some more sparse and some more dense than trees. We show that, under a mild assumption on the adversary, every equilibrium network with $n$ agents contains at most $2n-4$ edges for $n\geq 4$. So despite permitting topologies denser than trees, the amount of overbuilding is limited. We also show that attack and immunization don't significantly erode social welfare: every non-trivial equilibrium with respect to several adversaries has welfare at least as that of any equilibrium in the attack-free model. We complement our theory with simulations demonstrating fast convergence of a new bounded rationality dynamic which generalizes linkstable best response but is considerably more powerful in our game. The simulations further elucidate the wide variety of asymmetric equilibria and demonstrate topological consequences of the dynamics e.g. heavy-tailed degree distributions. Finally, we report on a behavioral experiment on our game with over 100 participants, where despite the complexity of the game, the resulting network was surprisingly close to equilibrium.Comment: The short version of this paper appears in the proceedings of WINE-1

Centrality Analysis in Vehicular Networks

To better understand networking and security aspects of VANETs, we have been investigating network connectivity issues and mappings of car networks to the underlying road topology. Using this mapping and various metrics based on centrality, we locate hot-spots in vehicular networks to determine the most vulnerable points for jamming. We also use these to optimize the placement of roadside units

Maximum Power Game as a Physical and Social Extension of Classical Games

We consider an electric circuit in which the players participate as resistors and adjust their resistance in pursuit of individual maximum power. The maximum power game(MPG) becomes very complicated in a circuit which is indecomposable into serial/parallel components, yielding a nontrivial power distribution at equilibrium. Depending on the circuit topology, MPG covers a wide range of phenomena: from a social dilemma in which the whole group loses to a well-coordinated situation in which the individual pursuit of power promotes the collective outcomes. We also investigate a situation where each player in the circuit has an intrinsic heat waste. Interestingly, it is this individual inefficiency which can keep them from the collective failure in power generation. When coping with an efficient opponent with small intrinsic resistance, a rather inefficient player gets more power than efficient one. A circuit with multiple voltage inputs forms the network-based maximum power game. One of our major interests is to figure out, in what kind of the networks the pursuit for private power leads to greater total power. It turns out that the circuits with the scale-free structure is one of the good candidates which generates as much power as close to the possible maximum total.ope

MBotCS: A mobile botnet detection system based on machine learning

As the use of mobile devices spreads dramatically, hackers have started making use of mobile botnets to steal user information or perform other malicious attacks. To address this problem, in this paper we propose a mobile botnet detection system, called MBotCS. MBotCS can detect mobile device traffic indicative of the presence of a mobile botnet based on prior training using machine learning techniques. Our approach has been evaluated using real mobile device traffic captured from Android mobile devices, running normal apps and mobile botnets. In the evaluation, we investigated the use of 5 machine learning classifier algorithms and a group of machine learning box algorithms with different validation schemes. We have also evaluated the effect of our approach with respect to its effect on the overall performance and battery consumption of mobile devices

Distributed Stochastic Power Control in Ad-hoc Networks: A Nonconvex Case

Utility-based power allocation in wireless ad-hoc networks is inherently nonconvex because of the global coupling induced by the co-channel interference. To tackle this challenge, we first show that the globally optimal point lies on the boundary of the feasible region, which is utilized as a basis to transform the utility maximization problem into an equivalent max-min problem with more structure. By using extended duality theory, penalty multipliers are introduced for penalizing the constraint violations, and the minimum weighted utility maximization problem is then decomposed into subproblems for individual users to devise a distributed stochastic power control algorithm, where each user stochastically adjusts its target utility to improve the total utility by simulated annealing. The proposed distributed power control algorithm can guarantee global optimality at the cost of slow convergence due to simulated annealing involved in the global optimization. The geometric cooling scheme and suitable penalty parameters are used to improve the convergence rate. Next, by integrating the stochastic power control approach with the back-pressure algorithm, we develop a joint scheduling and power allocation policy to stabilize the queueing systems. Finally, we generalize the above distributed power control algorithms to multicast communications, and show their global optimality for multicast traffic.Comment: Contains 12 pages, 10 figures, and 2 tables; work submitted to IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computin

Information metrics for model selection in function estimation

A model selection framework is presented for function estimation under limited information, where only a small set of (noisy) data points are available for inferring the nonconvex unknown function of interest. The framework introduces information-theoretic metrics which quantify model complexity and are used in a multi-objective formulation of the function estimation problem. The intricate relationship between information obtained through observations and model complexity is investigated. The framework is applied to the hyperparameter selection problem in Gaussian Process Regression. As a result of its generality, the framework introduced is applicable to a variety of settings and practical problems with information limitations such as channel estimation, black-box optimisation, and dual control

An Information-Based Learning Approach to Dual Control

Dual control aims to concurrently learn and control an unknown system. However, actively learning the system conflicts directly with any given control objective for it will disturb the system during exploration. This paper presents a receding horizon approach to dual control, where a multiobjective optimization problem is solved repeatedly and subject to constraints representing system dynamics. Balancing a standard finite-horizon control objective, a knowledge gain objective is defined to explicitly quantify the information acquired when learning the system dynamics. Measures from information theory, such as entropy-based uncertainty, Fisher information, and relative entropy, are studied and used to quantify the knowledge gained as a result of the control actions. The resulting iterative framework is applied to Markov decision processes and discrete-time nonlinear systems. Thus, the broad applicability and usefulness of the presented approach is demonstrated in diverse problem settings. The framework is illustrated with multiple numerical examples

Collusion of operators in wireless spectrum markets

The liberalization of wireless spectrum markets has been envisioned as a method for improving mobile communication services and accommodating the increasing traffic volumes of wireless users. It has been assumed that competition among operators will foster optimal utilization of wireless spectrum and ensure the provision of cost-efficient wireless services to users. However, spectrum markets often function inefficiently due to collusion of the operators. Although it is illegal and detrimental to users, such phenomena are often observed in real life as, for example, in the form of implicit price fixing. This results in a de-facto monopoly in the spectrum market to the detriment of the users. In this paper, we consider a general wireless spectrum market where a set of operators sell bandwidth to a large population of users. We use an evolutionary game model to capture the user dynamics in the presence of limited market information and analyze the interaction of the operators using coalitional game theory. We define a partition formation game in order to rigorously study the conditions that render the grand coalition (emergence of monopoly) stable under various stability notions. The results obtained provide a foundation for effective measures against operator collusion by altering the underlying motivations rather than fighting against the symptoms through law enforcement. © 2012 IFIP