Wielding the sword: President Xi’s new anti-corruption campaign

A state achieves legitimacy through multiple sources, one of which is the effectiveness of its governance. Generations of scholars since Hobbes have identified the maintenance of peace and order as core functions of a legitimate state. In the modern world, economic prosperity, social stability and effective control of corruption often provide adequate compensation for a deficit of democracy. Corruption closely correlates with legitimacy. While a perceived pervasive, endemic corruption undermines the legitimacy of a regime, a successful anti-corruption campaign can allow a regime to recover from a crisis of legitimacy (Gilley 2009; Seligson and Booth 2009). This is the rationale behind the periodical campaigns against corruption that have been conducted by the Chinese Communist Party (‘Party’ or ‘CCP’) (Manion 2004; Wedeman 2012). Political leaders in China have found it expedient to use anti-corruption campaigns to remove their political foes, to rein in the bureaucracy and to restore public confidence in their ability to rule. Through anti-corruption campaigns, emerging political leaders consolidate their political power, secure loyalty from political factions and regional political forces, and enhance their legitimacy in the eyes of the general public. In an authoritarian state that experiences a high level of corruption, an anti-corruption campaign is a delicate political battle that addresses two significant concerns. The first concern is to orchestrate the campaign so that it is regime-reinforcing instead of regime-undermining. To remain credible, the regime must demonstrate its willingness and capacity to punish corrupt officials at the highest levels.preprin

Is it Fair to Treat China as a Christmas Tree to Hang Everybody’s Complaints? Putting its Own Energy Saving into Perspective

China had been the world’s second largest carbon emitter for years. Recent studies show that China had overtaken the U.S. as the world’s largest emitter in 2007. This has put China on the spotlight, just at a time when the world community starts negotiating a post-Kyoto climate regime under the Bali Roadmap. China seems to become such a Christmas tree on which everybody can hang his/her complaints. This paper first discusses whether such a critics is fair by examining China’s own efforts towards energy saving, the widespread use of renewable energy and participation in clean development mechanism. Next, the paper puts carbon reductions of China’s unilateral actions into perspective by examining whether the estimated greenhouse gas emission reduction from meeting the country’s national energy saving goal is achieved from China’s unilateral actions or mainly with support from the clean development mechanism projects. Then the paper discusses how far developing country commitments can go in an immediate post-2012 climate regime, thus pointing out the direction and focus of future international climate negotiations. Finally, emphasizing that China needs to act as a large and responsible developing country and take due responsibilities and to set a good example to the majority of developing countries, the paper articulates what can be expected from China to illustrate that China can be a good partner in combating global climate change

Assessing China's Energy Conservation and Carbon Intensity: How will the Future Differ from the Past?

As an important step towards building a 'harmonious society' through 'scientific development', China has incorporated for the first time in its five-year economic plan an energy input indicator as a constraint. While it achieved a quadrupling of its GDP while cutting its energy intensity by about three quarters between 1980 and 2000, China has had limited success in achieving its own 20% energy-saving goal set for 2010 to date. Despite this great challenge at home, just prior to the Copenhagen climate summit, China pledged to cut its carbon intensity by 40-45% by 2020 relative its 2005 levels to help to reach an international climate change agreement at Copenhagen or beyond. This raises the issue of whether such a pledge is ambitious or just represents business as usual. To put China's climate pledge into perspective, this paper examines whether this proposed carbon intensity goal for 2020 is as challenging as the energy-saving goals set in the current 11th five-year economic blueprint, to what extent it drives China's emissions below its projected baseline levels, and whether China will fulfill its part of a coordinated global commitment to stabilize the concentration of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere at the desirable level. Given that China's pledge is in the form of carbon intensity, the paper shows that GDP figures are even more crucial to the impacts on the energy or carbon intensity than are energy consumption and emissions data by examining the revisions of China's GDP figures and energy consumption in recent years. Moreover, the paper emphasizes that China's proposed carbon intensity target not only needs to be seen as ambitious, but more importantly it needs to be credible. Given that China has shifted control over resources and decision making to local governments as the result of the economic reforms during the past three decades, the paper argues the need to carefully examine those objective and subjective factors that lead to the lack of local official's cooperation on the environment, and concludes that their cooperation, and strict implementation and coordination of the policies and measures enacted are of paramount importance to meeting China's existing energy-saving goal in 2010, its proposed carbon intensity target in 2020 and whatever climate commitments beyond 2020 that China may take

Programs, Prices and Policies Towards Energy Conservation and Environmental Quality in China

China has gradually recognized that the conventional path of encouraging economic growth at the expense of the environment cannot be sustained. It has to be changed. This article focuses on Chinas efforts towards energy conservation and environmental quality. The article discusses a variety of programs, prices, market-based instruments, and other economic and industrial policies and measures targeted for energy saving and pollution cutting, and the associated implementation and reliability issues. The article ends with some concluding remarks and recommendations

Relevant, or irrelevant, external factors in panic buying

In view of panic buying prevalence across countries during the COVID 19 pandemic, this study explores the external factors that may influence consumer engagement or disengagement with this buying behaviour and how they are related. Two studies were undertaken to achieve this research aim. The first was to explore these factors through a scale development processes. Three factors were revealed including (1) intervention and support from the government to combat and manage the pandemic, (2) intervention and support from businesses to prevent stockpiling or panic buying, and (3) influence of different categories of social groups, namely, family and relatives, peers and friends, acquaintance and non-acquainted social-media group. The second study collected data from five countries (Australia, India, China, Vietnam and Indonesia) to understand the relationship between these factors and panic buying engagement or disengagement. The rationale for the country choices has been provided in this manuscript. The results show that interventions and support from government and businesses influenced panic buying engagement, whereas social groups did not. Implications of these findings are highlighted for the relevant stakeholders

Breaking the Impasse in International Climate Negotiations: A New Direction for Currently Flawed Negotiations and a Roadmap for China to 2050

China's unilateral pledge to cut its carbon intensity by 40-45 percent by 2020 relative to its 2005 levels raises both the stringency issue, and given that China's pledge is in the form of carbon intensity, reliability issues concerning China's statistics on energy and GDP. Moreover, as long as China's commitments differ in form from those of other major greenhouse gas emitters, China is constantly confronted with both criticism on its carbon intensity commitment being less stringent and the threats of trade measures. In response to these concerns and to put China in a positive position, this paper will map out a realistic roadmap for China's specific climate commitments towards 2050, with its main distinguishing features including China taking on absolute emission caps around 2030 and the three transitional periods of increasing climate obligations before that. With current international climate negotiations flawed with a focus on commitments on the targeted date of 2020 that does not accommodate well the world's two largest greenhouse gas emitters, the paper suggests a new direction to break the current impasse in international climate negotiations

Policies and Measures to Mitigate Potential Environmental Impacts of Cross-Border Infrastructure Projects in Asia

While bringing positive impacts and benefits, cross-border infrastructure projects face additional challenges relative to national projects. Moreover, such projects involve a variety of technical, regulatory, institutional, and legal factors, and their obstacles constrain the development of cross-border infrastructure projects. This paper argues that proper technical specifications and well-functioning regulatory, institutional and legislative/legal frameworks with clearer lines of oversight are crucial to getting such projects off the ground in the first place and to ensure that they operate properly and reliably while minimizing their environmental impacts. It is pointed out that many issues in theses areas need to be addressed at the national level. The paper concludes that such domestic efforts, coupled with regional frameworks and arrangements wherever necessary, will promote the further development of cross-border infrastructure projects