Episodic future thinking in generalized anxiety disorder

Research on future-oriented cognition in generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) has primarily focused on worry, while less is known about the role of episodic future thinking (EFT), an imagery-based cognitive process. To characterize EFT in this disorder, we used the experimental recombination procedure, in which 21 GAD and 19 healthy participants simulated positive, neutral and negative novel future events either once or repeatedly, and rated their phenomenological experience of EFT. Results showed that healthy controls spontaneously generated more detailed EFT over repeated simulations. Both groups found EFT easier to generate after repeated simulations, except when GAD participants simulated positive events. They also perceived higher plausibility of negative-not positive or neutral-future events than did controls. These results demonstrate a negativity bias in GAD individuals' episodic future cognition, and suggest their relative deficit in generating vivid EFT. We discuss implications for the theory and treatment of GAD.R01 MH060941 - NIMH NIH HHS; R01 MH078308 - NIMH NIH HHS; R01AG08441 - NIA NIH HHS; R01 AT007257 - NCCIH NIH HHS; R01MH60941 - NIMH NIH HHS; R01 AG008441 - NIA NIH HHS; R34 MH099311 - NIMH NIH HHS; R21MH102646 - NIMH NIH HHS; R01AT007257 - NCCIH NIH HHS; R21 MH102646 - NIMH NIH HHS; R34MH078308 - NIMH NIH HH

fMRI Evidence for Separable and Lateralized Prefrontal Memory Monitoring Processes

Source memory research suggests that attempting to remember specific contextual aspects surrounding prior stimulus encounters results in greater left prefrontal cortex (PFC) activity than simple item-based old/new recognition judgments. Here, we tested a complementary hypothesis that predicts increases in the right PFC with tasks requiring close monitoring of item familiarity. More specifically, we compared a judgment of frequency (JOF) task to an item memory task, in which the former required estimating the number of previous picture encounters and the latter required discriminating old from new exemplars of previously seen items. In comparison to standard old/new recognition, both source memory and the JOF task examined here require more precise mnemonic judgments. However, in contrast to source memory, cognitive models suggest the JOF task relies heavily upon item familiarity, not specific contextual recollections. Event-related fMRI demonstrated greater recruitment of right, not left, dorso-lateral and frontopolar PFC regions during the JOF compared to item memory task. These data suggest a role for right PFC in the close monitoring of the familiarity of objects, which becomes critical when contextual recollection is ineffective in satisfying a memory demand.Psycholog

Memory distortions: When suggestions cannot be easily ignored

In the present study, the persistence of personal false memories (FMs) after social feedback that denies their truth was assessed. Participants imitated actions performed by the experimenter (Session 1) and watched a doctored video with performed and critical “fake” actions (Session 2), followed by a memory rating and a recognition task. A few days later (Session 3), participants were clearly told that some memories were false and received daily reminders of the correct list of objects/actions before testing their memory again in Session 4. Results of both memory ratings and recognition indicated effective FM implantation. Interestingly, response times for correct rejections were longer for fake than true objects, suggesting participants struggled to ignore false suggestions. Crucial for our aim, Session 4 showed that FM persisted also after the debriefing and repeated presentations of correct list of objects/actions, suggesting that FMs for actions are rather difficult to discard

Spontaneous and deliberate future thinking: A dual process account

© 2019 Springer Nature.This is the final published version of an article published in Psychological Research, licensed under a Creative Commons Attri-bution 4.0 International License. Available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-019-01262-7.In this article, we address an apparent paradox in the literature on mental time travel and mind-wandering: How is it possible that future thinking is both constructive, yet often experienced as occurring spontaneously? We identify and describe two ‘routes’ whereby episodic future thoughts are brought to consciousness, with each of the ‘routes’ being associated with separable cognitive processes and functions. Voluntary future thinking relies on controlled, deliberate and slow cognitive processing. The other, termed involuntary or spontaneous future thinking, relies on automatic processes that allows ‘fully-fledged’ episodic future thoughts to freely come to mind, often triggered by internal or external cues. To unravel the paradox, we propose that the majority of spontaneous future thoughts are ‘pre-made’ (i.e., each spontaneous future thought is a re-iteration of a previously constructed future event), and therefore based on simple, well-understood, memory processes. We also propose that the pre-made hypothesis explains why spontaneous future thoughts occur rapidly, are similar to involuntary memories, and predominantly about upcoming tasks and goals. We also raise the possibility that spontaneous future thinking is the default mode of imagining the future. This dual process approach complements and extends standard theoretical approaches that emphasise constructive simulation, and outlines novel opportunities for researchers examining voluntary and spontaneous forms of future thinking.Peer reviewe

Deese-roediger-McDermott paradigm: Effect of previous recall and type of memory task

