The Potential of Diaspora Groups to Contribute to Peace Building: A Scoping Paper.

YesThis paper is a preliminary consideration of the question of how Diaspora from Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sierra Leone could contribute to peace building in their home states. Often Diasporas are regarded as obstacles to peace building, so it is not the assumption of this scoping paper that the relationship between Diasporas and peace building will always be positive. That being said, neither does the paper make the assumption that the Diaspora are homogenous groups that behave in consistent and coordinated ways. The aim is to consider what scope there is for tapping into more positive elements of Diaspora relations with their homelands as they emerge from conflict

Contending cultures of counterterrorism: transatlantic divergence or convergence?

Terrorist attacks on the United States, Spain and the United Kingdom have underlined the differing responses of Europe and the United States to the 'new terrorism'. This article analyses these responses through the prism of historically determined strategic cultures. For the last four years the United States has directed the full resources of a 'national security' approach towards this threat and has emphasized unilateralism. Europe, based on its own past experience of terrorism, has adopted a regulatory approach pursued through multilateralism. These divergences in transatlantic approaches, with potentially major implications for the future of the relationship, have appeared to be mitigated by a revised American strategy of counterterrorism that has emerged during 2005. However, this article contends that while strategic doctrines may change, the more immutable nature of strategic culture will make convergence difficult. This problem will be compounded by the fact that neither Europe nor America have yet addressed the deeper connections between terrorism and the process of globalization

The Impact of Mercenaries and Private Military and Security Companies on Civil War Severity between 1946 and 2002

Research has long abandoned the view that only states wage war. On the contrary, civil war research has produced an impressive body of literature on violent non-state actors. Still, a particular group of actors—mercenaries—has been widely neglected so far, although they have participated in numerous conflicts in the second half of the twentieth century. Whether their presence aggravated or improved the situation is a matter of dispute. Some believe that the additional military capabilities provided by mercenaries help to end civil wars quickly without increased bloodshed, while others deem mercenaries greedy and bloodthirsty combatants who contribute to making civil wars more brutal, while a third opinion differentiates between different types of mercenaries. This article tests the impact of mercenaries on civil war severity. The evidence indicates that the presence of both mercenaries and private military and security contractors increases its severity

A comparison of the conventional arms transfer policies and practices of the Carter and Reagan administrations 1977-1985

This thesis compares and contrasts the declaratory and operational conventional arms transfer policies of the Carter and Regan Administrations. It investigates why the two President's declaratory policies were so different, but their operational policies so similar. Several factors account for this similarity in operation, key amongst which is the role of the bureaucracy as the implementor of arms transfer policy. Within the Carter Administration there were political appointees and bureaucrats opposed to the policy of arms transfer restraint (PD 13) introduced in May 1977. These two groups eroded the PD 13 policy from above and below. Political appointees had an important role in judging significant arms transfer requests and from the outset, these seuqential decisions undermined the PD 13 policy. The role of bureaucrats was particularly important in dealing with the day-to-day operation of the policy. The Reagan Administration's arms transfer policy was very different to its predecessors and stressed the positive role that such transfers could play. This led to expectations of increased sales. However, transfer levels did not increase dramatically. Once again the role of the bureaucracy was important, in particular a group of officials charged with protecting against loss of sensitive technology to the Soviet Union. This group vetoed certain arms sales and acted as an inhibitor on transfers. The theoretical thrust of this thesis concerns implementation theory. Through the case studies outlined above the applicability of implementation theory as an explanation of foreign policy outcomes is examined.</p