Polar Environmental Monitoring

The present and projected benefits of the polar regions were reviewed and then translated into information needs in order to support the array of polar activities anticipated. These needs included measurement sensitivities for polar environmental data (ice/snow, atmosphere, and ocean data for integrated support) and the processing and delivery requirements which determine the effectiveness of environmental services. An assessment was made of how well electromagnetic signals can be converted into polar environmental information. The array of sensor developments in process or proposed were also evaluated as to the spectral diversity, aperture sizes, and swathing capabilities available to provide these measurements from spacecraft, aircraft, or in situ platforms. Global coverage and local coverage densification options were studied in terms of alternative spacecraft trajectories and aircraft flight paths

Stochastic dominance equilibria in two-person noncooperative games

Two-person noncooperative games with finitely many pure strategies and ordinal preferences over pure outcomes are considered, in which probability distributions resulting from mixed strategies are evaluated according to t-degree stochastic dominance. A t-best reply is a strategy that induces a t-degree stochastically undominated distribution, and a t-equilibrium is a pair of t-best replies. The paper provides a characterization and existence proofs of t-equilibria in terms of representing utility functions, and shows that for t becoming large-which can be interpreted as the players becoming more risk averse-behavior converges to a specific form of max-min play. More precisely, this means that in the limit each player puts all weight on a strategy that maximizes the worst outcome for the opponent, within the supports of the strategies in the limiting sequenceof t-equilibria.microeconomics ;

Revision of conjectures about the opponent's utilities in signaling games.

In this paper we apply the concept of preference conjecture equilibrium introduced in Perea (2003) to signaling games and show its relation to sequential equilibrium. Furthermore, we introduce the concept of minimum revision equilibrium and show how this can be interpreted as a refinement of sequential equilibrium. We also present a method to compute preference conjecture equilibria.econometrics;

Plasma and milk oxytetracycline levels in post parturient sows

Plasma and milk samples were collected from three sows injected with LA 200 at 4 hours after injection and at 24-hour intervals thereafter. The single dose was calculated at 1 ml/22 pounds.; Swine Day, Manhattan, KS, November 12, 198