Pretendeu-se averiguar se a activação dos itens críticos no paradigma de Deese-Roediger-McDermott também ocorreria numa tarefa de completamento. Para analisar a contaminação explícita explorámos a existência de resultados dissociados em função da manipulação do nível de processamento. Na tarefa de completamento, a primação semântica foi estatisticamente superior à primação directa. A ausência do efeito do nível de processamento demonstra que o teste foi de memória implícita. Também avaliámos o impacto de uma tarefa de evocação numa tarefa de memória posterior. Verificámos que a evocação prévia anulou o efeito do nível de processamento na tarefa de reconhecimento. Na tarefa de completamento de inícios de palavras, o incremento de inícios de palavras completados com associados só foi expressivo quando as palavras foram codificadas superficialmente.This study aimed to verifj whether lhe activation ofcritical items in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm ofproducing false memories could also occur in the word stem completion task. The finding that lhe levei ofprocessing did not seem to have any effect on the word stem completion task supported lhe conclusion that the stem completion task was in fact an irnplicit memory test. The impact of a previous recali in a followng memory task was also evaluated. The results indicated that lhe previous recall inhibited the effect ofthe processing levei in lhe recognition task. In the word stem completion task lhe increase ofstems completed with associates was only relevam when words were encoded superficialiy.(undefined

Risk-Sensitive Resource Defense in a Territorial Reef Fish

As coral reefs are home to dense aggregations of a variety of species, aggressive territoriality is often a critical component of individual behavior. Identification and assessment of the risk posed by intruders is crucial to defending a territory, and fishes on coral reefs have been found to attend to body shape, body size, and coloration when responding to intruders. We examined the extent to which dusky damselfish (Stegastes adustus) discriminate among distinct categories of intruders by measuring the distance at which a fish attacks an intruder and the relative intensity and frequency of those attacks. We found that S. adustus discriminated among perceived threats, attacking conspecifics more intensely and more often than egg-predators and herbivores, and showing a trend of attacking those groups more often than invertebrate-feeders, which do not compete with damselfish for resources. Furthermore, territory holders attacked initial-phase wrasses from a farther distance than terminal-phase wrasses, suggesting that they can discriminate among classes of individuals within a species other than their own. Dusky damselfish thus exhibit the ability to make fine distinctions among intruders in a diverse ecosystem

The Influence of Object Relative Size on Priming and Explicit Memory

We investigated the effects of object relative size on priming and explicit memory for color photos of common objects. Participants were presented with color photos of pairs of objects displayed in either appropriate or inappropriate relative sizes. Implicit memory was assessed by speed of object size ratings whereas explicit memory was assessed by an old/new recognition test. Study-to-test changes in relative size reduced both priming and explicit memory and had large effects for objects displayed in large vs. small size at test. Our findings of substantial size-specific influences on priming with common objects under some but not other conditions are consistent with instance views of object perception and priming but inconsistent with structural description views

True and intentionally fabricated memories

The aim of the experiment reported here was to investigate the processes underlying the construction of truthful and deliberately fabricated memories. Properties of memories created to be intentionally false - fabricated memories - were compared to properties of memories believed to be true - true memories. Participants recalled and then wrote or spoke true memories and fabricated memories of everyday events. It was found that true memories were reliably more vivid than fabricated memories and were nearly always recalled from a first person perspective. In contrast, fabricated differed from true memories in that they were judged to be reliably older, were more frequently recalled from a third person perspective, and linguistic analysis revealed that they required more cognitive effort to generate. No notable differences were found across modality of reporting. Finally, it was found that, intentionally fabricated memories were created by recalling and then ‘editing’ true memories. Overall, these findings show that true and fabricated memories systematically differ, despite the fact that both are based on true memories

Metacognition as Evidence for Evidentialism

Metacognition is the monitoring and controlling of cognitive processes. I examine the role of metacognition in ‘ordinary retrieval cases’, cases in which it is intuitive that via recollection the subject has a justified belief. Drawing on psychological research on metacognition, I argue that evidentialism has a unique, accurate prediction in each ordinary retrieval case: the subject has evidence for the proposition she justifiedly believes. But, I argue, process reliabilism has no unique, accurate predictions in these cases. I conclude that ordinary retrieval cases better support evidentialism than process reliabilism. This conclusion challenges several common assumptions. One is that non-evidentialism alone allows for a naturalized epistemology, i.e., an epistemology that is fully in accordance with scientific research and methodology. Another is that process reliabilism fares much better than evidentialism in the epistemology of memory

Sleep Loss Produces False Memories

People sometimes claim with high confidence to remember events that in fact never happened, typically due to strong semantic associations with actually encoded events. Sleep is known to provide optimal neurobiological conditions for consolidation of memories for long-term storage, whereas sleep deprivation acutely impairs retrieval of stored memories. Here, focusing on the role of sleep-related memory processes, we tested whether false memories can be created (a) as enduring memory representations due to a consolidation-associated reorganization of new memory representations during post-learning sleep and/or (b) as an acute retrieval-related phenomenon induced by sleep deprivation at memory testing. According to the Deese, Roediger, McDermott (DRM) false memory paradigm, subjects learned lists of semantically associated words (e.g., “night”, “dark”, “coal”,…), lacking the strongest common associate or theme word (here: “black”). Subjects either slept or stayed awake immediately after learning, and they were either sleep deprived or not at recognition testing 9, 33, or 44 hours after learning. Sleep deprivation at retrieval, but not sleep following learning, critically enhanced false memories of theme words. This effect was abolished by caffeine administration prior to retrieval, indicating that adenosinergic mechanisms can contribute to the generation of false memories associated with sleep loss